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1. INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis had far-reaching repercussions for cross-border 
economic activity. After a sharp and sudden collapse in international trade in the 
last quarter of 2008, world trade flows declined by about 12% in 2009 according 
to the WTO. This exceeded the estimated loss of 5.4% in world GDP during the 
same period. Two aspects of the global financial crisis are believed to be behind 
this large decline in international trade. One is determined by the producer side, as 
the financial crisis reduced the availability of bank loans for small and medium 
size firms. At least the credit costs were much higher. The higher credit spreads 
was as well the disadvantage for big corporates. In sum all firms and corporates 
were affected. As a direct consequence this situation negative influenced firms' 
production capacities. On the consumer side, the gloomy economic outlook led to 
a slowdown in global demand in general, and for imports in particular. The effects 
of these forces may very well have been amplified by disruptions to global 
production lines, and by inventory adjustments made by import firms and 
distributors. Both aspects together are based on the same fact: Globally, the banks 
reduced the credit capacity to the corporate strongly as they were very pessimistic 
in their credit evaluation about the future and had themselves liquidity problems. 
This reduced globally in the real economy the possibilities to finance the operation 
and growth (Campello et al. 2009).  
1.1.Bank crisis 
As banks in the developed countries had since decades no problems to get enough 
market liquidity or central bank financing, the impact was a new situation for the 
real economy world. Furthermore banks and credit insurers had no global sector 
insolvency risk and therefore were the financing source for the expansion of world 
trade. IMF-BAFT calculated the banks share in delivering short-term trade credit 
at 80 % of total trade finance (2009). This was done by offering letters of credit or 
guarantees with the merchandise as the collateral or financing open account 
receivables. This was routine business for the financial sector with low-default and 
therefore low-risk. But the situation was only new for firms in the “old world” 
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(OECD-countries). Africa, Latin-America even Asia had seen with the Indonesia 
crisis 1999 before a credit crunch. The effect was hard for the inhabitants of the 
relevant countries as both exports and imports had a time of stoppage. In the 
financial crisis 2008 in all counties globally the financial and trading communities 
were very much concerned about the availability of trade finance. To avoid the 
experienced local developments for the global world, the World Bank, IMF, 
regional development banks and private sector actors worked to identify possible 
market failures, developed spot best practice and had cooperative actions in crisis 
response (IMF 2003). WTO Members were already before aware of a possible 
banking crisis and documented at the fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún 
(2003) that "based mainly on experience gained in Asia and elsewhere, there is a 
need to improve the stability and security of sources of trade finance, especially to 
help deal with periods of financial crisis. Further efforts are needed by countries, 
intergovernmental organizations and all interested partners in the private sector, to 
explore ways and means to secure appropriate and predictable sources of trade 
finance, in particular in exceptional circumstances of financial crises". 
1.2. Global action  
Furthermore, the IMF and WTO analyzed the reasons for the financial crisis of 
emerging economies in Asia and Latin America in the years from 1997 to 2001 
and the reducing in trade finance. The IMF attributed such declines to "the 
response by banks as leveraged institutions, to the lack of insurance when it was 
needed, and to herd behaviour among banks, official export credit agencies 
(ECAs), and private insurers". Moreover, the banking systems in those countries 
were weak and were therefore not able to solve critical market and political 
situations. In addition trade finance was not deeply developed by the banks in the 
emerging countries: The IMF found therefore "the consolidation of the 
international banking sector in recent years may also have had a bearing on the 
decline in trade finance during recent crises". 
 
As the contraction in international trade finance was as well globally the case, the 
financial crisis 2008 lead to an oligopolistic behaviour of the banks with less 
capacities in trade finance and an increase in its cost (Malouche 2009). This 
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market condition has worsening the situation particularly for corporates that have 
low-margin products conjunct with a high export rate and those that need banking 
trade finance to handle ex- and imports. With limited access to securing and 
financing as well as due to higher trade finance costs, these producer and 
distributors have problems in maintaining in the existing markets. 
1.3.Economic aspects of corporate trade finance 
On the macro-level, the financial crisis of 2008 showed that trade volumes 
depended not only on the political situation and market structure of the physical 
products, but also on the health of the financial markets. Although the physical 
markets did not change their products, the banks and credit insurers were no longer 
able to support trade credit as they had done before the crisis. Therefore, the banks 
reduced their funding to the corporate world, particularly trade financing (ICC 
2010). Furthermore, credit insurers reduced many credit limits; in fact, the insurers 
sometimes reduced the limits of all of their customers in a specific sector, region 
or country. Non-bank investors also reduced their exposure, thus making it very 
difficult for corporates to obtain new equity. The negative development of the 
financial crisis could not be explained by the internal view of trade finance 
because the basic trade finance situation was unchanged. Furthermore, in 
comparison with corporate credit, trade credit still had at least three advantages: 
 It became a normal part of business in most product markets; 
 It was and remains available to companies of all sizes although small 
companies, especially those that are fast-growing, have a limited range of bank 
financing sources (Arnold  p. 424); and 
 There is a low default rate in trade finance.  
 
Concerning the last point, the International Chamber of Commerce, the ICC, 
designed in 2010 a register to collect performance data on trade and finance. The 
ICC register evaluated the trade finance instruments volume and performance 
between 2005 and 2009. Basis data are 5.2 million transactions with a face worth 
over USD 2.5 trillion. First results are that the guarantee and letter of credit trade 
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finance transactions had an average duration of about 80 days, and an insignificant 
default rate of close to zero. This did even not change in the global economic 
crisis: Out of 2.8 million transactions were 500 defaults counted. Furthermore, 
when a default happened, the recovery rate was in average 60% for all deliveries 
(ICC 2011 p. 15).  
1.4. The micro aspect  
On the micro-level the in-house management of corporates must be re-evaluated 
due to the experience of trade finance during the financial crisis. Before the 
financial crisis, nearly half of the companies never scored or comprehensively 
analyzed their portfolios of trade receivables, and less than 20 % of corporates 
performed this analysis on a systematic basis. Since the crisis, companies 
worldwide are missing opportunities to maximize their cash reserves and reduce 
their borrowing costs because of a failure to analyze and manage their customers’ 
overall creditworthiness and payment history (Wimley, S.C. study of the 
technology company Sungard and approximately 300 companies worldwide). 
Wimley stated that “Savvy CFOs (Chief Financial Officers) and corporate 
treasurers consider trade receivables as part of the capital structure of the 
organization. But how do you maximize the return on that capital and use trade 
receivables to generate cash? You have to start with some intelligence, some 
visibility and transparency as to what’s happening across the portfolio” (Wimley 
C.J. 2011). The micro optimization of trade receivables can be organized under 
three main topics: credit risk evaluation, avoidance of late payments, and 
outsourcing.  
1.5. First motivation for the paper: the micro level 
The motivation for the paper is to evaluate the changes that have taken place for 
corporate trade finance due to the financial crisis. To explore these it is necessary 
to document the historic development in that area as well as to understand the 
current use and values of corporate trade with its inherent economic values, risks 
and possibilities for improvement. A further motivation is the impact of the actual 
situation for the management of firms, which is explained by Joy as follows: 
“Management must evaluate the risk-return trade-off alluded to in the ratios. For 
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any particular sales level or range of sales levels, in general, the greater the firm’s 
current assets (CA)/ total assets (TA) ratio, the lower the firm’s risk and return. If 
the firm maintains a relatively high level of current assets (a high CA/TA ratio), it 
will have sufficient cash to pay all its bills as they come due” (Joy 1977 p. 410). 
Third, the interest in corporate trade finance is based on its macro-level impact for 
global trade. In detail, it is a question of whether the new banking regulations, 
Basel III, are an adequate reaction to the financial crisis.  
 
Based on these topics, the following research questions could be answered as well 
through this research study: 
A. Corporate trade finance on the micro level: How should corporates analyze the 
credit risk of their customers to avoid making unpaid deliveries? Is there a fixed 
mathematical model to evaluate the credit limit, or can bank models be used or 
adopted? How can a seller best use trade credits for internal handling, and when 
should they be outsourced? The manual handling of credit analysis and collections 
is very expensive. In addition, the inherent accounting procedures used to 
undertake the management of receivables in accordance with security and legal 
requirements are not inexpensive. They can add up to about 3 % of the sales’ face 
value (Bolero). The easiest way to avoid these costs is to outsource the process. 
This has already been done in the past, as trade finance or trade credit is 
historically and currently a bank business and corporates accept this split in order 
to concentrate on selling their products. However, corporates have better product 
knowledge and have the option of selling a product to another customer if the first 
buyer fails to honor payment. To date, there is no proven result as to whether the 
trade credit solution by a bank is better than that developed by a corporation. The 
markets are currently testing new solutions such as reverse factoring, in which 
banks add a credit line to short-term payments and thus enable the product buyer 
to receive a longer payment term. In reality, there are many options regarding the 
internal handling and outsourcing of these processes and best practice will differ 
with each seller. Beside the costs, the risk appetite, the size of the company, the 
market in which it operates, the customer portfolio, the sales strategy, the regional 
structure and the outsourcing price will all have an influence on the best option.  
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How can the seller avoid late payment? Late payment is a common phenomenon 
in all parts of the world; the only exception for punctual payments is Scandinavia, 
as it is the only region where interest on late payments is accepted by the market. 
Twenty years ago, it was nearly impossible for sellers anywhere in the world to 
prevent the late payment phenomenon because paper reminders were sent by post 
and the reason for the late payment was always uncertain; in fact, it was often 
possible that the bank simply did not transfer the money on time. However, today, 
the reasons are different because late payment is seen more as a free source of 
liquidity for the buyer. 
1.6 Second motivation for the paper: the portfolio level 
B. Corporate trade finance for a firm’s open receivables portfolio: Even before the 
beginning of the financial crisis, sellers started to recognize the impact of late 
payments and employed professional actions to minimize them. Standard ERP 
systems enabled sellers to identify customers with overdue payments. Trained 
specialists were able to effectively remind late payers of their payment due dates 
by using phone reminders. These changes positively affected the costs associated 
with assessing late payments and reduced bank credit lines. The financial crisis 
emphasized the importance of (the avoidance of) late payments because bank 
credit lines were difficult to obtain, even for large producers and wholesalers. 
Therefore, every amount received helped to improve net working capital, thus 
reducing the need for credit lines. Further motivation is the micro-level analysis of 
trade finance and its link to the financing of a company. A negative working 
capital has to be financed; therefore, working capital is part of the creditworthiness 
process and has an impact on financing costs. The future impact of corporate trade 
finance on the profitability of a corporate is a further motivation and will therefore 
be addressed in more detail in the manuscript, considering that trade finance for 
trade liabilities and receivables represents large assets and liabilities for retail and 
wholesale companies. An adequate return on these positions is necessary. 
Furthermore, through its influence on sales and purchasing volume, trade finance 
has an even higher influence on the profitability of firms. 
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1.7. Third motivation for the paper: the macro level 
 
C. Corporate trade finance on the macro level: The motivation is to evaluate how 
the corporate sector can react to enable the financial trade flow to continue, in 
spite of any financial crisis in the future. This includes an evaluation of the actions 
of certain public bodies that actually try, through strict guidelines, to avoid new 
banking crises. Further motivation is the impact of economic globalization, which 
has resulted in increased interest in credit risk management, and is therefore of 
sufficient competition to trade financing through banks and credit insurers, and is a 
necessity for firms, as trade credit has three unique conditions. These are:  
1. Sales do not result in a source of significant financial leverage because the 
underlying transactions are driven by genuine economic activity;  
2. Significantly increased financial leverage hardly to archive because it can only 
occur with the help of a client; and  
3. Trade-related exposures are not likely to contribute to volatile asset prices 
because of their short-term nature and the fact that they are liquidated by payment 
upon their maturity. 
At the end of the research a new solution will be shown: how corporates can 
handle trade finance today by using the internet and having better market 
connections.  
1.8. Structure of the manuscript 
This research will evaluate in detail the consequences of the financial crisis of 
2008 for the financial activities of production companies. As the consequences of 
the crisis in corporate finance and treasury manifested in (too) many different 
ways, this research will focus on the trade financing between corporates. This 
separation was performed because one, corporate trade finance is a fundamental 
part of buying and selling products and two, corporate trade finance, as opposed to 
other credit products, has some specific characteristics.  
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The manuscript first analyzes the basics of corporate trade finance, which have 
previously been reviewed in the literature. This analysis starts with the theories 
that are readily available in the literature, followed by a hypothesis development. 
The analysis begins with the identification of the financial strategy that corporates 
have used in recent years, to broadly analyze the state-of-the-art processes in 
corporate treasuries. The internal and external implications of the actual corporate 
trade finance actions are then examined through several empirical studies. The 
impact of the financial crisis as it is understood by experts in treasury and 
corporate trade finance is also evaluated. This analysis enables a study of the 
future of corporate trade finance and a discussion of the global regulation plans for 
trade finance. The regulators want higher bank equity to reduce banking default 
risk, which will in turn impact corporate financing costs. The fundamental 
question that is evaluated concerns the economic justification of the higher 
financing costs. A more detailed question raised is the evaluation of the costs to 
the corporates. Finally, after assessing the various impacts, a novel concept to 
improve the process is proposed and discussed in the final chapter: Discussions 
and Conclusions.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section reviews a company’s basic methods and capabilities for handling 
financial trade, in the literature. To further understand the process of trade flow 
and trade credit, the following sections further review the concepts and theoretical 
background of working capital management. The structure follows the three 
research topics, starting with the micro level A: Corporate trade finance on the 
micro level: 
Although the term “credit management” is usually used, the more precise wording 
is credit risk management. The following section briefly discusses the concept and 
features of credit management. 
 
The word “credit” has its source in the Latin word “credere”, which means “to 
believe”. However, belief is not a certainty in business, where credit generally 
leads to a risk of default when lending money to someone for a set period. In the 
context of corporate finance, risk means uncertainty. The methods that is 
developed to determine corporate finance risk involve the method of probability 
distribution in many situations (Woolley 2009, p. 147), a decision tree for the all-
or-nothing events (Woolley 2009, p.151) and the sensitivities (i.e., strong/weak 
risk; Woolley 2009, p. 156). Using the same method like a medicine doctor to test 
the health of a patient, a trained financial analyst has his tools and knowledge to 
test the health of a firm (Fitzgerald 2002, p. 129). This analysis is also necessary 
when a company considers giving trade credit to a corporate.  
2.1. Definitions of credit management features  
Business-to-business (B2B) transactions are those that take place between at least 
two companies, in contrast to a business relationship between firms and other 
market groups (e.g., B2C, which refers to business-to-consumer or -government 
agencies).  
 
The methods that are used for forecasting of insolvency analyze different 
  
10 
 
indicators that are relevant in the assessment of the probability that a company is 
facing financial difficulties. These indicators are not always clear signals, therefore 
the first step is to sort out indicators with uncertain signals. There are many signals 
and methods for insolvency forecasting, and these reflect the fact that economic 
conditions, and thus the trust in a company’s future ability to pay its debt, 
continually changes, because the steadily changing political and economic 
conditions influence an individual company strongly. Economic developments and 
the actions of its competitors affect the ability of any business. It is therefore 
necessary to combine the company’s data (annual report) with an evaluation of the 
environment in which the firm conducts business (Fraser and Ormiston 2010, p. 
202). Thus, there is a different data structure for each corporate debtor. In common 
is that insolvency forecasting methods are often use historical data and norms. 
When the environmental conditions change rapidly, economic forecasting 
becomes more important. However, these forecasts are not particularly reliable 
indicators on their own. Riccio mentions that “the degree of a firm’s business risk 
sets the expectations for the financial risk it can afford at a particular credit level” 
(Ganguin et al. 2005, p.80). To date, only the scoring procedures have prevailed in 
the market because the other procedures, although not methodologically poor, are 
simply more difficult to use.  
2.1.1. Discriminate analysis and default rates   
 
The discriminate analysis uses the fact that companies that become insolvent show 
certain characteristics, mainly from the annual report. These characteristics are 
different from a "normal" company, which is successful. The discriminate analysis 
that was tested uses only the annual report data. However, the use of other data in 
business-to-business credit analysis is also important, as is discussed later in the 
manuscript. The initial determination of the discriminate calculation uses samples 
of insolvent and solvent firms. The discriminate calculation is dependent on the 
composition of the samples and the plausibility of the individual ratios of the 
sampled companies. The results usually have an accuracy of 80 %, which retains a 
residual risk (Rösler et al. 2002, p. 650). 
 
  
11 
 
The probability of default is the likelihood that a receivable, such as an unpaid 
trade account, will not be paid because the debtor does not have the necessary 
funds. The probability of default affects the theoretical interest rate that is used in 
the vendor credit, and which forms part of the product pricing.  The historical data 
that provides an insight into the probability of default in business-to-business 
transactions is increasingly available. This data is shown on a per annum basis; 
therefore, it has to be converted from turnover and payment periods. As a result of 
recent IAS accounting requirements, international corporations in particular, now 
publish details of their default rates. The information of the default rates that can 
be used to assess the credit risk in business-to-business transactions is then used in 
the analysis in combination with data on payment performance, and the usual 
financial data that is available to banks. Less research has been performed on 
stress scenarios (Hughes and Steward 2008, p. 25). These studies analyze 
scenarios for the development of various underlying data constellations and the 
identification of potential default rates. Such scenarios have gained in importance 
as a result of the financial crisis because the default risk affects entire sectors (e.g., 
the automotive sector). These scenarios place suppliers in a position in which they 
have to determine whether or not to accept the attendant risk.   
 
A distinction is necessary to separate the default probability and the risks that arise 
from unexpected events. The probability of default is calculated on historical 
insolvency trends and therefore on expected events. They are extrapolated to the 
future. The unexpected events and their risk of returning also needs to be 
considered. This can be done, for example, through the use of risk buffers. 
Another method is to evaluate stress scenarios (Homburg & Krohmer 2006, p.925 
and Hughes & Steward 2008, p.25ff). Convincing insolvency forecasting data is 
very important for the determination of default rates, which are the basis to find 
adequate credit limits, set prices, which are risk-based, and enables best practice 
processes. It has even an impact to the borrowers as efficient insolvency 
forecasting support them to adopt the same appropriate risk-aware practices.  
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2.1.2. Credit rating and credit spread 
 
In credit risk management, the credit assessment data is increasingly aggregated in 
a standardized way. The assessment of the credit data is implemented to obtain a 
practical interpretation (analysis) of the data and the weight of the different data, in 
an evaluation scale. It is also important to systematically select the data that will 
be used in the analysis depending on the weight. This applies not only to the data 
obtained from single borrowers but also for the data of an overall portfolio (Rösler 
et al. 2002, p. 647). The default probability is then converted into an easily 
readable scale, as with the credit score (Zahn 1986, p. 125).  
 
Credit rating has been widely performed for countries, multinationals and bonds 
by ratings agencies and banks for many years and is therefore well established. 
Creditworthiness is of paramount importance for obtaining finance, either for the 
public or the private sector, affecting both the volume and the interest rate of debt 
finance. At the same time, along with the issue of debt, a financial instrument was 
created, the credit default swap (CDS), which deals with protection against risk in 
the case of an emerging inability of debt repayment. A CDS refers to a swap 
contract in which the protection buyer of the CDS makes a series of payments, 
often referred on CDS fee or spread, to the protection seller and, in exchange, 
receives a payoff if a credit instrument – a bond or a loan – experiences a credit 
event. CDS spreads arise when there are signs that those repayments cannot be 
met, increasing the fear of a default by the entity that issued the underlying debt 
instrument. A default is referred to as a credit event and includes such events as 
failure to pay, restructuring and bankruptcy (Papaioannou 2011). 
 
Credit spread is defined as the additional amount of interest paid by a risky asset 
over the yield of a risk-free investment (Trück, Laub & Rachev, 2004). Credit 
spread was originally used to describe the default risk of bonds. The yields of 
corporate bonds differ from risk-free bonds (government bonds) depending on the 
creditworthiness of the borrower. This yield difference is called the credit spread. 
Although the ratings are not a linear scaling of the default probabilities, the credit 
spread between the ratings is more exact (Koller et al. 2005, p. 490).  
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2.1.3. Credit scoring 
 
Credit scoring is an application of a classification technique that evaluates the 
default risk of debtors into different risk groups. Because the classification 
techniques are based on data mining, the process of credit scoring can be 
considered a data mining application that utilizes new techniques to pre-process 
the input data and build classification models (Liu 2002, p.1 and Baetge et al. 
1994, p. 327ff). The aim of credit scoring is to use an analytical technique to 
standardize the pre-emptive diagnosis of the difficulties of an enterprise. This 
technique was developed in the US in 1960 by E. Altman and was rapidly 
customized in France by the National Bank of France (Quiry & Vernimmen 2011, 
p. 177).  The basic concept that was used to develop this method involves the use 
of the company account ratios, which are the leading indicators of business 
difficulties. Once these ratios are established, they can be compared to those of 
firms that have experienced difficulties or failures. The comparison is performed 
in an overall framework rather than ratio by ratio. In effect, the ratios are 
aggregated into a Z-score function that gives each company a score. The 
calculation of the Z-score has the general form 
    
     Z = ∑ α +  βi Rini=1  
    
where α is a constant, Ri refers to each ratio, βi corresponds to the relative weight 
that is attached to Ri and n is the number of ratios that are used in the analysis 
(Vernimmen 2011, p. 178). Depending on whether the value of the function is near 
or far from the normative values that were determined for a sample of companies 
that have experienced difficulties, the probability that the company that is being 
studied will experience difficulties in the next two or three years can be estimated. 
 
A business-to-business credit score works with numerical values based on a 
statistical analysis that indicates the default probability of a firm. Credit scoring is 
based on procedures that are pre-defined and standardized for a portfolio of 
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debtors. The aim for the using firm is to assess the creditworthiness of their 
customers. The advantages of credit scoring are as follows: 
 It eliminates the analyst’s personal preferences; 
 It facilitates making an objective decision;  
 It lowers credit analysis costs; and 
 It enables faster credit decisions. 
The disadvantages of credit scoring are the following: 
 The analyst’s personal experience of the customer in question and the risk 
environment are seldom taken into account 
 Special credit relevant points for the respected customer cannot be included; 
 The data are not available as they may be confidential; 
 Scoring is seldom used with adequate attention to qualitative data; and 
 The scoring methods back-testing need to be regularly done. 
In addition to the scoring system described, further computational and/or 
mathematical methods are used to facilitate the assessment of credit and 
creditworthiness. As with credit scoring, these methods ensure that the decisions 
are easier to control. Furthermore, the worsening risks of company activities can 
be recognized faster through the use of these procedures.  
2.1.4. Credit limit 
Credit limit defines the maximum level of receivables for a specific customer 
(Fitzgerald 2002, p. 192). The credit limit should include any open orders if the 
goods are produced specifically for the customer. These limits should be regularly 
reviewed to determine if any changes in the credit limit are needed due to changes 
in the buyer’s creditworthiness. In addition to the identification of individual limits 
for each customer, credit limits may be set for groups of companies, entire 
countries or sectors.  
 
To generate additional sales, suppliers may be prepared to grant trade credit, even 
when the default rate is above the financially viable credit limits that were 
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determined for the individual customers. From a business viewpoint, these credit 
limits are part of the marketing mix (Homburg and Kohmer 2006, p.61 and Weiß 
2007, p. 18f) that is determined in an attempt to increase overall profits (Broens 
2010 b). If a company accepts marketing limits, the sales department is included in 
the approval process for the determination of this limit. This can be performed 
through the addition of a marketing limit without the performance of any 
finance/credit analysis, or through a common process between both departments 
(Fitzgerald 2002, p. 199).  
 
2.1.5. Further definitions 
Some of these aspects have already been partially defined in the introduction of 
receivables management. Risk appetite is further defined as “the amount of risk, 
on a broad level, that an organization is willing to accept in the pursuit of 
stakeholder value. Risk tolerances are the levels of variation that the entity is 
willing to accept for specific objectives” (COSO 2011). The terms “risk appetite” 
and “risk tolerance” are frequently used, but sometimes in different meanings. 
Risk appetite describes the planned level of risk that an entity will take in 
accordance with other targets of the firm. Risk tolerance focuses on the outcomes 
that are possible. The risk tolerance should considers only results which are within 
the targets of a corporate (COSO 2011).  Ernst & Young have a different 
perspective which they document in its paper “Risk Appetite: The strategic 
balancing act”. In this report, they define multiple terms: 
 
 Risk capacity: the volume per kinds of risk that an organization can support 
within its business objectives; 
 Risk appetite: the volume per kinds of risk that an organization is willing to 
support within its business objectives; 
 Risk tolerance: the maximum volume for a specific risk that an organization is 
willing to take; 
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 Risk target: the planned amount of risk that an organization wants to take, as 
that amount is seen to best support  a specific business goal; and  
 Risk limit: the threshold that a company installs to avoid that the actual risk 
exposure does deviate too much from the risk target. Furthermore, the risk limit 
is within an organization’s risk appetite. The exceeding of risk limits will 
typically lead to manual management action (Ernst &Young 2010).  Ernst & 
Young’s definition for risk limit can also be used to define credit limit. 
 
An expert system consists of a collection of facts and decision rules that represent 
the knowledge of experts in a particular subject area. In addition, an expert system 
is capable of learning, which means that it can recognize patterns from different 
layers and consider these patterns in the decision-making process. However, an 
expert system is complex and hard to use and is therefore expensive.  
 
“Neural networks” are often referred to as “artificial intelligence”. These make it 
possible, in certain respects, for an (initially) inaccurately described problem 
structure to adapt on the basis of empirical observations. Neural networks used to 
require high memory capabilities and were therefore expensive (Rösler et al. 2002 
p. 652). However, these are no longer as expensive, although the software costs 
are not acceptable compared to the default volume of business-to-business credit 
management. 
 
2.2. Credit analysis  
The next topics discussed in this manuscript are the relevant sources and methods 
that can be used to more efficiently analyze credit: 
  
There are various types of data in business-to-business credit management that 
form the basis of a credit decision. Data can first be divided into internal and 
external data. The internal information is obtained from the company of the 
seller/creditor, whereas the external data is information that is received or acquired 
by the seller through other sources. Both these categories can then be subdivided 
  
17 
 
into quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data can be represented 
numerically, whereas qualitative methods in credit management involve the 
description, interpretation and understanding of other economic circumstances 
(Jährig and Schuck 1982, pp. 181ff). 
 
The primary source for information on a buyer’s creditworthiness is the year-end 
accounts (Vernimmen 1976, p. 174). These reports contain the basic data that 
many analysts feel is required for a thorough statistical default prediction. During 
the calculation of the default prediction, several individual pieces of data from the 
year-end accounts are converted into ratios, which are then combined with a 
comparison of several periods (trend analyses) and with industry trends and 
averages (Leffson 1984, p. 205ff). The age of the client company and the duration 
of the business relationship have also been suggested as additional quantitative 
company data (Weiss 2007, p. 5). 
 
2.2.1. Quantitative data and their sources  
 
The quantitative data on the buyer’s payment behavior history also plays an 
important role in the evaluation of their creditworthiness. In fact, the payment 
behaviour of the buying company over the past twelve months is considered 
particularly important for the company to be adjudged creditworthy or not. The 
profit margin from the sale of goods (not including the credit risk costs) is also an 
important internal criterion for a credit decision. If the inherent credit risk costs 
exceed the profits from a business transaction, the forecasted revenue is negated 
and thus this type of sale should be avoided. The qualitative company data 
includes the assessments of the condition of buildings, machines and warehouses 
and an evaluation of the debtor’s product range. Furthermore, the qualitative 
company data involves an assessment of the debtor’s company management with 
respect to the ability of the company’s leadership to ensure the company’s 
financial success (Böhnisch et al. 2004, p. 348).   
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Commercial credit agencies are an alternative source of information because these 
provide details of the economic and legal situation of a company for a fee (Brealey 
et al. 2009, p. 558 and Gallinger and Healey 1991, p. 356). Credit agencies do not 
guarantee the quality of their data; therefore, it is possible that some individual 
figures are incorrect. These agencies often collect their data from self-investigation 
by the company in question. Moreover, credit agencies do not disclose the 
methodology used in their estimation of a company’s credit scores and limits. 
Therefore, there is always a risk that the use of credit agency data could lead to a 
false assessment. Banks also play a vital role for the credit manager. “With the 
customer’s permission, the customer’s bank can be approached as a credit source 
either directly or through the credit managers’ bank” (Gallinger and Healey 1991, 
p. 358). Furthermore, the ratings agencies, such as S&P and Moody’s, publish 
benchmark ratios that can be used to compare companies. These are presented 
both in verbal form and in the form of a credit score. The ratings agencies analyze 
a company’s annual reports and evaluate the company’s financial obligations and 
growth expectations during the calculation of these ratios. These companies also 
analyze the quality of the management by addressing questions directly, asking for 
transparent information, and discussing strategy and other activities openly with 
the board (Gallinger and Healey 1991, p. 90ff).    
2.2.2. The important of annual report data  
As stated by Keown, the most common form of credit analysis uses the 
information that is provided in the financial statements to measure a company’s 
performance and make financial projections of their future performance. In 
general, Keown considers “financial analysis a tool for not just financial managers 
but also investors, lenders, suppliers, employees, and customers” (Keown 2006, p. 
102).  
 
An income statement is a summary of the profitability of a firm over a period of 
time, such as a year. It therefore presents the revenues that were generated during 
the operating period, the expenses that were incurred, and the firm’s net earnings, 
which are simply the difference between the revenues and the expenses (Bodie et 
al. 2009, p. 429). In addition, the balance sheet, which is a list of the firm’s assets 
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and liabilities at a specific moment, provides a situational report of the firm as at 
the end of the period. The difference between the assets and the liabilities is the net 
worth of the firm (Bodie et al. 2009, p. 431). Financial statements are used by 
credit analysts to determine a number of features: a) the financial reserves, b) the 
effectiveness of the management, c) the business attractiveness, d) the payment 
behaviour, and e) the firm’s securities. 
 
2.2.3. Credit analysis of the financial reserves of a company 
Financial reserves are needed for times of financial instability. There are two 
forms of protection against instability: operational security, which is judged by the 
interest cover; and structural security, which is judged by the gearing (Bodie et al. 
2009, p. 431). Operational security is the ability of a firm to create cash that can be 
used to repay bank and trade loans and the conjunct interests. The security ratio is 
the comparison of the operating profit before interest and tax, with the net interest 
payable. The financial ratio “interest coverage” provides a good understanding of a 
firm's ability to pay the interest charges on its finance liabilities. Koller describes 
interest coverage as the most significant single indicator. “The coverage aspect of 
this ratio indicates how many times the interest could be paid from the available 
earnings, thereby providing a sense of the safety margin a company has for paying 
its interest in any period. A company that sustains its earnings well above its 
interest requirements is in an excellent position to weather possible financial 
storms. In contrast, a company that barely manages to cover its interest costs may 
easily fall into bankruptcy if its earnings suffer for even a single month” (Koller 
2005, p. 488). 
 
In general, an interest coverage ratio under two investors is a warning signal for 
investors. An interest coverage ratio below one gives a hint that the business 
concerned generate not sufficient cash to pay its interest payment. In addition, the 
history and consistency of its earnings is tremendously important. More consistent 
earnings are reflected by lower interest coverage ratios. The second protection of 
the financial reserves in a company is related to the financing structure of the firm 
(Fraser and Ormiston 2010, p. 210). This question can be answered in part by the 
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gearing ratio, which is the relationship between net borrowing and equity. Net 
borrowing refers to all the external bank debt deducted by the available cash. In 
some cases, the trade receivables and liabilities are included in the gearing 
calculation. The gearing shows the %age of the debt financing, and the %age of 
equity as the financial source. The equity is helpful in a critical profit situation 
because there is then no need to pay any dividend.  
 
2.2.4. Credit analysis of the gearing of a company 
Financing of companies with a debt-to-equity gearing ratio of over 10 can be 
difficult. An evaluation of the 2009 financial statements of approximately 4.3 
million European companies shows that there are significant differences in the 
gearing ratios between countries. A gearing over 10 is typical in southern Europe, 
such as in Italy (36 %), Portugal (27 %) and Spain (26 %), but also in Great 
Britain and Ireland, where approximately 33 % of companies have an equity ratio 
of less than 10 %. More stable funding, however, is apparent in companies in 
Scandinavia. In Sweden, for example, only 14 % of the companies have a gearing 
higher than 9. The proportion of weakly capitalized companies in Germany is 
23 %, which places Germany in the middle of the countries that were analyzed, 
based on their %age of weak companies. Overall, approximately one in four 
companies (26 %) in western Europe have a gearing ratio of over nine and thus 
depend on external creditors, which results in the company having a corporate 
stability risk (Creditreform 2011, p. 19f). Excessive gearing arises through an 
increase in interest costs, payment of higher dividends as the so-called dividend 
cover, acquisitions that are financed by debt, and operating losses, which can be 
the (negative) result of a lack of management effectiveness.  
 
2.2.5. Credit analysis of the effectiveness of management 
Management effectiveness can be evaluated first-hand through financial results. 
Shareholders consider financial results as indicators of management effectiveness; 
in this context, high profits are a documentation of effectiveness. Therefore, most 
shareholders judge management effectiveness by the profits. According to an 
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analysis of the accounts in Europe in the year 2009, 27.8 % of the three million 
companies that were surveyed did not report profits. In 2008, the year of recession 
all over the world, this figure fell to 26 %. In 2007, only 24 % of the companies 
were negative. However, other companies performed better. In 2008, 16 % of 
companies had a profit of over 10 %, and 10 % of the total companies exhibited a 
profit of over 25 %. In 2007, even more companies were successful. In contrast, 
the %age of companies that exhibited a profit margin over 10 % in 2009 was 15 % 
(Creditreform 2011, p. 19f). 
 
Management effectiveness can also be analyzed through the use of other 
profitability ratios. Of the various possible ratios, the returns on equity and on total 
assets ratios are most widely used.  Investors will typically consider the return on 
equity, and lenders (banks or trade partners) will usually analyze the total assets 
return on equity and on sales. In 2010, the return on equity in Europe (27 
countries) was 4.96 % (ECB). There are many additional indirectly measurable 
items that can signify the effectiveness of management. In addition to financial 
data, shareholders analyze other data, such as productivity ratios, which are 
expressed as the amount of sales per employee. Although the number itself is not 
helpful, its development over time and its comparison with other firms of the same 
sector enables an evaluation of management effectiveness. As an example, the 
sales per employee of a wholesaler must be significantly higher than the sales per 
employee of a production company, because there is a bigger chain of additional 
economic value in a production company. In addition, the effect of external 
factors, that cannot be influenced by the management, such as changes in the 
inflation rate and economic changes (i.e., general demand/GDP development), 
should be considered.  
 
The effectiveness of the management can also be indirectly evaluated through the 
analysis of soft factors, because the board ultimately determines the result. The 
evaluation mainly concerns the formal criteria of the board members, such as their 
experience in the business, their education, the necessary changes that might arise 
due to the retirement of a manager, and the link between the management and 
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other companies, organizations, employees and government. In addition, the 
personal integrity of the board can be considered.   
2.2.6. Credit analysis of the attractiveness of a business  
For a credit lender, the attractiveness of a business refers to its profit stability in 
the sector. Because every company faces many distinct risks, it is hard to identify 
the most important ones. The risk of default is a conglomerate of all the possible 
risks, such as those associated with the product, country, market, competition, tax, 
pollution, and personnel. The diversity can refer to a reduction of risk, but a single 
risk can also be such that it can result in the total failure of the company. Large, 
advanced corporates handle all of their risk through the installation of an enterprise 
risk management organization system (Fraser and Ormiston 2010, p. 112). 
Although the “normal” credit interest does not affect the positive developments of 
a company, it is indirectly important for the lender because it will influence the 
company’s investors. Typical situations include the recovery of a company such as 
the following: A company has valid assets that can be sold; however, these are 
usually sold at a poor profit or even at a loss. The credit analysts consider either 
the value of asset stripping, especially if the market prices are higher than the book 
value, or they evaluate the changes that are required of the company, if it is well-
managed and the industry has reached the bottom of its cycle (Fitzgerald 2002. p. 
167). 
 
For start-ups/high-growth companies, the prediction of future cash-flows varies 
greatly and includes the risk of default. The development of the US-based 
NASDAQ index is an example of this prediction. Investors buy technology shares 
without using normal valuation methods. Instead they consider deeply the product 
and growth rate planning. However, in addition to the risk that the competitors 
might be better, the profit of high-growth companies does not often increase to the 
same degree as sales. Many of these companies never achieve a comparable profit, 
but trade on over-average price-earning-ratios (Fitzgerald 2002. p. 166). 
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2.2.7. Credit analysis of business payment behaviours  
The monitoring of the payment behaviours of a portfolio of credit exposures 
generally has the aim of obtaining prompt cash payments. However, along with the 
nominal credit size, there is a need to monitor the portfolios of credit balances 
more effectively, incorporating an evaluation of the actual portfolio as well as the 
planning and execution of policies for each of its sub-segments. This monitoring 
only makes sense if the seller is certain of the timely and accurate dispatch of 
invoices, and the subsequent enforcement of the credit terms.  Traditionally, credit 
and disbursement managers use turnover ratios (or the complementary DSO) and 
aging schedules to analyze outstanding credit balances. In this analysis, credit 
managers continue to employ aggregate models, which are easy to use, to calculate 
these performance indices (Damodaran 2006. p. 425). Furthermore, these indices 
are a tool that can be used to compare two different periods. 
  
The aging of accounts receivable is another traditional method that is used to 
analyze these balances. An aging schedule attempts to show the proportion of the 
current outstanding balance that originates from sales made in previous periods. 
Considerable controversy exists on whether the DSO and aging procedures are 
acceptable methods to monitor the accounts receivable. Although these methods 
are still widely used, their results may be misleading and are frequently erroneous 
(Damodaran 2006, p.432). The difficulty with using DSO and aging schedules 
arises from the fact that an upward sales trend gives the impression of improved 
customer payment behaviour when, in fact, the behaviour may have worsened or 
not significantly changed. In addition, when sales are falling, both monitoring 
techniques give the impression that the receivables are less current than they 
actually are.  
 
2.2.7.1. Days sales outstandings theory and practical 
 
Furthermore, any changes to any of the conditions that govern the accounts 
receivable balance make the interpretation of the DSO index difficult. If the DSO 
index does not change, but the corporate adds new customers or changes the sales 
price, the significance of the DSO index is obscured. In addition, the DSO measure 
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simply does not take into account the impact that credit sales have on the cash 
flow and the profit from the investments in receivables (Stone 1976, p. 65). 
Consequently, most analysts recognize the influence of this sales pattern and 
consider an extra factor. A technique that can be used to overcome the problems 
associated with these traditional techniques is the use of a weighted-DSO scheme. 
This technique allows the calculation of the DSO to be independent of both the 
sales averaging period and the sales pattern. Furthermore, it provides a comparison 
with a standard, such as the budget or last year’s results, and thus also gives the 
information that is provided by aging schedules in addition to the DSO 
(Damodaran, 2006, p. 433).  The collections experience variance (CEV) is a direct 
measure of collections efficiency. The CEV is calculated at the sales level and is 
linked with the corresponding new receivables budget, which allows recognition 
of whether the outstanding receivables should increase or decrease directly with 
any changes in sales (Damodaran 2006, p. 435). The collections experience 
variance is therefore not influenced by any changes in the sales pattern, which 
would typically hinder the traditional DSO and aging schedules measures.   
 
The sales pattern variance (SPV) is another major component of the receivables 
variance. This variance indicates the effect that a change in the sales pattern has on 
the receivables balance. One might argue that credit analysts cannot be held 
accountable for any variance in the sales pattern. Although this is generally true, 
this variance should be considered when credit decisions are made. Companies in 
Europe have significantly different open invoice times that depend on the country 
in which they are based. For example, companies in Greece (average 140 days) 
and Italy (105 days) have to wait the longest for the payment of any outstanding 
receivables, whereas companies in Germany (26 days), Finland (26 days), and 
Austria (28 days) receive their money much faster. In fact, the average in Western 
Europe is 54 days. Mid-sized suppliers and service providers in particular can have 
a long period of outstanding payments, which has a significant impact because 
these companies often supply goods in advance. These payment delays or even 
failures lead to severe liquidity shortages. Therefore, export-oriented companies 
have to establish a per country approach to collections (Creditreform 2011, p. 20f). 
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2.2.7.2. Days sales outstanding parts  
 
The time from the creation of the invoice to the receipt of cash can be split into 
two parts: the payment term granted and the overdue period. These are reported in 
an “aging schedule” (Fitzgerald 2002, p. 197), which breaks down the receivables 
by the age of the account. This is normally performed for overdue periods of 
between 0 to 10 days, 10 to 30 days, 31 to 60 days and longer. It is interesting to 
observe the value of the accounts in each period and the %age in relation to the 
total open receivables of each customer (Brigham and Gapenski 1997, p. 882). 
This type of structure is often shown in annual reports under IRS and US-GAAP 
accounting rules (for an example, please refer to the annual reports from BASF SE 
and Bayer AG). The aging schedule should be regularly analyzed, taking into 
account the absolute figures and any developments that have occurred since the 
previous analysis. However, deterioration in the figures does not necessarily 
indicate that collections are more inefficient, but can be due to varying market 
trends, different sales strategies or seasonal effects.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Aging schedules of companies in different European countries (adapted 
from data reported by Dun & Bradstreet for 2009).   
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
due date up to 30 days
overdues
more than 30 days
overdues
Open receivables 
Germany
Poland
Denmark
%
  
26 
 
Corporates typically deal with overdue payments in one or a combination of the 
following ways:  
1. Sending reminder letters, which inform the buyer about the overdue debt. These 
letters are necessary for the start of legal proceedings in some countries.  
2.  Calling the customer and informing him about the situation. 
3.  Appointing a collections company (outsourcing the action to specialists). 
4. Starting legal procedures.  
5.  Stopping further deliveries of goods until all overdue payments over a set limit 
are paid.  
 
The use of any of these actions has the inherent risk of conflict between the 
finance and sales departments because these actions make further sales to the 
customer difficult. In addition, not all customers can be treated equally. The best 
practice is to define customer groups that can be handled similarly. For example, 
some customers should receive reminders rapidly, whereas this action would 
disturb sales with other customers. In addition, some customers react to mailings, 
whereas others are better reached by phone. The European Commission has 
implemented a directive to help prevent late payment of commercial sales. This 
was designed to alleviate administrative and financial burdens for small and 
medium enterprises, which are most affected by late payments. The directive is 
also binding for public authorities. Basically, the directive refunds the interest to 
the buyer for any delay of over 30 days. The interest rate that is used is well above 
the minimum rate of the European Central Bank. Furthermore, the creditors, in the 
case of uncontested claims, can undertake legal action, which must be initiated 
within 80 days (EU 2000).   
 
2.2.8. Credit analysis and securities  
The securing of loans by appropriate legal measures was started in the difficult 
economic times after World War I and received further practical importance 
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during the Depression of 1929/1930. Before World War 1, an unsecured credit was 
mostly used (Jährig and Schuck 1982, p. 272). The use of securities could almost 
be considered a refusal to undertake a commercial credit risk. Even when a 
company trusts the creditworthiness of a debtor, these securities are often 
requested because the credit situation of the buyer could change. Furthermore, 
trust in a debtor’s morality and creditworthiness is not always sufficient for the 
granting of a loan. In both these situations, an additional certainty of debt 
repayment positively affects the credit agreement for both sides because it reduces 
the credit risk and the margin.  
 
The business cycle is reflected in credit securities. During a rising economy, the 
use of credit by the economy increases because the increased sales, inventories and 
investments must be financed through the appointment of the appropriate 
collateral. However, a decline in the economy, particularly during the onset of a 
recession, inevitably tests the loan securities. The value of the loan collateral 
proves the lender’s credit risk in terms of their rights and their value, which means 
that the loans have to be legal and their value has to be as high as the part of the 
loan that is secured by the security. Companies and banks have problems if the 
creditworthiness of debtors without securities decreases. If these companies and 
banks were careless with their risk-taking during times of economic boom, they 
will have higher defaults if their debtors do not have securities. The national law is 
relevant and covers, in addition to the usual conditions that are defined by private 
laws, issues of excessive credit protection, bankruptcy laws, the relationship with 
other creditors, and credit fraud. 
2.2.8.1. Credit data interpretation  
 
Corporate credit managers must be able to make fast credit decisions, which are 
usually based on limited information because the sales departments want to rapidly 
execute the sale by sending the product and writing an invoice (Dennis 2000, p. 
323). Because there is no certainty that payment will be made, the credit-giving 
company and its credit analysts should make a basic decision regarding the amount 
of risk they want to take. The credit manager can choose to take a conservative 
approach and give credit only when the facts confirm a high probability of 
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payment, which makes sense if the margin of the product is low or if the market is 
very risky concerning non-payment. He can also choose to take an aggressive 
approach to credit limits, which might be the best solution in very stable markets 
(Fitzgerald 2002, p. 129). However, it is necessary to exhibit a basic consistency 
because too much change will lead to misunderstandings by the sales personnel 
(Dennis 2000, p. 325). 
 
Data is interpreted using absolute figures and ratios. The ratios enable the analyst 
to reduce the information (mainly of accounts) to a marketable size. Both the ratios 
and absolute figures provide an indication of the performance of a business (Irwin 
1991, p.33). Even though it would be easier if a single measure could be used to 
describe the creditworthiness of a company, multiple ratios must be compared and 
linked with other data and ratios to obtain an accurate assessment of the company. 
This use of multiple ratios will provide an understanding that the evaluation 
reflects a good qualitative assessment of the health of a firm (Irwin 1991, p. 34). It 
was mentioned previously that a corporate’s success in working capital 
management can be assessed by considering a number of factors. Similarly, a 
company’s creditworthiness too can be assessed by a few factors. In fact, there are 
four types of ratios that the product seller considers when giving credit: the 
liquidity, the equity, the efficiency and the profitability of a firm (Subramanyam 
2010, p. 526ff).  
 
2.2.8.2. Evaluation of liquidity  
 
“Liquidity risk refers to the availability of company resources to meet short-term 
cash requirements” (Subramanyam 2010, p.526). The importance of liquidity is 
best understood by considering the repercussions that stem from a company’s 
inability to meet its short-term obligations. “The lack of liquidity prevents a 
company from taking advantage of favorable discounts or profitable opportunities” 
(Subramanyam 2010, p. 528). In addition, extreme liquidity problems can force a 
sale of assets, reduce prices or, in its more severe form, lead to insolvency or 
bankruptcy (Subramanyam 2010, p.528).   
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The liquidity of a company is shown in the balance sheet. A net working capital 
ratio of one or higher is interpreted as a good liquidity position (Subramanyam 
2010, p. 531 and Keown 2007, p. 1059). However, a very good liquidity position 
requires the display of a positive development of this ratio over time, and this 
development should be comparable to that of benchmark companies.  The cash-to-
sales ratio provides more concrete information on the liquidity of a company. 
Obligors prefer to know that the debtor has sufficient cash to pay all of its bills, 
and this ratio indicates whether or not the sum of bills is smaller than the relevant 
sales (Higgins 2007, p. 43). Companies require a modest amount of cash to 
facilitate supply chain transactions, and they sometimes need substantially larger 
amounts to compensate balances for bank loans and productive investments.  
 
2.2.8.3. Evaluation of long-term financing/equity relationships 
 
Long-term financing/equity-relationships are focused on bankruptcy risk. 
Bankruptcy is considered if the net worth of a company becomes negative, i.e., if a 
business closes tomorrow, it would not be possible to satisfy all of the company’s 
debts. The equity of a company must therefore be used wisely. The substantial 
investment is retained and strengthened by the profits of the company. The 
substance of the company must be sufficiently high that the debtor is convinced 
that the company can deal with all of its individual risks.  
 
Equity is important. “Equity refers to the capital risk of a company. The 
characteristics of equity capital include its uncertain or unspecified return and the 
lack of any repayment pattern” (Subramanyam 2010, p. 548). Unlike short-term 
and long-term debt, capital must not be repaid. In contrast, debt must be paid back 
in full (Fraser, L. & Ormiston 2010, p. 206).  A highly debt-leveraged company 
“enables” both managerial success (income) and failure (loss). For creditors, an 
increased equity capital is preferred because it confers protection against losses 
that can occur during difficult situations.  A lower equity increases the credit risk 
for the debtor.  
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The typical equity ratios of global production companies are 30 % or higher 
(Subramanyam 2010, p. 549 and Keown 2007, p. 114). The individual %ages of 
equity depend on various factors. Damodaran describes three alternatives for how 
firms should choose their financing (Damodaran 2006, p. 326). The first depends 
on the growth lifecycle of the firm because high-growth firms steadily use 
increased equity. The second is the structure of other firms in the company’s 
sector, and the third is the preference of the firm (and its bankers) for certain types 
of financing. It is also important for the lending bank to know whether the 
company belongs to a sector that ensures constant growth or whether there is a 
need to make other products to decrease the exposure of the company to one-way 
market risk.  
 
A ratio that combines a company’s long-term financing and equity with its need to 
be successful in the market is the financial leverage index, which measures the 
return on equity in relation to the adjusted return on assets. The adjusted return on 
assets, which is a denominator of the financial leverage index ratio, is calculated as 
the net earnings plus the interest expense (1 - tax rate) in relation to the total assets 
(Fraser and Ormiston 2010, p. 206). Furthermore, the asset turnover is worth 
analyzing. Although some newcomers believe that more assets indicate better 
liquidity, the reality is the opposite. As Higgins writes in his book, Analysis for 
Financial Management, “unless a company is about to go out of business, its value 
is in the income stream it generates and its assets are simply a necessary means to 
this end” (Higgins 2007, p. 40).  For 27 countries in Europe, the average return on 
assets (after interest) in 2010 was 0.23% (ECB). 
 
2.2.8.4. Evaluation of efficiency and profitability 
 
An efficiency ratio evaluates the management. However, because this assessment 
includes the evaluation of soft factors, it is very difficult to translate the results 
into a mathematical form such that all analysts would obtain the same result. 
Fraser and Ormiston use some annual report data as efficiency indicators (Fraser & 
Ormiston 2010, p. 205). These include the rapidity of the turnover process for 
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receivables, the inventories, and the trade payables, which are discussed in the 
sections on working capital management and the evaluation of liquidity. These 
researchers also believe that efficiency can be evaluated through the ratio of fixed 
assets to turnover of the total assets. This ratio should improve if an expansion is 
successful (Fraser & Ormiston, 2010, p. 205). 
 
When analyzing profitability, it is necessary to distinguish between earnings and 
variable costs and between earnings and fixed costs. In certain situations, 
companies accept sales on the basis of variable costs. Credit costs are variable 
costs because a stoppage of sales will quickly reduce the open receivables to zero. 
Therefore, an analyst has to consider the gross margin (total costs) as well as the 
margin on variable costs. In addition, companies with a high proportion of fixed 
costs are more vulnerable to a decline in sales than are other firms, because these 
“fixed costs” companies cannot reduce their fixed costs when sales fall (Higgins 
2007, p. 39). 
 
The profitability of the company also has to be considered in the analysis. Is it 
sufficient and allowable to self-finance by strengthening its own funds and 
liquidity? From a risk management point of view, the profit in relation to the asset 
must be higher than the riskless bank loan, i.e., because bank loans typically have 
an interest rate of 5 %, the profit margin for a company should be approximately 
10 % (Keown 2007, p. 115f). This difference arises because the investor has the 
risk of obtaining less profit, which can occur due to various reasons, and of losing 
his total investment through bankruptcy. Consequently, the funding and liquidity 
must be sustainable and may be affected by increasing business costs, especially 
wages and salaries, rising costs, and scarcity of raw materials and/or a drop in 
sales prices. These problems can occur often and the company must be in a 
position to change and adapt regularly. Furthermore, the development of earning 
power will determine the extent to which self-financing is possible. The reinvested 
amount supports both liquidity and equity. Any self-financing that has taken place 
can be observed in the balance sheet. There is another ratio that is used for 
assessing companies that are listed on a stock exchange. This ratio is not 
calculated by using the book value, but its market price (Higgins 2007, p. 49), i.e., 
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the profit in relation to the market value of the equity, or the number of shares 
multiplied by the price per share. The market value of the total of the shares thus 
indicates to the credit analyst how investors perceive the future of a company. 
 
In general, the market value ratios are superior to the book value ratios because 
book values are historical whereas the market values indicate the true value of the 
creditors’ or owners’ stake in the business. Market value ratios are especially 
helpful when assessing the financial leverage of rapidly growing, or start-up 
companies (Higgins 2007, p. 50). In addition, a market price ratio that is below the 
company’s accounting worth is a warning signal.  
 
2.2.8.5. Limitations of financial ratio analysis 
 
Although annual report data is the most important source of data for credit analysis 
and the subsequent determination of a credit limit, it has the following limitations:  
- It is often difficult to define the sector to which a firm belongs when the firm is 
engaged in multiple lines of business.  
- Accounting practices differ widely among firms. For example, the LIFO/FIFO 
inventory validation and depreciation behaviours result in different data.  
- All financial ratios are based on historical and/or sector behaviours, and different 
situations can thus lead to different results in the analysis of a company.  
- Many firms experience seasonality in their operations (e.g., crop protection is a 
classical sector that experiences this behaviour). Therefore, to avoid inaccurate 
results, average account balances should be used in these cases (Keown 2007, p. 
122). 
In spite of their limitations, financial ratios are extensively used and are considered 
one of the most valuable tools for the assessment of the financial conditions of a 
company. In addition, ratio analysis is widely used by all firms, banks, investors, 
regulators and the public (Higgins 2007, p. 56). The solution, therefore, is not the 
use of fewer ratios but the definition of more comprehensive measures within their 
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use. If developed with care and imagination, these new ratios can provide a large 
amount of information on a company. However, it is difficult to combine several 
ratios into a single data measurement because modern firms are complex. In 
addition, one or even several single ratios might give the wrong perception of a 
business. In fact, a ratio has no single correct value for all readers. The 
interpretation of a value depends on the perspective of the analyst and his 
evaluation of many other factors. All credit analysts do not have the same 
understanding regarding the definition of high, low or normal values. This is the 
case with working capital ratios. From the perspective of a credit analyst with a 
short-term view, a high current ratio is positive and suggests ample liquidity and a 
high probability of payment. However, an owner of the company might look at the 
same current ratio as a negative sign that suggests that the company’s assets are 
being deployed too conservatively (Higgins 2007, p. 56). Therefore, the business-
to-business credit analyst has to understand that the management’s best working 
capital ratio might be different than expected.  
 
2.2.9. Final evaluation of creditworthiness 
Generally, there are two methods that can be used to obtain a deeper interpretation 
of data: verbal-qualitative methods, such as the traditional credit report or 
protocol, and quantitative methods, such as scoring models (Schulte 2002, p. 
59f).The verbal-qualitative method has been employed since the implementation 
of credit. In this assessment, the credit report is based on traditional financial 
statement analysis. Traditional balance sheet analysis and ratios are generally 
considered as absolute individual values, which are presented to facilitate prompt 
decisions. The balance sheet valuation history is added to the analysis of the 
expectations on the projected figures. Furthermore, emphasis is placed on the 
overall consideration of all the risk factors, which are evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis. The overall assessment is then summarized in a vote. The scoring, however, 
is more regulated. Linear discriminate models have been used in credit decisions 
for several years. These models attempt to discriminate among customers on the 
basis of several variables. The score indicates an indifferent point between success 
and failure relative to an objective relationship of similar customers. The score is 
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usually based on past financial data and is consequently biased by these 
procedures (Gallinger and Healey 1991, p. 364).  “Usually credit scoring models 
classify credit customers into two classes: 'good' and 'bad'. The two types of error 
rates are used to assess the performance of the models. There are different 
evaluation methods to describe these two types of errors. The most simple and 
direct method is a matrix” (Liu 2002, p. 51).  
 
The credit scoring process can be considered as a data mining framework that 
consists of three stages: problem definition, data analysis and model control.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Schematic of the credit scoring process (Source: Liu 2002, p.1) 
 
Scoring analysis requires sufficient relevant credit default data. However, because 
credit managers generally do not publish this type of data, the necessary data 
volume is not easily accessible. (Banks behave similarly; however, under the Basel 
III strictures, banks decided to build a common data pool to collect data on credit 
defaults (ICC 2010). Gallinger stated that “this system seems to offer the credit 
manager a relatively simple method for evaluating credit applicants . . . although 
there are a number of potential problems” (Gallinger & Healey 1991, p. 367). He 
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believes that analysts do not use the best ratios in their assessments of credit 
scoring; in fact, he postulates that analysts use some measures that have no 
influence whatsoever on the future success of credit customers.  
 
The credit analyst, who has access to all the ratios, should consider the inter-
relationships between individual ratios. Therefore, short-term liquidity, operating 
efficiency and capital structure should be considered in one ratio. This is 
theoretically possible because all these ratios are relevant. The DuPont system 
developed a formula for the calculation of an overall ratio:  
 
Net profit margin x Total assets turnover 
=  Return on investment Return on investment x Financial leverage 
=  Return on equity 
 (Fraser and Ormiston 2010, p. 21) 
 
2.3. Corporate trade finance for a firm’s open receivables portfolio 
Management of receivables  
 
If a company sells goods or services, (1) either an immediate payment in cash is 
agreed or (2) the company gives credit to the customer and thus has to wait a set 
amount of time to receive the funds. Buckley refers to this credit as an investment 
in a customer that is linked to the sale of a product or a service (Buckley et al. 
2000, p. 611).  
 
If credit is granted by a company, a demand for its goods and services is created. If 
these credits are granted as loans to other companies, these are considered trade or 
commercial debts. Today, business-to-business credits are often used and are 
called consumer loans or consumer credit if these are granted to customers. The 
basis of receivables is that the firm sells a product and gives the payer time to pay 
the bill. Joy describes this as “The firm grants trade credit because it expects the 
investments in receivables to be profitable . . . and the motivation for investments 
in receivables may be oriented either toward sales expansion or sales retention” 
(Joy 1977, p. 457).  
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As mentioned previously, receivables are part of a company’s current assets and 
appear on the credit side of the balance sheet, thus indicating the success of the 
company. However, each company should be aware that receivables are simply 
loans without interest, which can become very expensive. For example, the daily 
interest on a debt of euro 10 million with a 10 % interest rate amounts to 
approximately euro 2,800. An increase in the receivables reveals that the funds 
from the sale of products or services are being received later, and should thus be 
considered a signal to investigate the cause: Are customers not paying as agreed, 
paying late, or not able to pay? How many customers are critical?   
Damodaran attempted to determine the best method to calculate the credit term 
because credit decisions have a significant influence on cash flows (Damodaran 
2006, p. 399) and therefore credit terms are used to stimulate sales (Damodaran 
2006, p. 408). Because the management’s objective should be to maximize the 
long-term wealth of the shareholders, the first approach involves transferring the 
right proportion of receivables to the other assets.  
 
2.3.1. Investment in receivables  
 
The amount of investment in receivables that a company claims depends on the 
following factors:  
 Risk attitude: an organization’s approach to handle or risk. 
 Level of risk: the amount of a risk or combination of risks for a corporate in 
conjunction with the potential probability. 
 Risk evaluation: the process of evaluating different results out of the risk 
analysis to determine whether the risk amounts are acceptable. 
 Risk appetite: the amount per type of risk and the total addition sum that an 
organization is willing to take. 
 Risk tolerance: the firm’s general willingness to take the risk (all ISO 
31000). 
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 Credit borrowing aspects: the influence of receivables on the company’s 
credit rating.  
 
Traditionally, risk is a negative factor and thus something to be avoided. Webster’s 
dictionary defines risk as an “exposure to danger or hazard” (Damodaran 2006, p. 
50). Ingersoll, who analyzed financial behaviours, defined risk as a “property of 
the set of random outcomes that is disliked by the risk averters” (Ingersoll 1987, p. 
114). However, risk becomes positive if the management considers their risk 
appetite, which gives the firm a clear vision of the acceptable risk tolerance levels 
and specific limits. Therefore, the determination of risk appetite is a healthy 
process because it opens communications among business units and boards of 
directors (KPMG 2008).  
 
According to Paton (1922) accounting has to adapt continuously the real live 
conditions in order to document adequate the reality and its changes. This is still 
nearly hundred years later valid as well for the receivables accounting: Credit sales 
are now a financial service by which turnover can be increased. However, this 
leads to increasing receivables, which credit analysts cannot evaluate easily, as the 
debtor are not shown in the annual report. Thus, management policy on credit 
sales impacts the operational value of the firm. An increase in credit sales leads to 
a higher size of the inventory, and (assumingly) the cash-flow. Furthermore, the 
percentage between the categories of current and non-current assets will be 
affected. The higher current asset part might negatively impacted some financial 
ratios. For example, an increase in receivables due to stronger sales causes a need 
to increase inventory which is, in turn, related to the adequate increase in sales. In 
total, we can say that a change in receivables due to trade finance actions causes 
many effects to the categories of assets on the balance sheet. 
2.3.2. Defining the corporate trade credit portfolio  
The granting of credit by corporates is often a precondition for a transaction.  
There are several alternatives giving trade credit. The main financing alternatives 
are open account or secured by banks, credit insurers, or by another corporate, 
depending on the strategy used, the market condition and the sales volumes. For 
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nearly all firms, trade credit is a basic instrument to sell and run their operations. 
In Europe, Japan and North America, it is in many sectors since long time market 
condition to finance inventories and receivables heavily by asking supplier and 
banks for trade credit. A research for the US - Federal Reserve Board, done by 
Elliehausen and Wolken (1993), found that in 1987, producers’ accounts payable 
count for 20% of all small businesses' liabilities, and 15% of all large firms' total 
liabilities. On the active side of the balance sheet, accounts receivable count for 
about 20 % of most corporate balance total active, as later shown. Therefore, trade 
credit is an instrument, which is used in two-ways from the firms. Particularly 
distributors represent the two-ways position and behave as an intermediate in the 
value chain, use trade credit as a product buyer, and provide it as suppliers. Thus, 
both corporate trade liabilities and assets trade credit inherent a substantial 
component for each management (Atanasova, 2007). The following section 
reviews the theoretical and empirical research and literature as well as the different 
standpoints for trade credit use. 
 
Several studies document in their empirical work that a relationship between firm 
growth rates and the use of trade credit is given (Cunat, 2007; Tsuruta, 2008). 
Cunat found in his work that firms with increasing sales often show an increase in 
using of trade credit relative stronger to other sources of finance, particularly in 
case of liquidity shocks. A reason might be that banks wait for annual reports and 
therefore are not so one reacting fast on fast-growing firms’ financial needs. This 
is confirmed by Howorth and Reber (2003), who reports about fast-growing firms 
and their habitual of late payment by using trade credit. From the balance sheet’s 
ratio Tsuruta (2008) suggests that firms with a high percentage of short term assets 
are more likely to use trade credit than firms with high percentage of machines and 
buildings in their balance sheet. A basic rule for trade lending is that a corporate 
will grant the loan if it is expected to lead to an improvement in their overall 
business performance. This differs from the credit decisions undertaken by banks. 
Banks generally decide that granting credit is profitable if the total costs of the 
credit and its credit risk margin are lower than the price that the debtor has to pay 
for it. Trade credit is also given under the assumption that the debtor is able to pay 
(Brealey et al. 2009, p. 558). In addition to these financial orientated factors, 
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Klapper cited the main reasons for giving trade credit as: a) sale price 
discrimination, b) to convince a buyer of the quality of the products, c) as a tool to 
investigate the creditworthiness of the buyer, d) to assist the buyer in funding until 
it receives its revenues, and e) if bank loans are not obtained (Klapper, et al., 
2010).  
2.3.2.1. The use of trade finance for the discrimination of sales prices 
 
The price discrimination theory is one reason for the use of trade credit, because 
trade credit offered to specific buyers is for them more important than a price 
reduction.  This theory is empirical confirmed by Pike et al. (2005) and Ng et al. 
(1999). Evaluating the reasons in detail, there are two major different one for using 
trade credit under the aspect of a sales price differentiation (Petersen and Rajan, 
1997): First, suppliers offer trade credit as a form of lower price giving for 
products, where a more elastic demand is market condition. Second, suppliers 
support their long-term customers to avoid bank debt. This is in normal times for 
the buyer often expensive, but it helps strongly in a firm or economical financial 
crisis situations. Suppliers have a strong interest that their customers stay in the 
market to secure future demand, as this is easier than developing new customer 
relations. 
 
As defined by Vishwanath: “Credit sales could be a potential marketing tool. If 
other things remain constant, credit terms could be used to differentiate from 
competitors or match the industry norm”. In addition, Vishwanath explained that 
selling on credit usually induces further buying and should thus be performed, as 
long as the “benefits of granting credit exceed the costs” (Vishwanath 2000, p. 
323). Klapper writes that, in practice, the customer with the best credit rating often 
obtains the longest credit terms. This is understandable from the perspective of the 
supplier, because the best-rated customer has the lowest credit risk. Furthermore, 
these customers will accept average payment terms only if the price is better. A 
longer payment term is therefore a good alternative for the seller. A cash discount 
with earlier payment serves as an instrument for credit risk control (Watson & 
Head 2010, p. 87). From a financial point of view, a discount rate should not be 
offered to customers with top credit ratings because the discount rate is much 
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higher than the conventional bank loan. Thus, the sales management needs 
guidance from the treasury department to determine which customers should 
receive a discount. Klapper analyzed discounts from another viewpoint and found 
that the providers of discounts are big companies with an investment-grade rating, 
or small companies that are driven by the demands of a larger customer (Klapper 
2010). It should be considered, that the interest costs for 30 to 60 days are 
approximately 1 % of the sales face value. The financing factor in relation to the 
total product price is therefore not the most critical. Other factors, such as the 
customer’s satisfaction, the need to optimize working capital and the corporate 
credit standing, influence sales more than the financing does (Watson and Head 
2010, p. 72). This is valid for trade receivables as well as for supplier financing. 
2.3.2.2. Further use of trade finance as a tool to evaluate the creditworthiness  
             of the buyer 
 
Some of the literature evaluated the information advantage that is given when 
delivering under trade credit. Theoretical is this evaluated by Biais and Gollier 
(1997) and empirical studies in that field are from McMillan and Woodruff (1999) 
and Johnson et al. (2002).  In theory, a product seller, who has no credit risk due to 
spot payment or securing the outstanding, does not need financial information 
about the customer. But this knowledge helps in all existing business relationships 
to evaluate the customer’s reliability and buying capacity (Kallberg and Udell, 
2003; Jappelli and Pagano, 2005). In a moment of crisis banks have already the 
necessary information to evaluate credit worthiness, but they are more concerned 
about credit risk and are less willing to give trade credit. Therefore suppliers need 
like the banks the credit relevant information regularly to decide on adequate 
information in a crisis situation themselves, whether to reduce trade credit, which 
lead to a damage of the customer relations for a long time or to give the trade 
credit. For the export business is a sharing of cross-country information helpful; 
for example, by informing private and public credit registries and voluntary 
exchange mechanisms to developing countries. 
In the financial crisis of 2008, suppliers generally gave credit, whereas the banks 
and credit insurers did not (Broens 2011). Klapper explained this as a bank cannot 
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link the real transaction of the supplier with the financial risk given. But finally the 
market conditions determine for bankers and supplier the reasons for the giving of 
trade credit in each specific instance (VCI 2000, p. 12). In general, these reasons 
lead to trade credit practices that vary depending on the industry and country 
(Creditreform 2011). 
Discounts are the predominant costs of trade credit (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 
1994). Often, trade credit seems to be cheaper for the buyer than bank credit. But 
the supplier will include late payment and reminder costs. From that viewpoint it is 
a win-win-situation. In addition, suppliers have more knowledge of the strategic 
default risk of a product than banks, and their inputs are less liquid and thus less 
easily diverted than cash given by banks (Burkart and Ellingsen 2004). 
In addition to the points raised by Klapper and others, Aktas cites important 
aspects that need to be included in the analysis of trade credit. Aktas used a 
holistic approach to determine the reasons for the intensive use of trade credit in 
non-listed US companies, and found that companies with improved credit ratings 
used increased trade credits. He justified this finding by discussing the increased 
focus that companies with strong trade finance have on the shareholder values 
(Aktas et al. 2010).   
 
2.4. Working capital management 
Because trade credit is part of working capital management and corporate strategy, 
the literature on working capital management should also be considered. The 
following section elaborates on working capital, after an introduction:  
Adam Smith developed the concept of circulating capital, which is still relevant 
today. In 1871, Smith referred to differences between fixed capital and current 
capital in the balance sheet contents of the Society of Mines Royal (Dewing 1953, 
p. 685).  Therefore the early development of working capital management was 
based mainly on accounting and unfortunately did not have any significant 
meaning in terms of value creation at that time (Smith 1936). However, it wasn’t 
until 1917 that the term “working capital management” was explained in detail by 
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Lough, a business administration researcher, who stated: “Sufficient working 
capital must be provided in order to take care of the normal process of purchasing 
materials and supplies, turning out finished products, selling the products, and 
waiting for payments to be made. If the original estimates of working capital are 
insufficient, some emergency measures must be resorted to or the business will 
come to a dead stop” (Lough 1917, p. 355). 
Working capital management, from 1920 to 1970, was largely determined by the 
development of macroeconomics, accounting, and the early development of 
operations research (Beranek 1988, p. 11). For example, Keynes devoted much of 
his work to the role of liquidity in the economy (Keynes 1936). Most of the papers 
published during this phase dealt with the management of isolated and individual 
optimization of short-term assets and liabilities (Gentry 1988, p. 43). Only in 
initial research was information from cash, receivables, inventory, and the 
management of short-term loans combined (Mayer 2007, p. 39). Since 1970, 
declining growth rates and competitive markets forced management to shift their 
enterprise strategies. Before the shift, business strategies focused primarily on 
increasing a company’s profitability through the growth of sales revenues. Since 
the 1970s, more complex business strategies such as target sales growth and a 
concentration on maximum returns on capital invested became important, which, 
in terms of short-term assets and liabilities, mainly meant increasing capital 
turnover.  
2.4.1. Definition and scope of working capital management 
The term "working capital" is used in corporate finance as a generally accepted 
explanation for short-term balance sheet items, which include current assets and 
short-term liabilities (Brealey and Myers 2000, p. 856). Firth uses working capital 
as a "general term" (Firth 1976, p. 1). Current assets include all the assets that are 
not recognized as long-term assets and are therefore expected to be changed into 
cash within twelve months. Major balance sheet items include inventories, trade 
receivables and liabilities, other receivables, pre-payments and cash (Coenenberg 
2003, p.199 and Eilenberger 2003, p. 152). Their positioning in the balance sheet 
is determined by the cash conversion times. Analogous to the short-term 
investments on the asset side, companies have various short-term financing 
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alternatives (Ross 2005, p. 732). Unlike the fixed capital or long-term assets, 
working capital has a relatively rapid cash recycling rate. As part of the normal 
business cycle, investments in inventories and receivables are converted into cash 
after the sale of the manufactured products and payment of the receivables. In 
contrast, long-term assets require several years for the repayment of the initial 
investment (Meyer 2007, p. 528). Concerning the scope, working capital 
management is strongly relevant concerning the combination of resources and 
consumptions of working capital. A good management of resources and 
consumptions leads to a higher shareholder's wealth (Neveu 1985).  
Working capital is not only a general expression for short-term operating assets 
and liabilities, but also utilizes liquidity ratios to evaluate the short-term financing 
behaviours of companies. In fact, there are different definitions for this term, 
depending on which short-term balance sheet items are ultimately considered 
(Schneider 2002, p. 540). Brigham and Gapenski define current assets and 
liabilities as working capital (sometimes called gross working capital) or net 
working capital, consisting of the current assets minus the current liabilities. They 
are further convinced that “approximately 60 % of a typical financial manager’s 
time is devoted to working capital management. This is particularly true in smaller 
businesses, where most new jobs are created”. Furthermore, they state that the task 
of working capital involves the basic question: “What is the appropriate amount of 
current assets for the firm to carry both in total and for each specific account?” 
(Brigham and Gapenski 2007, p. 856). In addition, Keown defines working capital 
or gross working capital as the total current assets and current liabilities that 
include the following: a) the assets including trade receivables and inventories, the 
bank deposits and the short-term financial investments and b) the bank overdraft 
and other short-term liabilities (Keown 2007, p. 106).  
 
2.4.2. External evaluation of working capital  
 
Financial analysts are generally concerned with gross working capital, because 
these individuals focus on all the trade activity that can be switched into cash (van 
Horne, 2008). Watson described working capital management through the 
association of the general aims of a company. In his book “Corporate Finance” he 
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wrote: “Working capital management is created by a long-term investment and 
financing decision of a company to raise future cash flow, which, when discounted 
by the appropriate cost of the capital, determines the market value of a company. 
However, such long-term decisions will only result in the expected benefits for the 
company if attention is also paid to short-term decisions regarding current assets 
and current liabilities” (Watson and Head 2010, p. 70). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Schematic of working capital and trade finance   
(own source) 
 
The term management has its source in the verb “to manage”. This verb comes 
from the Italian word “maneggiare” (to handle, in particular tools), which was 
derived from the Latin word “manus” (hand). The French word “mesnagement” 
(later “management”) influenced the meaning of the English word “management” 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Oxford English Dictionary). Today 
"management" is a fixed term in the English language that has also found 
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widespread use in other languages, but the term is so widespread that no 
universally accepted definition exists. In this manuscript, functional and 
institutional management can be distinguished from a business perspective 
(Steinmann et al. 1997, p. 5).  
2.4.2.1. Scope of management  
 
A functional management approach is defined by the functional organization of a 
company and describes the management functions that are involved in its 
planning, organization, management, coordination and control (Fayol 1949, p. 
43ff). The approaches of this function depend on the phases of the management 
process and can be considered an extension of the analytic function-based 
approach (Terry 1977, p. 34). The functional management approach treats 
management as a profile function that controls the interaction of the above-
mentioned management functions and the factual functions of procurement, 
production and sales.  
 
Figure 4: Schematic of factual functions. The five management functions are 
involved throughout the factual supply, production and sales functions of a 
company (source: Fayol 1949)  
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The institutional approach evaluates the people (groups) that perform the 
management tasks; it describes their activities and roles. The scientific research 
mentioned in this manuscript is focused on the actions of management. Mintzberg 
concluded that managers fill a series of ten roles: 1. the figurehead, or 
representative of the organization; 2. the leader; 3. the liaison officer; who 
associates particularly with outsiders; 4. the recipient, who receives information 
regarding the operation of an enterprise; 5. the disseminator, who passes 
information to the subordinates; 6. the spokesperson, who transmits information to 
those outside the organization; 7. the entrepreneur; 8. the disturbance handler;  9. 
the resource allocator; and 10. the negotiator, who deals with various people and 
groups of people (Mintzberg 1973, p. 15). Although the traditional management 
culture emanated from the idea that institutions should be organized like machines, 
companies are now understood to be complex systems. Therefore, systems theory 
has strongly influenced current management theory. This point of view allows an 
interdisciplinary research approach that fully supports the consideration of 
different values (Staele 1999, p. 162). In addition, the priorities of different 
management approaches can be considered through this holistic, abstract and 
integrated view (Ulrich 1994, p. 165). 
 
According to Malik, one of the major problems of management is to master 
complexity, i.e., the proper handling of the variety of relationships between 
elements within the system, or company, and an ever-changing environment 
(Malik 1994 p. 18f). Contemporary management therefore has to be determined by 
the Ashby rule of necessary variety, in order to be able to respond to problems 
(Ashby 1958. p. 202f). Thus, it seems sensible to accept Malik's understanding of 
systematic evolution management, which deals with the design and control of 
entire systems or institutions (Malik 1996, p. 102). The term “management” is not 
committed to a specific type of organization and can relate, in terms of 
management science, to various recognition findings (Staele 1999, p. 162). The 
present study refers to the recognition finding of the market economy based on 
Gutenberg (Gutenberg 1972, p. 507ff). As a consequence this work is problem-
oriented and uses a holistic, integrative, interdisciplinary approach.  
 
  
47 
 
2.4.3. Metrics of working capital management  
The working capital ratio can be used to analyze the %age proportion of the short-
term liabilities that are covered by the current assets. Therefore,  
 
Working capital ratio   =     
current assets 
current liabilities 
 * 100 
 
The formula is sometimes seen as a way to measure a firm’s liquidity. However, a 
high working capital ratio does not necessarily lead to a situation, where a 
company will have enough cash to pay at all times. The risk is still that the 
finished products cannot be sold or receivables are not paid in a timely manner, 
then the apparent good situation reflected by a high working capital ratio could be 
deceptive (Brigham and Erhard 2008, p.856). A company should, following the 
universal and ordinary funding rules, ensure that the working capital ratio is at 
least 100 per cent. If this ratio is exactly 100 per cent, the working capital is 
balanced, the net amount is zero and the relative figure is 1. A company should 
therefore aim to permanently maintain its minimum working capital ratio at 
approximately 100 per cent (Subramanyam 2010, p. 531). In fact, various banks 
require a working capital ratio of at least 200 per cent to rate a company as 
favorable.  
 
Furthermore, the financing of working capital is very important. This relevant 
ratio, which is called net working capital, is defined as:   
 
Net working capital   =   
current assets 
short term loans 
 * 100  
 
Net working capital shows the amount of short-term financing that is covered by 
the current assets. In general, liquidity presents a high risk if short-term financing 
is also used to finance long-term assets. The relevant metric is the calculation of 
the number of days that are occupied with working capital (DWC = days working 
capital). A typical figure is 55 days but some companies have much lower ratios. 
For example, Dell, Apple, Vobis (a German computer seller) and a US petroleum 
company have had negative DWC values for several years, which means that these 
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companies are paid by their customers before they have to pay their suppliers 
(Brigham and Erhard 2008, p.774).  
 
2.4.3.1. The Acid test  
 
The quick ratio, or “acid test”, also attempts to measure a company’s liquidity and 
is determined through the subtraction of the inventories from the current assets and 
the division of this value by the current liabilities. This quick ratio removes the 
inventories from the current assets because these are the least liquid of the current 
assets (Brigham and Gapenski 1997, p.856). The term “acid test” derives from the 
test that gold miners used to determine if their findings were real gold 
nuggets. Unlike other metals, gold does not corrode in acid; therefore, if the 
nugget did not dissolve when submerged in acid, it was said to have passed the 
“acid test”. Similarly, a company can be considered to have financial integrity if 
its financial statements pass the figurative “acid test”. Companies with a quick 
ratio that is much lower than the working capital ratio are highly dependent on 
their inventory, e.g., retail stores.   
 
Each of the main drivers of working capital also has its own metric. The inventory 
conversion period, which is called “days on hand” (DOH), is calculated by 
dividing the inventory by the sales. The receivables collection period is the ratio of 
receivables at the end of the period to the sales that were made during the period. 
The result is called “day’s sales outstanding”, or DSO (Brigham and Erhard 2008, 
p.777). The DSO is analyzed in detail later in the manuscript. The payables 
deferral period is the average time from the purchasing of the material and labour 
(date of invoice) to the moment of payment (Camerinelli 2009, p. 15). This ratio, 
which is called “day’s payable outstanding”, or DPO, is calculated by dividing the 
payables by the purchases that were made in a specific period.  
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2.4.3.2. The cash conversion cycle and further measurements of working 
capital management  
 
Gross working capital can be divided into treasury-related activities, which include 
bank deposits, short-term loans and cash positions, and the remaining trade 
receivables, liabilities and inventories, which are more operationally oriented. A 
benchmark of success for corporates on working capital mostly excludes the 
treasury-related activities because these are influenced by many non-operative 
decisions, e.g., cash reserves, upfront payment, and cash deposits as securities 
(REL 2003). 
 
Data from accounting is the basic metric that is used to measure a company’s 
working capital, although in the global accounting standard IAS/IFRS, working 
capital is not defined (Pellens et al. 2004, p. 15). The assets are classified by 
IAS/IFRS through their liquidation as either "non-current" or "current" assets. 
According to the maturity criterion, the short-term debt is disclosed separately 
from the long-term debt. The maturity classification is often used as a benchmark 
in the basic balance sheet analysis that is performed in North America under the 
local GAAP (Gräfer 1992, p. 19).  
 
The metric for the total working capital period is called the cash conversion cycle. 
This period is the time that transpires from the purchase of the production 
materials until the cash inflow from the sale of the relevant end products. The 
optimal control of working capital in the company is therefore linked to target-
oriented measures for inventories, trade receivables and trade liabilities (Watson 
and Head, 2010 p. 75). The analysis of the cycle can be considered a starting point 
for the identification of the potential optimization of the working capital. The 
financial aim is to optimize the firm’s liquidity without having a negative impact 
on the production process. The common solution is based on the principle "as 
much as necessary, as little as possible" (Hennah 2009a). 
Subramanyam considers working capital a measure of a company's liquidity 
position (Subramanyam, 2010. p. 529). Thus, working capital is the difference 
between the current assets and the short-term accounts payable. This means for the 
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working capital management that it must maintain a good balance between the 
trade activities cycle, the liquidity circulation and the profitability to finally 
increase the firm’s value. Therefore, bringing working capital requirements and 
profitability not in the right relation, not defining the rules about each side, and not 
planning and controlling the components for both targets may lead to insolvency 
and bankruptcy. The past shows that a large number of business failures came 
from the inability of the financial management to plan and control the current 
assets and current liabilities of their respective firms (Gill 2008, p. 30). 
2.4.4. Decisions made by working capital management   
 
The right decisions form the basis of the best working capital management. To be 
effective, working capital management requires a clear specification of the 
objectives to be achieved (Camerinelli 2009, p. 15). In general, the aim of working 
capital management is to optimize the working capital within the general aims of 
the company, which are its profitability, an adequate long-term financing/equity 
ratio and liquidity (Irwin 1991, p. 34).  
 
Profitability is the result of all the actions that are taken by a company. There are 
several methods that can be used to evaluate a company’s profitability. These 
methods include net profit in relation to the equity and net profit in relation to 
turnover. Both these ratios do not use working capital data in their calculations.  
Other profitability evaluations include net profit in relation to total investment and 
net profit in relation to total debt. In these two cases, the net working capital has an 
impact on the result because it is a direct or indirect part of the denominator.  
 
Long-term financing/equity ratio, or gearing, is important to obtain additional cash 
for the company. A business would become insolvent when its liabilities exceeded 
its assets. In other words, if an insolvent business closed tomorrow, it would not be 
possible to satisfy all the company’s creditors (Irwin 1991, p. 34). However, the 
gearing criterion is not focused only on the actual status, but also on the 
expectations of the business. If a credit grantor is convinced that the company will 
earn money in the future, it will offer credit even if the company is over-indebted 
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for different reasons, such as unpaid receivables, extremely high inventories or 
excessive trade liabilities.  
 
2.4.4.1. The relation between working capital and liquidity 
 
Liquidity is necessary for the daily financing of a corporate. “Liquidity should be 
considered in the evaluation of the company context as the ability to convert assets 
into cash or to obtain cash to meet its short-term obligations. (Short-term is 
conventionally viewed as a period of up to one year, although it is identified 
within the normal operating cycle of a company).Lack of liquidity prevents a 
company from taking advantage of favorable discounts or profitable opportunities. 
Extreme liquidity problems reflect a company’s inability to cover its current 
obligations. This can lead to forced sale of investments and other assets at reduced 
prices and, in its most severe form, to insolvency and bankruptcy” (Subramanym 
2010, p. 528). Beside the cash position, working capital is the next important 
parameter in the evaluation of the liquidity of a company. The measurement used 
in the assessment of liquidity is current assets subtracted from trade liabilities, 
which gives the net current assets.  
 
Current assets are items in a company that are either temporary or are used only 
for short periods. Goods that are available for consumption, for sale or for other 
short-term use within the company include: goods purchased that are later resold; 
raw materials purchased and processed into different products, either through the 
use of machines or handcrafting; and receivables, which should be converted into 
liquid funds as quickly as possible, short-term securities and cash deposits.   
 
The asset and liability structures of different industries are shown in Table 1:  
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Table 1: The asset and liability structures of different industries 
(Source: Adopted from Fitzgerald 2002, p. 138) 
 
 
 
 
2.4.4.2. Working capital management impacts on corporate strategy, corporate 
values and equity  
 
Working capital management is part of the management of a company. The 
focused aims of working capital management are a) avoidance of practices that can 
lead to the demise of a company (e.g., insolvency due to insufficient liquidity) and 
b) obtaining the right return on investments for the company’s owner(s). The EVA 
(Economic Value Added) concept provides a useful way of analyzing working 
capital. EVA is a key measure of the value that is created in a company. It can be 
calculated as the difference between the company results (EBIT-Earnings before 
interest and taxes – plus taxes) and the capital costs on the invested capital; thus, 
the EVA shows the value of a company at a specific period. Grant considers the 
EVA as the only metric that is based on the principles of wealth maximization 
(Grant, 2003. p. 40). As a result, the EVA measure is positively affected by a 
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reduction of inventories, cash or receivables, without having a serious effect on the 
operating income, which in turn results in a reduction of the company’s capital 
requirements and financing costs. Return on Equity (RoE), an overall aim of the 
company and for equity investors as well, is also influenced by the working 
capital.  The RoE can be improved by reducing that part of the working capital that 
does not have an effect on the sales profit margin; by using cash to reduce equity, 
and; by reducing financing costs (Bodie et al., 2009, p. 460). 
 
A firm’s significant capital amount is tied to its current assets, which are mainly 
accounts receivable and inventories. In spite of this, companies in the past did not 
consistently control and optimize receivables, inventories (stocks) and trade 
payables. However, if a systematic and active working capital management is 
operated, the working capital can be permanently reduced by double digits in a 
short time. The released liquidity can then be used for other purposes, such as 
necessary investments, repayment of debts and adding to the liquidity reserve. In 
addition, a reduced working capital increases the value of a company, which is 
particularly important for listed companies. Furthermore, improvement in working 
capital strengthens the negotiating position of a company with regard to potential 
investors (Keown 2006, p. 469f). On the other hand, the efficient management of 
working capital creates financial reserves, which can be used to pay off loans or 
finance additional growth of a given equity. Stronger working capital also results 
in a decrease in the company’s borrowing costs and the inherent improved 
liquidity situation reduces the vulnerability of a company to financial and other 
risks.  
 
2.4.4.3. Working capital and further relations 
  
The management of inventories, assets and liabilities is therefore an important 
indicator of a company’s ability, even in financially critical situations, to meet its 
financial obligations. This was confirmed in the internal assessment of banks when 
the credit risk of a company that applies for a loan is analyzed.  
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Effective working capital management is strongly necessary for all firms due to 
the link on performance and liquidity of the firm (Taleb et al. 2010). The main 
objective of working capital management is to establish best practice in all 
working capital management components (Gill 2011). The efficient management 
of working capital must be a sub target of the overall corporate strategy and must 
aim to create value for shareholders (Nazir and Afza 2008). A negative, or very 
low positive working capital is regarded as critical because it shows a potential 
risk of a low liquidity and indicates that the operation has structural difficulties. 
The most popular measurement of working capital management is the cash 
conversion cycle (CCC), which is the time lag between the purchase of raw 
materials or the rendering of services, and the collection of cash from the sale of 
goods or services rendered. If the time lag is long, it means a greater investment to 
working capital components must be made, causing greater financing needs. Thus 
interest expenses will be higher, which leads to a higher default risk and lower 
profitability. Use of profitability as an indicator of a firm’s performance can be 
misleading, as there can be a reverse relationship between the CCC and the firm’s 
performance.   
 
For the most part, the goal of improving working capital is the release of capital. 
However, it is not always necessary to reduce the absolute working capital; for 
example, a better turnover usually leads to an increase in receivables and the 
payment of these increased receivables is initially an influx of cash, which does 
not change the volume of the current assets and is an improvement from the 
viewpoint of credit. The management always has to optimize working capital 
without losing potential for sales. In general, improvement in working capital is 
only possible when the business partner receives, for example, a less favorable 
price (Joy 1977, p. 410). In a good market situation the “price” for better working 
capital is low, but in a downturn, generating cash is important for all firms, and 
consequently the “price” is more expensive. The financial crisis of 2008 showed 
how important (and expensive) this optimization was because the banks, as the 
lenders of cash, had their own problems and were often unwilling to take a credit 
risk. 
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2.4.4.4.  Best practice in working capital management    
 
Some corporates use working capital to speed up efficiency; this method is called 
zero working capital (Brigham and Erhard 1997, p. 860). Although it is nearly 
impossible to reach zero working capital, this measurement symbolizes that 
inventories are reduced as much as possible through “just in time” production and 
product demand, which enables the produced goods to be sold at once. Experience 
shows that all elements of production operate quickly and efficiently through data 
links between buyers and suppliers. Therefore, a much reduced working capital 
can be obtained through good planning (Vormbaum 1995, p. 147). 
 
Generally, working capital is vital to any business because it is the source of the 
corporate’s liquidity (Camerinelli 2009, p. 38), which represents its cash flow 
(Witeley 2003, p. 68). The volume of a company’s working capital depends on its 
type of business. The two extremes are the distributors who have very high stocks, 
and the consulting companies, that have no need at all for stocks. Retailers have 
the lowest receivables outstanding, because private consumers do not receive any 
payment terms. The improvement of working capital management includes the 
following best practices that drive continuous improvement in working capital 
management and generate high-quality cash flow intelligence (APQC 2012): 
 
 Strategic intention should determine all operational processes;  
 A prerequisite is that executive-level support leads officially the working 
capital initiatives like the reduction of the amount of cash that is invested in;  
 To reach the maximum efficiency processing in financial transactions should be 
centralized and standardized. This draw meaningful insights from the 
underlying data;  
 A cross-functional approach is necessary to avoid silo thinking in working 
capital accountability; 
 Using the enterprise resource planning (ERP) system with the stored data helps 
in reporting the daily credit and collections activities;  
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 Conduct real-time detailed analysis of the cash flow;  
 The operating units should be informed on basis on the steps analyze, measure 
and advise how to improve working capital and how to increase the return on 
the invested amount in operations;  
 Working capital management has to consider the models relevant to the 
company’s business and design with this focus measures;  
 Quality and productivity tools improve processes and enables efforts in finance; 
 Discrepancies must be corrected at the front end of the process;  
 The working capital risk in its various ways has to be actively managed;  
 Self-service tools support efficiency; and  
 Electronically transactions should be made whenever possible not only with 
vendors but with all partners, so that they can do the same.  
The effective handling of working capital leads not only to improved liquidity, but 
also to a strong discipline in working capital management that is reflected in a 
strong sense of discipline in operations. The total results are strong gains as well in 
productivity as in, by extension, economic profit growth (Driscoll 2011).  
 
2.5. Corporate trade finance on the macro level 
Trade credit (i.e. accounts payable for the buyer and accounts receivable for the 
supplier) comprises short-term loans extended by suppliers to customers 
purchasing their products. The loan is automatically extended when the debtor 
pays late to the suppliers. Trade credit is part of the traditional credit channels, and 
can substitute bank loans. This was first suggested by Meltzer (1960). Jaffee and 
Russell (1976) found that in situations of high interest costs or limited access firms 
were credit-constrained and made greater use of trade credit. Nilsen (2002) looked 
at a longer period and calculated in his research that the use of trade credit was 
strongly used in the US by both small and large corporates with no access to open 
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market credit (like stock exchange). For firms not listed trade credit has an 
important role as a substitute for bank credit.  
De Blasio (2003), using Italian data, confirms that firms uses corporate trade 
finance instead of bank credit during periods of monetary tightening; but the 
results were weak signals. Guariglia and Mateut (2006) started from the 
investment in inventories, where they used error-corrected data, and tested 
different trade credit alternatives to evaluate the transmission of monetary policy 
on trade finance. The result was that both, bank and corporate trade channels exist 
in the UK Mateut believes that the corporate trade finance offers tends to weaken 
the bank products. Love et al. (2007) made their research on data just before the 
global crisis. Their findings was that immediately after a financial shock in a 
country, region or globally, there is an increased supply of corporate trade credit. 
This exactly happened then in the following years.  
Documenting very early in the manuscript the very high volume in international 
trade in consequently the importance finance the transactions, a remaining 
question in the literature has been, whether there are in certain crisis situation 
specific trade finance instruments that are best to overcome financial constraints. 
Letters of credit, open account supplier credit, and cash-in-advance are the most 
use product in international trade finance. Using unique survey data from 
corporates, Eck et al. (2012) evaluated that about 96% of all exporters use open 
account supplier credit. Furthermore, in cross-border trades is the use of open 
account supplier credit and advance payments in percentage higher than in 
domestic trades. 
2.5.1. Corporate trade finance and national trade  
Even in domestic trades corporate trade finance us huge according to a Federal 
Reserve Board Study by Elliehausen and Wolken (1993). They calculated that 
15.78% of total assets of small US businesses were financed by trade credit. For 
the same years Rajan and Zingales (1995) found that in 1991 trade credit to 
customers counted 17.8% of total assets for US firms and 22% for UK firms. The 
percentage was more than 25% for countries like Italy, France, and Germany. 
Finally, Kohler, Britton, and Yates (2000) analyzed the split between bank loans 
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and corporates suppliers finance for the years 1983 to 1995. Here 55% of the total 
trade credit received by UK firms was given by other firms. They had the 
viewpoint that when higher interest rates occur, bank lending declines and firms 
increase their use of supplier trade credit to have sufficient financial resources. 
Although significant differences exist in the type and products and the method of 
using corporate trade finance for the firms around the world, financing of 
corporate trade is one of the most important sources of short-term finance. It is 
probably the most important one in a crisis situation due to the strong relation 
between producer and product buyer. According to later shown own evaluations 
for German publicly traded companies, accounts payable or accounts receivable 
can reach 25% of a firm’s total assets. In general, theories that explain trade credit 
argument with commercial reasons, total transaction-profit, and financial as well 
as liquidity advantages (e.g., Bastos and Pindado 2007; Deloof and Jegers 1999; 
Deloof and Overfelt 2010; Marotta 2005; Petersen and Rajan 1997). 
 
2.5.2. Corporate trade finance and international trade  
Without corporate trade finance firms could not finance their business, especially 
when banks have their own problems like in the global crisis 2008. Corporate trade 
finance is based on the fact that the buyer helps the producer to receive cash and 
therefore needs the delay between the delivery of goods and services and the 
payment for them. On the other hand, firms are mostly supplier as well as buyer. It 
is often a fact that firms that receive credit from their own suppliers are more 
likely to extend trade credit to their customers. This inter-firm trade finance is one 
of the most important sources of short-term financing for firms around the world 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997). To avoid a bank loans, the credit terms for receivables 
and liabilities must match the maturities.  
 
A further basic point for the macro evaluation of corporate trade finance is that 
suppliers to financially weak firms may in a financial crisis get fast their own 
financing problems. This is confirmed by existing theoretical models (e.g. Cunat 
2007; Wilner 2000 and Raddatz 2010. This would also be in line with Boissay and 
Gropp (2007) who found that the missing liquidity for the supplier is critical for 
  
59 
 
small and medium size firms or corporates with a low creditworthiness, while big 
firms with better credit rating have access to outside liquidity and can therefore 
absorb such shocks with their “deep pockets”. Evidence from the 1997 financial 
crisis on six emerging economies (Love et al. (2007) showed that firms with low 
credit rating have stronger to reduce the sales supporting financing of trade. A 
comparison work is done by Klapper & Randall (2010).  
 
Furthermore, trade credit is predominantly based on long-term relationships. This 
point from the micro view has to be considered as well on the macro-side, because 
trade creditors that are more dependent on their customer’s business grant more 
credit to financially distressed customers than banks would in a financial crisis 
(Wilner 2000 and Cunat 2007). Nilsen (2002) showed that during monetary caused 
high interest rates, small firms depend strongly on supplier credit. Petersen and 
Rajan (1997) found that the firms that are due to an external crisis in a financial 
weak position try to get their financing from the supplier more than from banks 
and get their liquidity from short credit terms with their customers. Fisman and 
Love (2003) analysed different sectors in combination with different countries.  
They found that when firms deliver in countries with high interest rates, corporate 
trade finance is used stronger than when the rates are low. Furthermore some 
sectors have general problems to get bank financing. Thus, the theory and 
empirical results suggest that suppliers are absolutely necessary for the existing of 
financially constrained firms. This has to be considered by the regulators 
especially when evaluating or controlling a financial crises. 
 
2.5.3. Corporate trade finance since the global financial crisis  
The recent global financial crisis brought back for the financial world the interest 
from topics like derivatives and mergers and acquisition back to the fundamentals 
of finance like transaction banking and trade finance (Korinek et al., 2009; Freund, 
2009; Evennett, 2009; Kee et al., 2010; Eaton et al., 2010; Levchenko et al., 2010; 
Chor & Manova, 2012).  The named studies focus however more on the volume of 
trade finance and on how trade finance can in future avoid the negative 
development on trade demand during the crisis. Korinek et al. (2009) are 
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evaluating as well not more trade finance itself. They examined the effects of the 
availability and costs of bank financed trade finance on imports for 43 different 
countries during the crisis. Their findings is that a low offer and high costs lead to 
decreasing in trade. Imports and exports to the US during the recession 2008 was 
the topic of Levchenko et al. (2010). They evaluated disaggregated quarterly and 
monthly data, and found that trade credit was no the main driver for the import 
reduction. Chor and Manova (2012) used monthly public US import data to 
evaluated international trade flows since 2007. Like Levchenko et al. (2010), Chor 
and Manova found that credit pricing does not strongly influence import volumes 
during a recession. 
 
2.5.3.1. Latest developments in corporate trade finance   
 
In the 1990s, as part of the introduction of newer software tools, the fax advice for 
payments was omitted. Electronic advices for payments are sent. In 2009, a 
technically similar initiative was implemented by the Brazilian Government for all 
business-related sales; this initiative required the storing of a copy of all business-
to-business receivables and payables for tax reasons. Auditors worldwide 
increasingly demand that reported receivables are confirmed not only randomly 
but in their entirety by the debtor. In addition, banks require this information in the 
context of a credit check. These requirements should drive an increase in the use 
of electronic data exchanges for all business activities. A recently developed 
method to improve the earnings of portfolio credit management involves ABS 
(asset-backed securities) programs. “The distinctive feature of asset-backed 
security is that the return on the securities is derived from the performance of the 
specific assets” (Rivett 1991, p. 159ff). In the case of credit-backed securities, 
investors have the same rights to the receivables in the event of a default by the 
company. In contrast, a corporate bond will be “secured” by the assets and the 
cash flow of the company.  
 
The characteristics of ABS securities are the following: 
 The final lender of the assets that back the securities will typically be in the 
form of a trust or another special vehicle (the intermediary or the ‘SPV’); 
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 The intermediary is typically a bank; and 
 The final investors will receive income and the return of capital from the assets 
throughout the life of the security. 
Typically, the corporate that sells its receivables is responsible for the first part of 
the default risk. Because this amount is much higher than the historic and expected 
default volume, the buyer of the receivables does not expect any credit risk. A 
proportion of the discount rate is a service fee for the arrangement, and a guarantee 
that the program will run for the total of the proposed period.   
2.5.3.2. Banks development for trade finance   
 
The management of trade receivables and liabilities by an enterprise considers the 
following processes: delay of payment; the financing; credit management of 
receivables; operational collections and management accounting costs; and 
optimization of the stocks. A new bank development enables corporates to make 
significant improvements to these processes. The new product, Trade Service 
Utility (TSU), was conceived by several global banks and their cooperative, 
SWIFT, which enables internal communication between banks. (The introduction 
of TSU coincided with a speech by the German Federal Chancellor, Angela 
Merkel at the computer fair Cebit, in Hanover in 2010, titled Connecting the world 
(Broens 2009). 
 
Banks are major supplier of payment transaction services as well as of risk and 
liquidity management. However, the internet has changed the requirement of 
commercial and end-user customers. Furthermore, banks increasingly consider 
themselves as service providers Therefore the focus of the bank institutes is more, 
to bring added-value in financial operation management to compete in the new 
market environment.  The financing of transactions becomes increasingly more 
important; in these cases, traditional products (e.g., factoring) are offered at the 
same extent as innovative forms of financing (e.g., supply chain finance).  
Furthermore, banks help their customers in their payment collection and data 
analysis. International cash management, e-invoicing and the creation and 
matching of commercial documents are further services that are offered by banks. 
  
62 
 
The aim is to get more detail knowledge about the financial side of firms as this 
will of central importance because it forms the basis of a successful customer 
relationship and financial profile analysis.  
 
In international business, data collection and the continuous monitoring of 
transactions is even more of interest for banks as this business enables the banks a 
lot of transaction and risk related business. On the other side this business is 
particularly challenging and only the big bank institute can handle it. The banking 
technique does not offer standardized electronic invoicing formats or other ruled 
commercial documents. Therefore, SWIFT introduced TSU in 2007, which is a 
communication-based bank-to-bank application through which data exchange and 
purchase orders, invoices, transport documents and certification data can be 
automatically matched.  The application, however, requires that companies make 
this data available.  
 
2.5.3.3. The advantage of the banks’ TSU  
 
TSU makes it possible to promptly recognize any differences between the 
documents without the need to perform any individual checking. Thus, payment 
losses are avoided and/or the turn-around times between delivery and payment are 
shortened. In addition to the time advantage, the expensive creation of documents 
and their checking is also improved through this application. Thus, banks once 
again have become the suppliers of trade finance. Banks have also introduced an 
electronic standardized irrevocable payment obligation (bank payment obligation, 
BPO). This is first performed by the bank of the buyer. However, it can also be 
performed by another bank or, in the case of an inherent country risk, by two 
banks. This BPO is similar to the confirmation that is given by banks to LCs. The 
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris has already confirmed this product; 
therefore, the TSU now receives worldwide status and rights that are comparable 
to those of LCs.  
 
TSU exhibits a number of other good functions. Supply chain financing (SCF) is 
based on a strong concept; however, this product will achieve a real break-through 
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if a matching standard is developed. Therefore, the target is integration of the 
workflow between the production and the financial data, in order to receive an on-
line total status. Another advantage of TSU is in currency management: companies 
have a more exact knowledge of their exposure and banks can thus offer better 
handling recommendations, or even an active management that channels all its 
trade flows through TSU. TSU has a stronger impact for the B2B trade outside of 
the banking products, as follows: Working capital improvement. By the matching 
of trade receivables and liabilities, mismatches can be made available to all parties 
before maturity. Delay of payment can then be authorized in exceptional cases 
only. The matching thus increases the substantial interest and liquidity advantages. 
Suppliers are also able to avoid direct debits and check payments, which have 
some legal and financial risk. The majority of the actual collections work 
decreases because the information of a planned payment is available before 
maturity. Furthermore, a majority of the manual accounting work becomes void 
because debtors and creditors have a stronger interest under the electronic data 
exchange to harmonize the data records, such that both sides have to do the least 
amount of manual work. End-of-year procedure work: Confirmations with debtors 
over the existence of the receivables are void through this application, because the 
position is confirmed by the matching. The matching is improved because only a 
random sampling currently occurs. Thus, any deliberate and/or erroneous 
representations of data in the annual report is avoided.  
 
Optimization of inventories: The data exchange over the TSU begins with the 
order placement, which makes it possible for the supplier to conduct a fast 
consideration of the demand in the production process. The TSU is then used to 
redefine the order quantities and times, and to determine what factors might have a 
positive effect on the prices. In addition, TSU is the enabler of an increasingly 
important argument that states that a smaller inventory protects the environment. 
TSU is now supported by nearly all major trade-related banks.  
2.6. Conclusions drawn from the literature  
Today, rating and scoring procedures are comparable to the systems that are used 
in a school exam (Keown 2007, p. 510; Brealey et al. 2009, p. 559). Business-to-
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business scoring procedures, which have proven failure rates, can be determined 
using data from financial statements. Some essential questions that should be 
answered during the credit assessment are the following: Does the firm receive 
sufficient profit from its operations? Are the total assets adequate?  Does the 
turnover of the firm compare well with the credit limit? Can the company pay its 
total liabilities, even at unfavorable interest rates? Does the company have 
sufficient equity to realize the business developments that it has planned? Does the 
firm have a positive net current asset? In some of the literature, the scoring 
judgment is based on the so-called “five Cs of credit”: The customer’s character, 
customer’s capacity to pay, customer’s capital, the volume of collateral provided 
by customer, and the condition of the customer’s business (Brealey, A. 2009 p. 
559; Gallinger & Healey 1991, p. 358). 
Analytic procedures that utilize other data include an assessment of the payment 
performance of the buyer. In 2008, a creditor in Germany would have had to 
accept a time period of approximately two weeks on overdue payments. Insolvent 
companies, however, exhibit different values: three financial quarters before the 
application for insolvency is made, the company has overdue payments of four 
weeks on average. During the last quarter before insolvency, these delays are 
approximately 43 days on average and one-eighth of the receivables were overdue 
for more than three months (Creditreform 2011 p. 21). Other sources name 30 
days past due date as a criterion of insolvency (Neumayer 2007, p. 145 and Thiel 
1997, p. 99). Further criteria include a company’s repeated failure to comply with 
its payment plans, the age of a company, and the length of the buyer/seller 
relationship (Dennis 2000 p. 328). 
A scoring procedure that does not use any balance sheet data but utilizes only 
customer relationship data has also been developed. Surveys indicate that the 
weighting of the factors is quite different in this assessment. Further evidence of 
insolvency risk is provided by the customer’s industry type. The insolvency risk 
increases during lower industry demand, but also during strong industry growth 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2007, p. 27). The country in which the customer is located 
is also critical, particularly when there are difficult market conditions, 
governmental intervention and high inflation. Furthermore, the owners of a 
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company become meaningful should the company’s exposure be higher than the 
creditworthiness of its subsidiaries. Individual criteria are first systematically 
assessed in relation to the importance of a default. The results are then ordered and 
presented to obtain an overall statement. During this evaluation, because not all 
criteria are equally important in the assessment of bankruptcy, the rated aspects are 
combined with the respective factor levels to obtain the total score. Correlation of 
the factors should also be considered. The data used for the standard process 
should be reviewed regularly to ascertain the continued validity of the specified 
failure criteria. Similarly, the economic assumptions that are used, such as 
inflation and general demand, must be continuously adapted. This evaluation has 
to be performed by a fundamental analysis, and by the back-testing of the 
company’s historical data. 
 
In the following section researcher had developed theoretical development for the 
study based on the above literature review.  
 
2.7. Theoretical development of the planned research 
The study objective is to find out the impact of the financial imbroglio on 
corporate trade credit. Therefore, the study takes the literature assessment route on 
the financial hypothesis for corporate trade credit. This study is a piece of 
mounting literature on the characteristics of the 2008 – 09 worldwide financial 
disaster in general and the collapse of global trade in particular. The monetary 
hypothesis of trade credit (Emery, 1984, Meltzer, 1960; Schwartz, 1974) 
speculates that companies that had ample and easy access to credit facilities had 
limited access to trade credit. This study also includes tax row (Brick & Fung, 
1984), suggesting various tax brackets for buyers and sellers allowing them with a 
variety of borrowing costs since interest is tax deductible. This also allows 
suppliers, who are in the higher tax rate brackets, to offer credit to buyers of lower 
tax rate brackets. Several researches track Meltzer's (1960) and Schwartz's (1974) 
financial clarification for trade credit. This is evident from Petersen and Rajan 
(1997) findings indicating more number of firms’ preferring trade credit in the 
absence of bank credit. Additionally, the focus of Nilsen (2002) and Baum, 
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Caglayan, and Ozkan (2003) lay importance of financial tightening measures 
besides macroeconomic ambiguity in the trade credit provided by companies. 
Further, Nilsen came across practical confirmation that smaller companies have 
limited access to loans from banks during monetary tightening periods forcing 
them to opt for more trade credit. Interestingly, Baum et al. gets support that 
companies’ turn towards their supplier for financing as a source during ambiguous 
macroeconomic conditions, especially from non-durable goods maker, who are 
also big, and, high-growth deliverers. Other works also point to a similar literature 
offering practical confirmation that links demand for trade credit and credit 
rationing; for example, Danielson and Scott (2004). These authors see more 
demand for trade credit from opaque firms during credit rationing. Wilner (2000) 
sees that a dependent creditor offers more sops to a customer during the financial 
distress in a long-term association. Delannay and Weill (2004) confirmed that 
trade credit provides an alternative route to bank credit in credit starved companies 
like transition economies. Uesugi and Yamashiro (2008), in their recent study, 
examined the opposite side of influence as to the extent of how decreasing trade 
credit impacts the credit availability from financial establishments. Significantly, 
they term that bank credit and trade credit are complementary or corresponding 
one.  
2.7.1. Corporate credit and the financial crisis  
During the crisis, production companies suffer as the credit availability gets 
reduced in trade finance instruments provided by credit insurer and banks 
(Iacovone &Zavacka, 2009). There is also an investigation conducted by Bastos 
and Pindado (2013) in emerging markets on the usage of trade credit during the 
period of financial distress. According to the authors’ calculation, a higher level of 
ratio on days-sales-outstanding and increased possibility of insolvency is the 
strong reasons for using trade credit in the financial disaster. Significantly, Chor 
and Manova (2012) confirmed international trade during the period of financial 
turmoil. The result was not a favourable one for companies especially in countries 
where the interest management are strict. This is quite evident from an academic 
legalization of lower interest rate regime in many central banks policies during the 
financial crisis and is practised even today. In Asia, Love and Zaida (2010) 
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examined the trade activities of small and med-sized companies following the 
1998 crisis. They found that companies, which faced constraints in bank finance, 
could get only reduced trade credit. This has forced such firms to cut down their 
trade credit limits to their customers. According to Eck, Engemann and Schnitzer 
(2012), trade credits did have a favourable impact on companies importing and 
exporting activities. Moreover, trade credit is being offered by the product 
producer to its distributors to help finance distributors’ inventory till the goods are 
sold and money is paid (Klapper et al. 2010). 
It is a standard and a significant economic basic rule that the financially strong 
companies enjoy commercial loan facilities so as to help their financially weak 
partners in bringing down borrowing expenses. The financially stronger companies 
can be either buyer or seller (Giannetti et al. 2011). Secondly, corporate can take a 
call whether providing trade credit could potentially drive an enhancement of their 
business performance by and large, which the banks will shy away from it 
(Buckley et al. 2001). Financial institutions only offer credit facilities and have no 
goods to sell. Therefore, their objective is to earn profit from the credit lent 
including the risks associated with it and any default (Brealey et al. 2009). Our 
approach is purposely pessimistic, testing practically a broad range of studies 
planned in the literature. Hence, our results add to quantitative modelling efforts 
thus highlighting the more practical mechanisms to adopt. 
2.7.2. Hypotheses Development 
In this section, the study explains the financial crisis impact on trade credit, and 
the associated research. This research was devised based on practical studies. 
Earlier research referred to trade credit as an alternative to bank credit for those 
firms without credit facilities (Nilsen 2002; Marotta 1997, Delannay and Weill 
2004). However, a panicked supplier could reduce investment in his customers by 
retracting his trade credit and tightening his terms. With these factors in mind, the 
following hypotheses were developed. 
Corporate trade finance on a micro level:  
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H1: Corporate trade credit limits have a specific relationship to financial data and 
ratios. 
H2: During a financial crisis, companies focus more strongly on a reduced 
working capital in order to improve liquidity. 
H3: The portfolio approach enables corporates to receive better results in trade 
credit management that are comparable to individual credit decisions. 
H4: The new banking regulations, Basel III, might strengthen shadow banking for 
corporate trade finance. 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter discusses the methodology utilized for the research. As far as can be 
ascertained, this is the first research that analyzes corporate trade credit limits 
(HR1), and the impact of Basel III on trade finance providers (HR4). Some 
previous studies were similar to H2: financial crises and working capital; and to 
H3: the portfolio approach in corporate trade finance, which includes a 
triangulation research method on the topic. Effectively it is all four studies put 
together that seemed capable of providing a fair evaluation of each piece of 
research, and the impact of the financial crisis on corporate trade finance, as there 
are many links between the smallest micro viewpoint (in HR 1) to the highest 
macro evaluation (in HR4). In other words, the correct perspective was to analyze 
the issues from a holistic angle: from deciding on a corporate credit analyst and 
treasurer for a corporate, to highlighting the risks involved in corporate trade credit 
under economic ambiguity. The following questions were asked: 
RQ1 (Corporate trade finance on the micro level): What are the criteria for 
deciding on corporate trade credit, its evaluation and limits? 
RQ2 (Corporate trade finance for a firm’s trade portfolio): How do companies 
manage their trade-related receivables and liabilities portfolios?   
RQ3 (Corporate trade finance for a firm’s trade portfolio): How was the working 
capital and liquidity of globally active German corporates developed? 
RQ4 (Corporate trade finance and its economic validation): What was the impact 
of the financial crisis and the resultant changes in corporate trade finance, 
especially from a corporate treasurer’s perspective? 
3.1. Research analysis and organization 
According to Buchanan (1992), qualitative research is a multi-faceted method of 
inquiry including facts and interpretive methods to find conclusions from the 
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evaluation. This transforms into single steps means that qualitative researchers 
analyze things in their natural condition and try to determine sense of relation, 
consequences etc.. Usually, qualitative research takes place in naturally existing 
situations, while in quantitative research settings and behaviours are evaluated and 
controlled. Qualitative research has its origins in descriptive analysis and is 
necessarily an inductive process involving reasoning from the particular situation 
to a general conclusion. According to (Maxcy 2003), qualitative research is a 
process of inquiry that implements human or social issues. The researcher 
develops a holistic and critical picture of an informant’s views, analyzes words, 
and conducts the study in a natural setting. On the other hand, Wholey, Hatry and 
Newcomer (2010) have described that studies using mathematical analyses that 
reveal statistically significant differences is called quantitative research. 
Quantitative research focuses on the considerations that underlie the positivist 
traditions within which financial research was originally located, and in terms of 
applied deductive logic, being hypothesis driven, achieves objectivity and causal 
relationships. Quantitative research characterizes phenomena numerically to 
respond to particular hypotheses or questions. Quantitative researchers often use 
what might be considered a narrow angle lens, because the focus is on only one or 
a few causal factors at once. Quantitative researchers often attempt to hold some 
factors constant. Quantitative research is used to describe phenomena numerically, 
in order to answer specific questions or hypotheses. Quantitative research is a 
scientific work including experiments and other systematic approaches that 
emphasize quantified measures and results of performance. In order to answer the 
research question, the study used not only triangulation, but also adopted 
quantitative data from different sets of questionnaires from different target 
populations.  
3.1.1. Research instruments 
For the quantitative study RQ1 (credit limit), the sample size was 90 companies. 
For the quantitative study RQ2 (corporate trade portfolio), the sample size was 200 
firms. 
For the quantitative study RQ3 (working capital and liquidity), the sample size 
was 72 companies. For the quantitative study RQ4 (financial crises and economic 
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validation), the sample size was 200 firms. For RQ1 and RQ3 the sample volumes 
were critically small for a mathematical evaluation. This affected RQ1, due to 
difficulties in getting real data from firms, as they considered customer data to be a 
major part of their business success and declined to support this research. Others 
did not have the requested data or did not have the time to extract it from their 
customer relations software. In RQ3, there were not many comparable firms. 
However, despite this, other research was successful, even with lower sample 
volumes; i.e. the Altman credit default prediction (1968), dealt with less than 40 
firms.  
 
The research instrument adopted in RQ1 in step one, was open-ended questions. In 
step 2 it was data collection of existing samples and close-ended questions. In RQ2 
and RQ4 the questionnaire had mainly close-ended questions, added to by a few 
open-ended ones. These assisted in the gathering of the needed information for the 
study.    
 
For RQ1, the research aim was to determine how the credit experts of corporates 
currently lend money to their trading partners. This analysis included an evaluation 
of creditworthiness and credit limits. In the first step, group interviews and 
discussions with approximately 50 credit analysts were performed during 2010. 
All interviewees belonged to different global production firms. In this step, data 
that was obtained was used to determine the criteria for the credit evaluation. In 
the second step, the participants (100) were either directly contacted or were asked 
by global credit manager FCIB, located in the US and the UK, and credit analysts 
anonymously provided data for the criteria that were selected in step 1. The 
relevant annual report year was 2009 in all cases. Data was obtained from 15 
participating firms. Each participant could input the relevant data for ten firms. A 
total of 90 datasets were measured and evaluated to determine how corporate 
credit management handles trade-related credit risk in different situations and how 
it determines the credit limits.  
 
For RQ2 and 4, the author developed the 2011 questionnaire. In February 2012, 
several thousand company treasurers were asked for their feedback. For the 
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contact-gathering, the author received the support of a global electronic financial 
newspaper (gtnews). Approximately 150 responses were received. In addition, a 
similar questionnaire was used to interrogate credit analysts, with the help of the 
FCIB in the UK. This questionnaire was submitted in November 2011 to 
approximately 500 corporate credit managers, most of whom worked for globally 
active companies. Approximately 50 responses were received. Compared to the 
initial research, the responses to the questionnaire were focused more in the 
receivables-oriented trade finance field than previously. The evaluation targets that 
were the focus of this study were a) determination of whether common 
developments occur, and b) identifying the changes that might occur due to the 
financial crisis. 
 
For RQ3, 432 (6 years multiplied by 72) annual reports of public listed German 
firms were evaluated. This analysis was an evaluation of the finance strategy of 
international corporates. Therefore, the annual reports of 72 companies belonging 
to the German Dax or the Mdax, and thus being part of the real economy, were 
analyzed. Banks, insurers and other financial firms were excluded from the 
analysis as they do not have product deliveries and (real) trade receivables/ 
liabilities. Approximately 30 German listed companies belong to the Dax and 
exhibit the biggest market capitalization. Mdax represents a second group of listed 
corporates that have a smaller market capitalization. The annual reports from the 
years 2006 to 2011 of the selected companies were analyzed. The measurements 
that were made included a) the operative and treasury fields, in which finance 
strategies are given; b) the changes that were made to the finance strategies of 
these companies due to the financial crisis; and c) a calculation of the non-
payment costs in corporate trade finance. The analysis of the comparable rates for 
credit insurers provided further insights into the non-payment costs for corporates 
in trade finance, and a central point from which to evaluate the Basel III 
regulations from the perspective of corporate trade finance. 
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3.2. Micro view: Corporate trade finance on a micro level. Research 1: 
Analysis of the decision-making methods used in corporate trade credit for 
the evaluation of credit and credit limits 
 
In order to understand in-house corporate trade finance management, the aims of 
Research 1 were the following: a) to determine the most common criteria that are 
actually used in the evaluation of credit risk; and b) to identify the trigger points 
for each of the criteria that are used in the determination of credit limits.  
 
Two basic approaches are generally used in the modelling of credit limits:  
I. The limit request from the sales department determines the maximum credit 
limit. In this context, three specific methods can be used: (i) the limit is determined 
by the limit of the previous year and the failure score. This method is based on the 
assumption that those customers who were able to avoid bankruptcy in the 
previous year would also be able to avoid it in the current year. (ii) The limit is 
determined by a set of fixed criteria and the credit score. The fixed criteria include 
the equity, because the owner has the greatest knowledge of the company’s wealth 
and is willing to disclose the equity amount. Other criteria include total value of 
the assets. (iii) The limit is based on the expected gain from the sale of goods over 
a defined period, and the insolvency risk. The relevant “recovery period” can vary 
but is often one year. Until then, the sum of the sales profits has to be at least as 
high as the credit limit. For example, if the profit margin is 20%, the sales are a 
consistent euro 1,000 each month, and the maximum DSO is 52 days, the annual 
profit is euro 2,400 and the credit limit should be between euro 2,000 (two months 
outstanding) and euro 2,400 (the profit for a year). This method exhibits a high 
probability of default and should be based on a portfolio management system. This 
is explained later in the manuscript.  
 
3.2.1 Finding the right criteria 
II. The maximum limit is independent of the contracted limit application. In this 
context, the credit analyst sets the maximum acceptable limit regardless of the 
current credit requirements. The advantage is that the sales unit can respond 
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immediately to the new credit demand. However, this approach does not involve 
any later credit evaluation, even in cases where the client makes sudden, 
significantly expensive purchases. Method B is used to support sales and/or to 
reduce the manual work and costs in credit analysis. A general constraint for the 
individual loan limit is the consideration of risk concentrations (Bonti et al. 2006, 
p.115ff). It is important to avoid the situation in which a single change in market 
conditions leads to a lack of payment, which generally endangers the credit risk of 
the supplier (Thomson Financials). This phenomenon relates to individual large 
exposure as well as to a sector or a country.  
In both cases, corporate trade finance requires the use of a large amount of 
information that is not available at the time, and thus significant time pressure is 
experienced because the product must be sent out. These factors differ from those 
experienced by banks’ credit management.  To date, the literature has not proposed 
a systematic method to determine credit limits. Many B2B credit analysts even 
believe that the determination of credit is an art. Despite this, it is of interest to 
determine if there is a commonly used method by which B2B credit managers set a 
credit limit. Therefore, an empirical study, which was split into two parts, was 
carried out. The first phase involved the identification of the criteria that are 
commonly considered important in the determination of a credit limit. This 
information was collected from approximately 25 experienced credit analysts after 
the financial crisis had taken place. They named a total (gross) of 30 different 
criteria. Many of the analysts considered not only the annual report, but also 
payment behaviour, a number of soft factors, and further information about the 
company. None of the credit analysts who participated in this study utilized all 30 
criteria. Therefore, these criteria were filtered by the research participants to 
determine which were the most used. The following are nine of the most widely 
used criteria for the evaluation of a credit limit: 
 Average number of days that the customer was delinquent in the past 12 
months  
 Number of years that the buyer had been active in business 
 Number of years that the buyer had been a customer  
 Buyer’s equity ratio 
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 Buyer’s current ratio 
 Buyer’s return on sales in the financial year before the invoice date 
 Buyer’s total sales for the financial year before the invoice date 
 Number of disputes concerning invoices in the past 12 months prior to the 
invoice date  
 Profit margin of the relevant sales  
 
3.2.2. Using the selected criteria  
The second part of the research aimed to determine how selected criteria were 
used in the evaluation of a credit limit. All the possible responses were structured 
specifically for analysis, as this enabled some groups to participate and avoid 
compliance aspects (Silvermann 2008, p. 215). The participants in this study 
discussed and proposed the following trigger points for each criterion: the 
weighted rolling average of the average days delinquent (ADD) over the past 12 
months (number of days that receivables were cashed in later than the agreed due 
date); if all payments were made before the due date, the score would be 1; if 
payment was made 0 to 2 days late, the score would be 2; if payment was made 3 
to 19 days late, the score would be 3.; if payment was made 20 to 31 days late, the 
score would be 4; if payment was made 32 to 61 days late, the score would be 5; if 
payment was made 62 to 75 days late, the score would be 6; if payment was made 
76 to 360 days late, the score would be 7; if this information was missing, the 
score would be 0. The number of years that the buyer had been active in business: 
less than 1 year, score = 1. 1 to 3 years, score = 2. 4 to 6 years, score = 3. 6 to 20 
years, score = 4; over 20 years, score = 5; missing information, score = 0. The 
number of years that the buyer had been a customer: less than 1 year, score = 1. 1 
to 3 years, score = 2. 4 to 6 years, score = 3. 6 to 20 years, score = 4; over 20 
years, score = 5; missing information, score = 0. The buyers’ equity ratio, which is 
calculated by net worth (after long-term assets adjustments)/total assets: negative 
result score = 1, 0% to 10% score = 2, 11% to 20%, score = 3, over 30% score = 4, 
missing information, score = 0. The buyer’s current ratio (current assets/current 
liabilities): less than 0.5, score = 1; 0.5 to 1, score = 2; 1 to 2 score = 3, over 2 
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score = 4, missing information, score = 0. The buyers’ return on sales in the 
financial year prior to the invoice date (ratio of income to sales): negative, score = 
1; 0% to 1% score = 2, 1% to 3% score = 3, over 3% score = 4, missing 
information, score = 0. The buyers’ total sales for the financial year prior to the 
invoice date: euro 0 to euro 10 million score = 0; euro 10 million to euro 250 
million score = 1; euro 250 million to euro 10 billion score = 2; over euro 10 
billion score = 3; missing information score = 0. The number of disputes 
concerning invoices in the past 12 months prior to the invoice date: less than 3 
score = 1; 3 or more score = 0; missing information score = 0. The profit margin of 
the relevant sales: negative, score = 0; 0 to 1% score = 2; 1 to 5% score = 3; 5 to 
10% score = 4; over 10% score = 5; missing information, score = 0.   
 
Secondly, calculated data was analyzed through SPSS analysis software. 
Descriptive analysis was used to report mean and standard deviations while 
categorical variables were analyzed using chi-square and continuous data using 
regression analysis. P <0.05 was considered significant.  
3.2.3. Data Calculation and Statistical Analysis 
Table 2: Frequency of demographic variables 
Demographic 
Variable Frequency Percent 
Disputes concerning 
invoices 
  No 89 97.8 
Yes 2 2.2 
Total 91 100.0 
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 Customers’ Home 
Country 
  
Africa 1 1.1 
Asia 22 24.2 
EE 21 23.1 
EU 35 38.5 
America 11 12.1 
Near East 1 1.1 
Total 91 100.0 
 Credit Limit in EUR   
< 500.000 38 41.8 
> 10m 9 9.9 
1000000 1 1.1 
1m-10m 29 31.9 
500-1m 14 15.4 
Total 91 100.0 
Average Days Delinquent    
0 3 3.3 
Before Due 20 22.0 
0-2 Days 17 18.7 
3-19 Days 22 24.2 
20-31 Days 3 3.3 
32-61 Days 13 14.3 
62-75 Days 5 5.5 
76-360 Days 8 8.8 
Total 91 100.0 
 Return on Sales  Frequency Percent 
Negative 7 7.7 
0-1% 43 47.3 
1-3% 24 26.4 
Over 3% 17 17 
Total 91 100.0 
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Table 2 portrays the demographic features of the participants who took part in this 
research. The research reveals a high percentage (97.8%) associated with “no 
disputes” pertaining to invoices. Additionally, it was noted that 38.5% of 
consumers were from the European Union, 24.2% were from Asia, 23.1% from the 
EE, 12.1 % from America and 1.1% from Africa and the Middle East nations. The 
highest percentage of credit limit in EUR was 41.8% of <500 and subsequently 
31.9% of 1m to 10m; 15.4% of five hundred thousand to 1m; 9.9% of >10m; and 
1.1% of 1 000 000. “Average days delinquent” was  24.2% out of 3 to 19 days; 
22% of “Before due”, 18.7% of 0 to 2 days; 14.3% of 32 to 61 days; 8.8% of 76 to 
360 days; 5.5% of 62 to 75 days; and 3.3% was similar to 20 to 31 and 0 days. 
Most “return rate on sales” were 47.3% of 0 to1%; 26.4% of 1 to 3%; 17% of over 
3%; and 7.7% was negative. Most of the profit margins of significant trade were 
79.1% of 0 to 2; 15.4% of over 10; 3.3% of 5 to 10; and 1.1% was similar to that 
of negative and 3 to 4. Likewise, most of the present ratio was 39.6% of 1 to 2, 
25.3% of (less than 0.5), 18.7% of (0 and 5 to 1), and 16.5% of over 2.  
The maximum consumers were 53.8% of 4 years, 16.5% of 3 years, followed by 
14.3% for both 3 and 5 years, 14.3 % of 2 years and finally just 1.1 % of 7 years. 
The maximum turnover in EUR in the year 2009 was 56% on 10m to 250m, 
followed by 26.4% on 251m to 10 billion, 14.3% on 0 to 10m and finally, 3.3% on 
over 10 billion. Additionally, the maximum number of years in business was 
47.3% for over 20 years, 41.8% for 6 to 20 years, followed by 6.6% for 4 to 6 
years and finally, 4.4% of 1 to 3 years. Ultimately, the maximum equity ratio was 
40.7% for 0 to 10%; 30.8% for over 30%, followed by 25.3% for 11 to 20% and 
finally 3.3% for negative.  
  Profit margin of  relevant sales Frequency % (percent) 
0-2 72 79.1 
Negative 1 1.1 
3-4 1 1.1 
5-10 3 3.3 
Over 10 14 15.4 
Total 91 100.0 
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3.2.4. Descriptive statistics 
EDA (Exploratory Data Analysis) for all the groups was carried out individually. 
EDAs were made of the following: “Average days delinquent”, “Years as 
customer”, “Current ratio”, “Return on sales”, and “Turnover  in EUR”, all for the 
year 2009, taking into consideration that 91 case samples were carried out to 
establish whether or not the readings pertained to the assumption of  standards. 
The assessment for “Average days delinquent” in 2009 pointed to the fact that the 
measurement was generally dispensed with, on average by 3.11, and with a 
measurement divergence similar to 1.975. The scrutiny for “Years as customer” 
pointed out that the measurement digressed considerably from the routine and was 
appreciably and unconstructively distorted, with an average of 3.725, and a 
standard digression equivalent to 0.955. Likewise, the “Current ratio”, “Return on 
sales” and “Turnover in EUR”, for the year 2009, further revealed an average of 
2.472, 1.186 and 2.560. Additionally, standard digressions were 1.047, 0.886, 
0.713 and 0.884. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics  
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Average days delinquent   0 7 3.11 1.97 
Years as customer 2.00 7.00 3.72 0.95 
Current ratio 1.00 4.00 2.47 1.04 
Return on sales 1.00 4.00 2.47 0.88 
Turnover in EUR  0.00 3.00 1.18 0.71 
Return on sales   1.00 4.00 2.56 0.88 
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3.2.4.1 Customers’ home country and average days deliquent 
Table 4: Relationship between Customers’ home country and average days 
delinquent  
Home 
country 
of the  
custo- 
mer 
Average days delinquent  
 
Total 0 
Before 
Due 
0-2 
Days 
3-19 
Days 
20-31 
Days 
32-61 
Days 
62-75 
Days 
76-360 
Days 
Africa 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 
Asia 0 1 0 2 0 8 5 6 22 
0.0% 5.0% 0.0% 9.1% 0.0% 61.5% 100.0% 75.0% 24.2% 
EE 0 8 6 3 0 3 0 1 21 
0.0% 40.0% 35.3% 13.6% 0.0% 23.1% 0.0% 12.5% 23.1% 
EU 3 4 8 16 2 1 0 1 35 
100.0% 20.0% 47.1% 72.7% 66.7% 7.7% 0.0% 12.5% 38.5% 
America 0 5 3 1 1 1 0 0 11 
0.0% 25.0% 17.6% 4.5% 33.3% 7.7% 0.0% 0.0% 12.1% 
Near East 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 
Total 3 20 17 22 3 13 5 8 91 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Phi-value: 0.935, P-value: 0.000<0.05. 
Table 4 shows a comparison between “Customers’ home country” and “ADD” 
(Average days delinquent) for the year 2009.  It was noted that 38.5% of the 
respondents were citizens of the European Union. Additionally, most of the ADD 
participants were from 76 to 360 days delinquent, i.e. about 75%, and were from 
Asia.  Most of the ADD participants for the year 2009 that were 62 to 75 days 
delinquent, i.e. almost 100%, were also from Asia, and most of the ADD 
participants that were from 32 to 61 days delinquent, i.e. about 61.5%, were also 
from Asia. However, most of the ADD participants that were from 20 to 31 days 
delinquent, equal  66 %, were from the EU, and most of those that were 3 to 19 
days delinquent, or about 72.7%, were from the EU. Furthermore, about 47.1% of 
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the ADD participants were 0 to 2 days delinquent, and were also from the EU. 
Additionally, most of the ADD participants that were in the “Before due” 
category, about 40%, were from the EE, and most of the ADD participants that 
were of 0-days, about 100%, were from the EE. Taking into consideration the Phi-
value of 0.935 and the P-value of 0.000, i.e. lower than 0.05, it can be deduced that 
there is a correlation between ADD and the customers’ home country. 
3.2.4.2. Customers’ home country and Disputes concerning invoices 
Table 5: Relationship between Customers’ Home Country and Disputes 
concerning invoices 
Customers’ 
Home 
Country 
Disputes concerning invoices  
Yes / No 
Total No Yes 
Africa 1 0 1 
1.1% 0.0% 1.1% 
Asia 22 0 22 
24.7% 0.0% 24.2% 
EE 21 0 21 
23.6% 0.0% 23.1% 
EU 34 1 35 
38.2% 50.0% 38.5% 
America 10 1 11 
11.2% 50.0% 12.1% 
Near East 1 0 1 
1.1% 0.0% 1.1% 
Total 89 2 91 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Phi-value: 0.196, P-value: 0.621>0.05 
Table 4 portrays a comparison between “Customers’ home country” and “Disputes 
pertaining to invoices”.  It was noted that about 38.5% of the respondents were 
from the EU. Additionally, most of “Disputes pertaining to invoices” participants 
who replied ‘yes’ were 50% from the US and the EU, and most of “Disputes 
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pertaining to invoices” participants who replied ‘no’ were 38.2%, from the 
European Union. Taking into consideration the Phi-value of 0.196 and the p- value 
of 0.621, i.e. more than 0.05, it can be deduced that no correlation exists between 
“Customers’ home country” and “Disputes pertaining to invoices”.  
3.2.4.3. Customers’ home country and average days deliquent 
Table 6: Relationship between Customers’ home country and Credit limit in EUR 
Customers 
Home- 
Country 
Credit limit  
in EUR 
Total 
< 
500.000 > 10m 1000000 1m-10m 500-1m 
Africa 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 
Asia 15 0 0 1 6 22 
39.5% 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 42.9% 24.2% 
EE 6 0 1 10 4 21 
15.8% 0.0% 100.0% 34.5% 28.6% 23.1% 
EU 16 1 0 15 3 35 
42.1% 11.1% 0.0% 51.7% 21.4% 38.5% 
America 0 8 0 3 0 11 
0.0% 88.9% 0.0% 10.3% 0.0% 12.1% 
Near East 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.1% 1.1% 
Total 38 9 1 29 14 91 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Phi-value: 0.952, P-value: 0.000<0.05. 
Table 6 reveals a comparison between “Customers’ home country” and “Credit 
limit in EUR”.  It was monitored that 38.5% of respondents were from the 
European Union. Additionally, most of the 42.9% “Credit limit in EUR” 
participants of five hundred thousand to 1m were from Asia; most of the “Credit 
limit in EUR” participants of 1m to 10m, or about 51.7%, were from the European 
Union, and most of the “Credit limit in EUR” participants of 1 000 000, or almost 
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100%, were from the EE. Most of “Credit limit in EUR” participants of more than 
10m, or about 88.9%, were from US and most of those participants of less than 
five hundred thousand were about 42.1%, and from the European Union.  As noted 
from the Phi-value of 0.952 and the p-value of 0.000, i.e. lower than 0.05, it can be 
deduced that a correlation was present between “Credit limit in EUR” and 
“Customer’s home country”. 
3.2.4.4. Customers’ home country and years in business   
 
Table 7: Relationship between Customers’ home country and Years in business 
Customers’ 
Home- 
Country 
Years in  business 
Total 1-3 Years 4-6 Years 6-20 Years 
Over 20 
Years 
Africa 0 0 1 0 1 
0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 1.1% 
Asia 2 3 8 9 22 
50.0% 50.0% 21.1% 20.9% 24.2% 
EE 2 2 16 1 21 
50.0% 33.3% 42.1% 2.3% 23.1% 
EU 0 1 12 22 35 
0.0% 16.7% 31.6% 51.2% 38.5% 
America 0 0 1 10 11 
0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 23.3% 12.1% 
Near East 0 0 0 1 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 1.1% 
Total 4 6 38 43 91 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Phi-value: 0.612, P-value: 0.003<0.05. 
Table 7 is a comparison between “Customers’ home country” and “Years in 
business”.  It is noted that about 38.5% of respondents were from the European 
Union. Additionally, most of the “Years in business” participants of more than 20 
years constituted about 51.2 % and were from the European Union. Most of the 
“Years in business” participants of 6 to 20 years were about 42.1%  and  were 
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from the EE, and most of the “Years in business” participants of 4 to 6 years were  
about 50% and from Asia, and those  participants of 1 to 3 years, about 50%,were 
from Asia and the EE. As noted from the Phi-value of 0.612 and the p-value of 
0.003, i.e. lower than 0.05, it can be deduced that a correlation exists between 
“Years in business” and “Customers’ home country”. 
3.2.4.5. Customers’ home country and years as customer 
Table 8: Relationship between Customers’ Home Country and Years as Customer 
Customers 
Home 
Country 
Years as customer 
Total 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 
Africa 0 0 1 0 0 1 
0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 
Asia 4 8 9 1 0 22 
30.8% 53.3% 18.4% 7.7% 0.0% 24.2% 
EE 3 3 13 2 0 21 
23.1% 20.0% 26.5% 15.4% 0.0% 23.1% 
EU 6 2 24 2 1 35 
46.2% 13.3% 49.0% 15.4% 100.0% 38.5% 
America 0 2 2 7 0 11 
0.0% 13.3% 4.1% 53.8% 0.0% 12.1% 
Near East 0 0 0 1 0 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 0.0% 1.1% 
Total 
 
13 15 49 13 1 91 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Phi-value: 0.708, P-value: 0.001<0.05. 
Table 8 portrays a comparison between “Customers’ home country” and “Years as 
customer”.  It is noted that about 38.5% of respondents were from the European 
Union. Additionally, almost 100% of the “Years as customer” participants of more 
than 7 years were from the European Union; most of the “Years as customer” 
participants of 5 years, at 53.8%, were from the US; and most of the “Years as 
customer” participants of 4 years, at about 49%, were from the European Union. 
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Furthermore, most of the “Years as customer” participants of 3 years, at about 
53.3%, were from Asia. As noted from the Phi-value of 0.708 and the p-value of 
0.001 that is lower than 0.05, it can be deduced that a correlation is present 
between “Years as customer” and “Customers’ home country”. 
3.2.4.6. Customers’ home country and equity ratio   
 
Table 9: Relationship between Customers’ home country and the Equity ratio 
Customers 
Home 
Country 
Equity Ratio 
Total Negative 0-10% 11-20% Over 30% 
Africa 0 0 0 1 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 1.1% 
Asia 0 20 1 1 22 
0.0% 54.1% 4.3% 3.6% 24.2% 
EE 0 4 8 9 21 
0.0% 10.8% 34.8% 32.1% 23.1% 
EU 3 13 11 8 35 
100.0% 35.1% 47.8% 28.6% 38.5% 
America 0 0 3 8 11 
0.0% 0.0% 13.0% 28.6% 12.1% 
Near East 0 0 0 1 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 1.1% 
Total 3 37 23 28 91 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Phi-value: 0.730, P-value: 0.000<0.05. 
Table 9 illustrates a comparison between “Customers’ Home Country” and the 
“Equity Ratio”.  It is noted that about 38.5% of respondents were from the 
European Union. Additionally, most of the “Equity Ratio” participants, at more 
than 30%, or about 28.6 %, were from the US and the European Union, while most 
of the “Equity Ratio” participants at 11% to 20%, or about 47.8%, were from the 
European Union. Furthermore, most of the “Equity Ratio” participants at 0 to10%, 
or about 54.1%, were from Asia, while most of the “Equity Ratio” participants of 
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negative, or almost 100%, were from the European Union. As noted from the Phi-
value of 0.730 and the p- value of 0.000, i.e. lower than 0.05, it was deduced that a 
correlation exists between “Equity ratio” and “Customers’ home country”. 
3.2.4.7. Customers’ home country and current ratio 
Table 10: Relationship between Customers’ home country and the Current ratio 
Customers 
Home 
Country 
Current ratio 
Total Less 0,5 0,5-1 1-2 Over 2 
Africa 0 0 0 1 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.7% 1.1% 
Asia 20 1 1 0 22 
87.0% 5.9% 2.8% 0.0% 24.2% 
EE 1 4 9 7 21 
4.3% 23.5% 25.0% 46.7% 23.1% 
EU 2 12 16 5 35 
8.7% 70.6% 44.4% 33.3% 38.5% 
America 0 0 9 2 11 
0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 13.3% 12.1% 
Near East 0 0 1 0 1 
0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 0.0% 1.1% 
Total 23 17 36 15 91 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Phi-value: 0.962, P-value: 0.000<0.05. 
Table 10 illustrates a comparison between “Customers’ Home Country” and 
“Current ratio”.  It is noted that 38.5% of the respondents were from the European 
Union. Additionally, most of the “Current ratio” participants of more than 2, or 
about 46.7%, were from the EE; most of the “Current ratio” participants of 1 to 2, 
or about 44.4%, were from the European Union; and most of the “Current ratio” 
participants of 0.5 to1 or about 70.6%, were from European Union, while most of 
the “Current ratio” participants of less than 0.5 or about 87%, were from Asia.  As 
noted from the Phi-value of 0.962 and the p-value of 0.000, i.e. less than 0.05, it 
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can be deduced that a correlation exists between “Current ratio” and “Customers’ 
home country”. 
3.2.4.8. Customers’ home country and return on sales  
 
Table 11: Relationship between Customers’ Home Country and Return on Sales  
Customers 
Home 
Country 
Return on sales 
Total Negative 0-1% 1-3% Over 3% 
Africa 0 0 0 1 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.9% 1.1% 
Asia 1 21 0 0 22 
14.3% 41.2% 0.0% 0.0% 24.2% 
EE 2 7 4 8 21 
28.6% 13.7% 25.0% 47.1% 23.1% 
EU 4 12 12 7 35 
57.1% 23.5% 75.0% 41.2% 38.5% 
America 0 11 0 0 11 
0.0% 21.6% 0.0% 0.0% 12.1% 
Near East 0 0 0 1 1 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.9% 1.1% 
Total 7 51 16 17 91 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Phi-value: 0.720, P-value: 0.000<0.05. 
Table 11 illustrates a comparison between “Customers’ home country” and 
“Return on sales” for the year 2009.  It is noted that 38.5% of the respondents were 
from the European Union. Additionally, most of the “Return on sales” participants, 
of more than 3%, or 47.1%, were from the EE, and most of the “Return on sales” 
participants of 1 to 3%, or about 75%, were from the European Union. 
Furthermore, most of the “Return on sales” participants of 0 to 1%, or about 
41.2%, were from Asia, and most of the “Return on sales” participants of negative, 
or about 57.1%, were from the European Union. As noted from the Phi-value of 
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0.720 and the p-value of 0.000, i.e. less than 0.05, it can be deduced that a 
correlation exists between “Return on sales” and “Customers’ home country”. 
3.2.4.9. Customers’ home country and turnover in EUR 
 
Table 12: Relationship between Customers’ home country and Turnover in EUR  
Customers 
Home 
Country 
Turnover  
in EUR  
 
Total 0-10m 10m-250m 
251m-10 
Billion 
Over 10 
Billion 
Africa 0 0 1 0 1 
0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 0.0% 1.1% 
Asia 2 18 2 0 22 
15.4% 35.3% 8.3% 0.0% 24.2% 
EE 8 11 2 0 21 
61.5% 21.6% 8.3% 0.0% 23.1% 
EU 3 18 12 2 35 
23.1% 35.3% 50.0% 66.7% 38.5% 
America 0 3 7 1 11 
0.0% 5.9% 29.2% 33.3% 12.1% 
Near East 0 1 0 0 1 
0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 
Total 13 51 24 3 91 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Phi-value: 0.608, P-value: 0.004<0.05. 
Table 12 portrays a comparative study between “Customers’ home country” and 
“Turnover in EUR”. It was noted that 38.5% of respondents were from the 
European Union. Additionally, most of the “Turnover in EUR” participants of 
more than 10 billion, or about 66.7%, were from the European Union; most of the 
“Turnover in EUR” participants of 251m to10 billion, or about 50%, were from 
the European Union; most of the “Turnover in EUR” participants of 10m to 250m, 
or about 35.3%, were from the EU and Asia. While most of the “Turnover in 
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EUR” participants of 0 to10m, or about 61.5%, were from the EE. As noted from 
the Phi-value of 0.608 and the p-value of 0.004, i.e. less than 0.05, it was deduced 
that a correlation exists between “Turnover in EUR” and “Customers’ home 
country”. 
3.2.5. Discussion of research 1 on corporate trade finance on a micro level 
Although the breakdown on the regions provided a lot of information about the 
prevailing differences, conclusions were drawn in respect of the global view in 
order to avoid too much information, and as stated in the research topic:    
In most cases, the profit margin of the relevant sales was unknown. Therefore, it 
was assumed that credit analysts took the average profit margin of a firm or unit 
into consideration in determining the credit limit. Furthermore, the country risk 
had no major impact on the credit limit. Debtors who were given credit limits of 
over euro 10 million were likely to pay on time. These debtors would have been 
active on the market for many years and typically had a long relationship with the 
seller. In these cases, the debtor’s balance sheet showed equity of 11% or more of 
the total assets. The current assets were higher than the current liabilities. The 
buyers’ turnovers were euro 250 million or higher. Consequently, the working 
capital management was considered successful. Buyers who were offered credit 
limits between euro 1 and 10 million had the following characteristics: 86% of the 
cases had an ADD (average days delinquent) of less than 20; the debtors had been 
active in business for a long time; the duration of the relationship between the 
customer and the buyer was over six years; 80% of the debtors had a balance sheet 
that showed equity of at least 11% of the total assets; 65% of the cases showed a 
working capital  ratio of over one; the return on sales was more than 1% in over 
50% of cases; and the customer’s annual turnover was between euro 10 and 250 
million. 
 
The debtors who had obtained credit limits of between euro 300 000 and 1 million 
were not as strongly focused on punctual payments, because 50% of them were 
late by over 20 days. These buyers had mostly been in the market for more than 
six years and the contact between the obligor and the debtor had existed for at least 
three years. In addition, the data showed that only 45% and 42% of debtors 
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respectively had an acceptable equity (11% or better) and a positive working 
capital (better than 1). In addition, the turnover of the buyers’ was typically (over 
75%) less than euro 250 million, or unknown. Nearly all of the criteria used to 
determine the credit limits below euro 300 000 had a comparable weight to those 
used in the determination of limits between euro 300 000 and 1 million. Only 
turnovers that showed these lower limits were mostly given to smaller companies 
that had turnovers of below euro 250 000 (only 12% of these debtors had a 
turnover of over euro 250 000).   
3.2.5.1. Back-testing the results of research 1 in a comparison with the literature 
 
The research results were theoretically evaluated using creditworthiness 
determining factors such as liquidity, long-term financing-equity ratio, efficiency 
and the profitability of a firm. “Liquidity refers to the availability of company 
resources to meet short-term cash requirements” (Subramanyam 2010, p.526). 
Credit analysts consider liquidity by evaluating the working capital ratio and 
payment behaviour. The determination of credit limits over euro 10 million 
confirms this theory because these credit limits are based on the lack of payment 
overdues and a positive working capital ratio. The liquidity data used for 
determining credit limits between euro 1 and 10 million was not as good as in the 
previous case. In these cases, payment overdues of up to 19 days were being 
accepted. In addition, in a third of the cases, working capital showed that the 
current liability was higher than the current assets. In cases in which the limits 
were determined to be below euro 1 million, the liquidity figures seemed to be 
even less important. This finding indicated that better liquidity results could be 
obtained by having a higher credit limit.  
 
The way in which the long-term financing of a company is set up is a measure of 
its bankruptcy risk. Although net worth was not mentioned by the expert group, 
many participants explained that, in addition to the data delivered, they determined 
credit limits through a combination of the probability of default and a percentage 
of the net worth. The handling of long-term financing used by the credit analysts 
who participated in the research was therefore unclear. A probable reason could 
have been that their payment terms were typically 90 days or less. Therefore, the 
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credit analysts were more focused on liquidity risk because it is the short-term 
reason for insolvency.       
 
Efficiency checks evaluate managements. However, this evaluation includes the 
assessment of soft factors, which are difficult to translate into a mathematical 
formula. Therefore, efficiency was not included in the 30 criteria that the 50 credit 
analysts indicated were important in the credit decision process. The sales people 
in the seller’s firm would typically be able to provide this information because 
they often knew the buyer’s company quite well. However, efficiency, which is 
the focus of 25% of the literature, is not typically considered in the credit limit 
calculation. Profitability assesses the path of self-financing. From a risk 
management point of view, the profit in relation to the total assets must be higher 
than a riskless bank loan. In the first step of credit limit research, most credit 
analysts preferred the profit to turnover ratio to the profit to net worth relationship. 
Consequently, this result indicated that the profit to turnover ratio is sufficient for 
the evaluation of insolvency risk.  
 
A comparison of the empirical results with the literature showed that many credit 
experts confirmed the observations presented in the literature, even if the literature 
did not propose a concrete method for the determination of credit limits. There 
seemed to be a common understanding that certain data led to a commonly agreed 
credit limit; this common understanding could be influenced by a number of other, 
changing factors such as country risk, high inflation, or a sector crisis. Therefore, 
the process should be updated regularly. As a final result of Research 1, the 
empirical study found that a defined data structure can be used for the evaluation 
and scoring of a limit. This result would reduce the amount of work and data 
required in future for the determination of credit limits. It would also help new 
credit analysts in learning how to determine credit limits, and help convince 
internal and external business partners that the credit limits are fair and that they 
conform to the market.  
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3.3. Corporate trade finance for a firm’s trade portfolio  
The current strong focus by corporate trade finance management on credit 
portfolios has resulted in a change from the use of many single optimizations to 
just one.  The literature states that the return from the combined assets in a 
portfolio is a weighted average of the return from the individual assets (Elton et al. 
2007, p.51; Bugar and Uzsoki 2012; Armitage 2005, p.41) and that the portfolio 
theory has the advantage that positive and negative positions result in lower risk 
(Elton et al. 2007, p.64). A further advantage of the portfolio view is that the 
inherent risk-adjusted return can help determine whether a company is extracting 
the highest possible return for the least possible risk. In the literature, this measure 
is called the risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC), and its calculation is based 
on research that was performed by Markowitz. The goal of his work was the 
identification of a risk measure of the diversification benefits of a composite 
portfolio, i.e. the benefits of diversification in different markets, regions or types 
of investments (Herring et al. 2007, p.347). In the analysis of a given return, 
optimization occurs on the assets (investment) side and the investor will select 
single items that obtain the lowest risk (Francis et al. 2010, p.731).   
 
The benefit of portfolio diversification is that it allows analysts to take a long-term 
view on the assets. However, an individual loss can be so damaging that it stops 
the investor from having the money to make subsequent investments; this would 
make the investor unable to benefit from the portfolio effect, which is available 
only to investors who can afford to stay in the business long enough to observe the 
numbers gradually trend towards the expected outcome. Some risks can be so 
serious that they obviously threaten the financial viability of a company. 
Companies that are subject to these types of risks cannot afford to take the long-
term view and are thus found to be in a “financial distress” situation. The positive 
view of this effect is called “risk capacity”, which describes the ability of a firm to 
cope with the risks inherent in its portfolio (Woolley 2009, p.164).  
 
 
 
  
93 
 
 
3.3.1. Corporate trade finance and the portfolio concept  
Michalski used the general portfolio concept to determine the levels of accounts 
receivable (Michalski 2008). He started with the definition of the target for 
receivables: the best volume of receivables is that in which any change in the level 
or risk position negatively influences the outcome of the receivables. He used this 
information to develop a formula based on the assumption that a firm’s present 
value is the sum of its future free cash flows discounted by the rate of capital 
financing costs: 
 
ΔVp = ∑
ΔFCFFt
(−1 + k) exp t
n
t=1
 
 
Where ΔVp is the increase in the firm’s value, ΔFCFFt is the future free cash flow 
growth that occurs during period t, and k represents the discount rate. The trade 
credit policy decisions that change the terms of the trade credit create a new 
accounts receivable level. Consequently, the trade credit policy has an influence 
on the firm’s value. The profit rate resulting from the trade credit can be obtained 
through the following formula:  
 
 RnAR    = 
ΔCR−ΔCosts
ΔCosts
 
Where RnAR indicates the profit rate that is obtained from giving trade credit to n 
purchasers, ΔCR is the cash from the sales growth that is generated from further 
sales to n customers, and Δ costs represents the increase in costs that result from 
offering the trade credit to n purchasers (Michalski 2008). This formula means that 
the netting of the results cannot be used for credit portfolios to determine the credit 
risk of a given amount of outstanding receivables because none of the receivables 
has a negative default probability. However, the portfolio of receivables can 
average single credit risks, which proves advantageous in the management of a 
combined risk position compared to the management of each single credit risk 
(Michalski 2008 and Niethen 2001, p.140). In addition, the manager can 
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mathematically optimize the cost-benefit relationship of the defaults of a 
receivables portfolio by adding the optimal securities, such as credit insurance and 
bank guarantees. When the credit capacity is reached, a bank or an insurance 
hedge is economically necessary.  
3.3.1.1. Transactions costs and the portfolio approach in corporate trade finance  
 
Transaction costs limit the benefits of a portfolio; these have nothing to do with 
cash, but are associated with sharing risk (Woolley 2009, p.166). In the past, the 
combination of all of a group’s credit exposures into a data pool was too 
expensive. However, new IT hardware and software solutions have decreased the 
costs of each exposure and are thus strong enough to make a corporate credit 
management portfolio approach make sense. The portfolio theory describes the 
best possible way to actively build a portfolio strategy (Günther 2003, p.139). If 
the strategy is defined for the credit portfolio, it can be used to guide the credit 
exposure and limit the decision process that results from the carrying costs and 
opportunity costs. The carrying costs are the costs associated with the credit and 
the capital that are associated with the receivables; it thus includes the costs of the 
payments that will be received later, the losses from bad debts and the costs of 
loan processing (Vishwanath 2000, p.323). The opportunity costs represent the lost 
sales due to rejections by the credit department. The optimal credit policy depends 
on the characteristics of each company. For example, some companies should 
handle their under-utilized capacity by granting more generous credit than others 
(Buckley et al. 2000, p.619 and Vishwanath 2003, p.323). 
 
The advantages of a portfolio strategy in corporate trade finance rely on its 
efficiency. The much improved information and communication methods, the new 
approaches of corporate management and the increasingly international markets 
have had a significant impact on the design of credit management in recent years. 
Furthermore, various new hedging instruments from the financial sector, such as 
CDS and CDOs, and the insurer, also increase the efficiency of corporate trade 
finance. Some of these are only effective for a portfolio of exposures.  As a 
consequence of their portfolio views, companies have recently streamlined the 
organization of corporate trade finance credit management with a focus on the 
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group risks, and profits and costs, which means that the optimization of the loan 
portfolio is related to the risks that should be taken internally in the group and 
those that should be hedged or sold (VCI 2000, p.26). Companies have 
implemented these goals in many ways. This was confirmed a number of years ago 
through a survey of the companies in the German VCI/chemical industry, all of 
which followed very different paths. The implementation of the portfolio is 
particularly reflected in the shaping of their risk strategies and organizational 
structures.  
3.3.2. Research 2: Impact of the financial crisis on the finance strategies of  
          stock-listed German companies 
The global financial crisis of 2008, which was mainly a crisis of the banks, had an 
impact on the German economy, and thus on companies listed on the stock 
exchange. Therefore, in 2008 and 2009, companies mainly focused on operational 
crisis management. This analysis portrayed how the financial management of 
manufacturing and trading companies had behaved after the financial crisis. Had 
their financial management changed since the financial crisis? Had financial 
managers, such as treasurers, implemented new strategies based on lessons learned 
from the crisis? In addition, were there other developments affecting the 
companies’ current financial strategy? 
 
This research was based on the public information supplied in the 2006 to 2011 
annual reports of companies that were listed on the German Dax and Mdax, 
whereas the descriptive information (other than balance sheet and profit and loss 
calculations) was taken from the year 2010. The analyzed companies included the 
biggest German groups, such as Siemens and Volkswagen. In total, approximately 
70 groups of companies were included in the analysis. All these companies had 
annual sales listed in the billions of euros. The analysis excluded firms that were 
not part of the real economy (e.g. banks) and firms that had business models with 
characteristics that required individual analysis (e.g. milestone payments to 
producers of long-term machines and the impact of these payments on the liquidity 
of that producer). Of the approximately 70 companies scrutinized, 14 belonged to 
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the chemical/pharmaceutical category, eight to the automotive sector, seven to 
technology, and six to the engineering/production sectors.  
3.3.2.1. Trade, country, and bank credit risk  
 
Fifty-six of the companies that were surveyed (78%) disclosed their trade credit 
risk. In most cases, an active receivables management and/or credit insurance was 
named. Twelve chemical or pharmaceutical, seven automotive, and all the 
technology and engineering companies addressed this issue. 
Nearly all of the German Dax- and Mdax-listed groups published their defaults on 
trade receivables. However, some companies included amounts that were not 
considered commercial credit risk defaults. This occurred in cases in which the 
receivables were defaulted due to country risk (i.e. pharmaceutical products that 
were outstanding to Greece), or when the written invoices that were used were 
later declared invalid. Therefore, it made sense to include 49 out of the original 72 
companies in this evaluation. These companies had an approximate euro 2.4 
billion trade exposure as at the end of 2010 and 2011. In addition, their default 
ratio in 2010 was 0.19 % of the trade exposure. In 2011, the ratio improved to a 
rate of 0.15% of the exposure.  
 
In 20 of the annual reports for the year 2010, the existing country risks were 
reported, in particular those concerning commercial transaction risks. Hedges are 
made with export agencies through either letters of credit or credit insurance. Four 
chemical/pharmaceutical companies, four automotive suppliers, two technology 
companies and two mechanical engineering groups reported information on 
country risks.  
 
A large percentage (82%, or 59 firms) of the companies surveyed reported on their 
management of bank default risk. A good credit standing would usually be 
required, which is often documented by the requested adequate (A) rating. Twelve 
chemical/pharmaceutical companies and all the automotive group companies 
reported on this risk. Conversely, banking risk is not named in the reports of three 
of the companies in the mechanical engineering sector. 
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3.3.2.2. Working capital  
 
Working capital was evaluated for each of the companies to analyze its 
development over the evaluated time period. Therefore, a comparison was carried 
out on three aspects of working capital:  
The volume of net working capital (trade receivables, inventories, and trade 
payables) of 68 analyzed companies (four had special conditions) had increased by 
euro 35.6 billion and, when taking into consideration the sales changes, it had 
increased by 94%. This corresponded to a cash conversion cycle increase from 
48.5 days to 53.1 days. In the chemicals/pharmaceuticals and automotive sectors, 
net working capital had increased by 11.3 billion, which meant that sales had 
adjusted by 11.8%. For the automotive manufacturers the increase was 10 billion, 
and sales had adjusted by 16%. The net working capital of the technology 
companies had increased by 6.7 billion and sales had adjusted by 11.7 %. In 
contrast, the mechanical engineering firms slashed their net working capital by 
euro 315 million, which exhibited a decrease of 6.5%.  
A comparison of the same period was made for the receivables subset. Total 
exposure increased by almost euro 14 billion (10%), and the time of invoice to 
cash (DSO) had improved from 57.3 days to 55.4 days on average. The DSO of 
the chemicals/pharmaceuticals companies had increased by 13.4% on average, 
while the DSO of the companies in the automotive sector improved (reduced) by 
4.2% or 1 day.  The technology firms remained nearly unchanged with a 1.1% and 
a 1 day increase. The best development could be seen in the case of machine 
producers whose DSO improved by 12% and 8 days. A further assessment of the 
absolute advantages of working capital changes considered that most companies 
had long-term loans. In this context, stronger working capital and less debt would 
lead to a positive market price change for the company. Active control of working 
capital is therefore nominally higher than the change in interest costs in the profit 
and loss calculation.   
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3.3.2.2.1. Working capital in relation to other annual report data  
 
Table 13: Relationship between Working capital and Sales growth, Tangible net 
worth, EBIT interest, EBITDA margin and Total assets 
 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
R-
square 
F-value T P-
value 
B Std. 
Error 
2011  
(Constant) 6369.188 13416.869 
0.999 780.706 
.475 .655 
Sales growth 1189.556 1483.440 .802 .459 
Tangible net worth -.998 .016 
-
61.370 
.000 
EBIT interest 12.609 41.499 .304 .773 
EBITDA Margin -8.514 25.243 -.337 .750 
Total assets .538 .031 17.289 .000 
2010  
(Constant) 812.584 2062.270 
0.999 1023.587 
.394 .720 
Sales growth -15.622 121.391 -.129 .906 
Tangible net worth -.073 .039 -1.856 .160 
EBIT interest 15.514 4.251 3.650 .036 
EBITDA Margin -8.237 2.714 -3.035 .056 
Total assets .202 .016 12.891 .001 
Dependent variable: 2012, 2011- Working capital 
 
Table 13 documents a trade credit analyze for 2010 and 2011. The influence 
between working capital and other variables that incorporate sales growth, tangible 
net worth, EBIT interest, EBITDA margins, and total assets were examined. All 
weakening comprised a constant; coefficients were not documented due to space 
constraints. Complete t-values were in digression after every coefficient. 
According to the results, working capital is seen to have a noteworthy correlation 
with sales growth, tangible net worth, and EBITDA margins. 
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3.3.2.3. Liquidity 
 
The availability of sufficient liquidity at all times is an important economic target 
of companies (Lee & Lee 2006, p.399). Similar to bank requirements (Basel 
Committee, p.2.), companies should retain approximately one month’s worth of 
cash. The ratio of liquidity to sales in 2011 was on average 46 days for the 
companies that were analyzed. This value was 46, 48, 34, 38, and 39 days in 2010, 
2009, 2008, 2007, and 2006, respectively.   
 
 
 
Figure 5: Average liquidity (in days) of listed German companies 
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Figure 6: Percentage of German listed companies that show a liquidity exceeding 
30 days of sales volume 
 
Figure 6 shows that after the financial crisis more firms examined their liquidity 
situation and increased their cash position to be better prepared for bad times, 
particularly concerning the non-payment risk. The chemical/pharmaceutical 
companies had an average ratio of 33 days. The average liquidity ratio of the 
sector increased steadily every year.  In the automotive industry, the average ratio 
was 31 days and the individual values ranged from 17 to 47 days. The average 
increased for the chemical/pharmaceutical firms until 2010, while 2011 showed a 
rebound.  In the technology sector, the average was 58 days with a maximum of 
168 days and a minimum of 8 days. This sector had already seen its peak liquidity 
average in 2009. The machinery firms exhibited an average of 23 days with 
individual results that ranged from 7 to 62 days. The average comparisons for the 
year showed no trends. It could be that this sector saw poor sales as a result of the 
financial crisis. In 2011, the 30-day cash reserve hurdle rate was managed by 
seven (from 14) chemical/pharmaceutical companies, four (from 8) automobile 
companies, four (from 6) technology groups and two (from 6) production firms. 
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Because the analysis included the period of the financial crisis, a view of how 
many companies increased their liquidity during this period was obtained. A 
comparison of the previously described liquidity-to-sales ratios in the years 2006-7 
with the corresponding ratios in the years 2010-11 showed that 45 of the analyzed 
companies (65%) experienced a liquidity increase as a result of the financial crisis. 
In general, the liquidity ratio rose by 14% from the period of 2006-7 to the period 
of 2009-11, which demonstrated that the financial crisis had an influence on the 
financial behaviour of companies.  
 
3.3.2.3.1. Liquidity and the financial crisis 
 
The sector analysis showed that eleven of the fourteen chemical/pharmaceutical 
companies exhibited an increase in this ratio after the start of the crisis. The 
liquidity ratio of three automotive companies, four technology groups and four 
mechanical engineering companies also increased. This data clearly showed that 
companies had higher liquidity as a result of the financial crisis. As mentioned 
previously, the availability of sufficient liquidity is an essential goal of all 
companies. This target entry was listed in most of the annual reports. Some 
companies believed that a low net debt was more relevant than a high liquidity 
position. Because the bank’s interest rate is lower than the hurdle profit rate for 
corporate assets (typically approximately 8 to 10%), the corporates had a stronger 
focus on efficiency.  
 
Some groups have confirmed credit lines and believe that they do not need 
significant cash-liquidity (reserves). An analysis of the Eurostat data (Statistical 
Bureau of the European Commission) shows a slow increase in the cash that 
European companies have; however, the turnover increases at approximately the 
same rate (Eurostat data 2011). As a consequence, state-of-the-art risk 
management in liquidity does not just aim to increase liquidity. The financial crisis 
has reminded us that banks, the banking industry, and even countries can become 
insolvent. Therefore, the current interpretation of whether higher liquidity is 
necessary now differs, due to the experience of the financial crisis. Because 
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liquidity is invested in banks or is at least received through bank transactions, 
higher amounts of cash might not be the solution to a banking crisis. Higher 
amounts of cash are more relevant to those countries that are in turmoil. Finally, 
each group has different conditions and views that determine its liquidity target. 
Short-term liquidity also has to consider a) the volatility of daily net changes, b) 
the risk strategy, c) the market situation, and d) the time until a defined liquidity 
need can be covered by a lender (bank).   
 
Out of the 72 companies that were evaluated, 35 reported that they undertook 
liquidity planning (for further information on liquidity planning, please refer to 
Tirole 2006, p.199). In addition, of these 35 companies, 13 indicated that their 
liquidity plan was prepared on a rolling basis for the following 12 months. These 
35 companies included six chemical/pharmaceutical groups, seven automotive 
companies, three technology companies and four engineering firms. 
 
3.3.2.3.2. Securing liquidity  
 
There are four methods by which corporates can secure themselves against 
liquidity risk:  
• It is beneficial to have operating accounts with multiple banks and in different 
regions. Therefore, it will be possible to run cash transactions at any time, even 
when one bank/region is not active. (This approach is common today but is not 
mentioned in the annual reports.) 
• The second option is the right choice of bank for cash management. If the 
assumption is that derivatives, securities speculation and risky loans are the main 
risks for the insolvency of banks, at least one of the banks that is used for the 
management of the company’s cash should not operate in any of these risky 
arenas. 
• The third approach is to treat remittances from one bank to another as real-time 
transactions (ECB). This avoids the risk that cash is not forwarded due to a bank or 
state bankruptcy (settlement risk; Padmalatha and Paul, p.222). In addition, the 
  
103 
 
bank exposures can thus be reduced and the operational handling in trade finance 
can be improved. (For example, reminders are avoided for trade exposure because 
these inform customers that invoices have not been paid, when in reality, the 
transaction has already been made. In addition, the suppliers can be paid at very 
short notice, which proves advantageous when the receipt of money is a 
prerequisite for the release of goods by the supplier.) 
• It is possible to use corporate clearing. If there is a general finance and banking 
solvency crisis, companies in the real economy might not be able to receive and 
pay money. In such situations, bilateral or multilateral clearing between corporates 
is a solution. In this context, multilateral clearing means that several companies 
pool their receivables and liabilities (in a data pool) in the same way that a 
corporation internally balances its group companies. Third party clearing is not 
new and is commonly used by the airways companies (IATA 2012). 
3.3.2.4. Further financial crisis-linked findings in annual reports   
 
In the analysis of corporate creditworthiness, the sum of equity and long-term 
liabilities should be higher than the long-term assets. This rule is “the golden rule 
of financing”. The reason for the evaluation in this research is that a short-term 
loan can expire before the cash-flow of long-term assets is received, and is 
therefore risky for the firm. (Wöhe1989,  p.264). On average, the “golden rule of 
financing” is a given in the stock exchange-listed companies that were investigated 
in this study. The best and worst years show an average ratio of 82% and 87% 
(82% of the credit analysis is a better value). The highest ratio was recorded in 
2011, despite the financial crisis. But the ratio was still within the framework of 
the “golden rule of financing” and was therefore, from a credit standpoint, 
acceptable. Not all single companies constantly followed this rule. The highest 
ratio for a company was 269% in one year, while a very efficiently-run firm 
showed a low 23% ratio in one year. This ratio fluctuated in one company from 
8% to 177% over a six year period. The average change for the firms over that 
time was 23.5%. 
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Figure 7: Average ratio of long-term assets to long-term liabilities of German 
listed companies 
 
The average deviation margins for each sector were the following: 
chemicals/pharmaceuticals from 81% to 86% (2011: 82%); automotive 
manufacturers and suppliers from 83% to 90% (2011: 82%); technology 
companies from 82% to 89% (2011: 85%); and machinery companies from 63% to 
70% (2011: 70%). An analysis of each year showed that the first worst peak was 
recorded during 2008, which was the year of the financial crisis. This result 
showed that the control of the equity and financial debt could not respond quickly 
enough to the economic developments. In 2011, the companies seemed to return to 
a less cautious consideration of the “golden rule of financing”, which might be 
interpreted to mean that the financial crises had less of an impact on companies.  
As in 2010, all groups reacted to the financial crisis. The 2010 annual reports were 
evaluated and the corresponding conclusions are described in the following 
sections.  
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3.3.2.4.1. Value management and the financial crisis   
 
The 2010 annual reports of the companies that were analyzed show how they 
managed their target profitability. The return on capital employed (ROCE) and the 
economic value added/cash value added (EVA/CVA) methods were mostly used. 
ROCE is defined as the net operating profit before or after taxes divided by the 
sum of the total assets that bear the debt, which is deducted from the available cash 
and cash equivalents. The EVA/CVA calculation is similar and results in an 
“excess return” that is based on the capital employed and a (free) rate, which is 
defined as a hurdle rate (McLaney and Atrill 2007, p.209). In enterprise planning, 
the hurdle rate is calculated as the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
(Brigham and Erhard 2008, p.361). The methodologies used in the analysis of the 
German firms were the following: ROCE was used by 32% of the companies; 17% 
of the companies utilized other economic calculations, 15% of the companies used 
EVA or CVA, 3% of the companies did not divulge their methods, 3% of the 
companies displayed non-economic financial aims, and 2% reported the creation 
of added value.  
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Figure 8: Distribution of methods used by German companies for value 
management  
 
Of the 14 chemical/pharmaceutical companies, seven utilized ROCE, three used 
EVA/CVA and four utilized other economic indicators. Out of the eight 
automotive manufacturers/suppliers, six used ROCE. In addition, six of the seven 
technology firms used ROCE. Nearly the same percentage was found in the 
machinery production sector: ROCE was used by four of the six companies. 
 
The value management analysis of the reports led to additional conclusions:   
a) The companies often used calculations based on values that differed from the 
reported figures in the balance sheet. This was done to exclude factors that were 
specific to a certain year. Because the items were not explained in detail, it might 
have been better to use the balance sheet figures as a basis for the calculation, and 
to have explained exempted items verbally. This would have enabled the receiver 
of the information to interpret the results accordingly and correct them if s/he was 
convinced of the need.  
b) The WACC measure makes an assumption of the base interest rate and the debt 
portion to represent long-term continuity, e.g. the interest rate is often determined 
by a 10-year bond loan. As is shown later, this was not an effective fixed interest 
rate for long-term loans in recent years. In addition, the underlying debt proportion 
in the WACC does not match reality.  
 
c) The stability of future yields is generally discussed in the Risks and 
Opportunities section of an annual report. The implementation of modern 
approaches in business administration, such as the “best/worst case scenario” 
analysis (Dewar 2002, p.27) and real options models (Shim et al. 2012, p.351), 
were reported by only a few companies.   
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3.3.2.4.2. Financial risks of corporates and the financial crisis   
 
Sixty percent of the companies addressed the management of foreign currency risk 
in their annual reports. Of these, 22 companies report that they fully hedged the net 
transactional currency risks. Fourteen mentioned that they were not affected by 
currency risk.  Nearly all the companies pointed out that entering into speculative 
currency risk was prohibited. The remaining companies did not report a 
speculative hedging position. Eleven chemical/pharmaceutical, six automotive, six 
technology, and three mechanical engineering companies reported on their 
currency risk and hedging strategies. The information on foreign exchange 
derivatives was highly relative to the information on other risks that are 
undertaken by the firms. In the credit analysis, information on the company’s total 
risk from the affected currency fluctuations was more important. However, this 
information was considered as internal knowledge. In addition, this information 
was not trivial, and perhaps it was not feasible to obtain, because the transactional 
risk in foreign currency is only a portion of the total economic currency risk. 
(Watson & Head 2010, p.386.) 
Special attention was paid to long-term loans (Shim et al. 2012, p.131.) The 14 
companies that did not exhibit any long-term debt financing in their balance sheets 
were excluded from the analysis. The remaining 58 firms had loans with an 
average four-year residual maturity. Although there were individual companies, 
such as those in the property sector, with a longer residual maturity, the maturity 
of the loans was generally less than the remaining use-time of the average assets. 
This finding suggested that the implementation of the golden rule in the asset-
liability control was at least partially abandoned in operative finance in favour of 
the speculative “riding of the yield curve”.  This result was found in all the sectors: 
the average credit periods were 4.2, 4, 4.1 and 3.6 years in the 
chemical/pharmaceutical, automotive, technology and mechanical engineering 
companies, respectively. 
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3.3.2.4.3. Covenants, commodity risk and the financial crisis   
 
Concerning covenants (Eckbo 2008, p.68), the 14 companies with no long-term 
loans were not affected. The 18 affected companies stated in their annual reports 
that they had no covenants. Twenty-eight companies (39%) reported the presence 
of covenants (this is particularly true of companies listed on the Mdax). Twelve 
companies out of these 28 did not provide detailed information on any covenants 
and/or their conditions. The remaining ten firms reported different details.  
 
Twenty-five companies reported the existence of commodity risks that were the 
result of commodity purchases or sales. Unless the volume is low, commodities 
risk is generally hedged by derivatives or future contracts. In the chemical/ 
pharmaceutical sector, five companies reported their commodities. All except one 
of the companies in the automotive sector mentioned commodities, whereas only 
the Siemens group in the technology sector was affected by this risk. This topic 
was not reported on by any of the mechanical engineering firms. (Smithson 1998, 
p.174.) 
 
Although interest rate management in often discussed in the financial press, there 
was no evidence of interest rate management goals in the annual reports that were 
studied. The interest rate management method advocated in the literature, which 
includes the use of variable interest rates for current assets, and fixed interest rates 
for the debt financing of fixed assets, was not detailed in any of the annual reports. 
(Brigham and Gapenski 2007, p.518.) 
 
3.3.2.4.4. Equity, other financial topics and the financial crisis   
 
The development of equity ratios is economically related to the corporate aim for 
financial security. Therefore, two equity developments were analyzed:  
a) The relationship between equity and total assets. The average ratio remained 
stable over the 6 evaluated years. It started in 2006, therefore before the crisis, at 
36.90 % and went down during the financial crisis in 2008 to 35.08%. In 2011 it 
rose back up to 36.95%. This development could be interpreted to mean that after 
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the start of the financial crisis, firms wanted more equity, as the credit spread for 
bonds increased strongly and debt financing was more expensive and risk inherent. 
The chemical and pharmaceutical companies had, over the six years, an average 
equity ratio that ranged from 33.67% to 37.57%. The year 2010 showed the 
highest ratio for equity in relation to total assets, and 2011 the lowest. Therefore, 
for this sector the financial crisis in 2011 was not as relevant in terms of the equity 
position. The financial crisis did not lead the automotive firms to a more judicious 
equity ratio. Their highest equity ratio was in 2006 and the lowest in 2009. But the 
balance sheets of the automotive producers had big leasing positions. Therefore, it 
may be said that the low equity ratio was influenced by the higher leasing demand 
during the financial crisis. The technology sector showed a development similar to 
the chemical/pharmaceutical sector, with an equity ratio peak in 2010 of 24.14%, 
and in 2011, on average, 22.87%. In comparison the machinery firms were, in 
2011 still more risk-aware, as their average equity ratio increased steadily each 
year from 35.50% in 2006, and in 2011 was nearly 40  per cent (39.92%). The 
company with the most stable equity ratio over the six years was a distributor with 
a ratio-range of 1.2 %.   
b) The relationship between equity and net financial debt. An analysis of the 
development of the ratio of net borrowing to equity was carried out with 49 
companies, as it made no sense to include firms with nil net borrowings. 
Automotive firms with high leasing positions were also excluded. The average of 
the net borrowings-to-equity ratio of all remaining companies was 59.16%, 
63.67%, 71.49%, 67.02%, 53.80% and 67.62% in the years 2006, 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively. The first result is that the listed companies had 
more money from equity investors than (net) from financial lenders. Firms were 
therefore evaluated as well capitalized. Furthermore, the year 2008 showed the 
highest ratio. As the banks were unwilling to give credit in 2008, companies had to 
reduce their debt ratio in 2009 and again in 2010. In 2011, firms again had a 
significantly higher debt ratio than in an average year, which meant that the 
financial crisis had had no further influence on corporate debt. The minimum 
average equity/net borrowings ratio of the chemical/pharmaceutical companies 
was 6.69% below the maximal average from 2006 to 2011. The lowest debt 
leverage was in 2007. As this was before the financial crisis, the reason for the low 
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debt financing was more sector-internally driven. From the automotive sector, only 
three companies could be included in the evaluation. Therefore, the ratios were 
listed without an evaluation, as follows: 2006: 37.67%; 2007: 94%; 2008: 
130.67%; 2009: 138, 67%; 2010: 79% and 2011: 56.04%. The technology sector 
experienced an average ratio of 56.21% with 69.25% for 2006, and 43.68% for 
2011. This could have been caused by the financial crisis, due to lower down 
payments from the customer in the latter years. In the technology and mechanical 
engineering sectors, some of the companies also exhibited high down payments, 
which resulted in the exclusion of some companies from the analysis. The 
remaining three companies had a strong downward trend concerning the debt-
equity ratio. From 2006 to 2011 the ratio went down from 61.67% to 28.20%, 
which is a reduction of over 50%.  
Some of the companies reported trade guarantee lines and asset-backed security 
(ABS) programs. One chemical/pharmaceutical firm listed its ABS-program and 
another reported its factoring system. In the automotive sector, five groups 
reported on their ABS and factoring programs. Two technology companies 
mentioned high bank-guarantee lines, whereas the other technology companies and 
all the mechanical engineering companies did not address any of these issues. 
 
3.3.2.5. Link concerning the discussion of Research 2 
 
The discussion will be presented together with those of Research 3, as both 
evaluate the trade finance portfolio approach.   
3.3.3. Research 3: Operative experts’ experience of the impact of the  
           financial crisis on corporate trade finance 
Using the author’s concept and questions, gtnews conducted a global survey in 
January 2012 and invited thousands of corporate treasury experts to participate. A 
total of 149 corporate treasurers responded, which illustrates the awareness and 
interest in this topic. The majority of the respondents were based in Western 
Europe, which, in combination with those from North America, constituted 75% of 
the respondents. Because most multinational groups are located in these two 
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regions, the percentage does reflect reality. The Asia-Pacific respondents 
comprised 11% of the total respondents, whereas the respondents from Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE), Latin America and the Middle East and Africa (ME&A) 
were each approximately 5% of the total.   
 
A further detailed analysis on the impact of the financial crisis in relation to the 
revenues of companies was also performed. The feedback reflected the typical 
diversification of the export industry. The respondents from companies that 
exhibited a turnover of below US$ 50 million constituted approximately 5% of the 
total. The second largest respondent group, which was composed of slightly more 
than a quarter (26%) of the respondents, where from corporates with an annual 
turnover of US$ 50 to 250 million. The corporates with turnovers of between 
US$ 250 million and US$ 1 billion constituted 20% of the total number of 
respondents. The corporates that had revenues between US$ 1 and 10 billion were 
most often those operating globally. Therefore, it was not surprising that this group 
comprised the largest proportion of respondents at 32%. The respondents from 
corporates with revenues of more than US$ 10 billion represented 17% of the total. 
A similar questionnaire was given to credit analysts, with the help of the UK 
branch of FCIB, which is a global association of credit managers. This 
questionnaire was answered by approximately 50 corporate credit managers, most 
of whom worked for globally active companies. This population was not broken 
down by region or by company size.  
 
3.3.3.1. Trade finance guidelines  
 
On average, approximately two-thirds of the participating corporates had stricter 
trade credit management guidelines as a result of the financial crisis of 2008. In 
fact, more than 80% of the participants based outside of Western Europe and 
North America reported stricter guidelines. The responses from corporates based 
in Latin America were similar to the global average of approximately 66%. About 
60% of the experienced private companies in Western Europe/North America 
reported stricter guidelines due to the crisis, which was lower than the global 
average. This lower rate could be explained by the fact that these corporates may 
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have started developing stricter credit management guidelines earlier than in other 
regions, or that they simply did not take any action as a result of the financial 
crisis. It is also possible that this result reflected the different risk situations of the 
different regions.  
 
Although the reason behind these different results is unknown, the rate that was 
found for the corporates in Latin America might provide a hint: this region was not 
strongly affected by the financial crisis. Its credit management frameworks had 
been built many years ago due to the difficult financial situation that this region 
experienced in the 1980s. Interestingly, the size of the company/group did not 
seem to have had an impact on the reassessment of credit guidelines. All the 
revenue categories exhibited fluctuations within 5% of the overall average, which 
showed that the financial crisis had had a global impact. The credit analysts’ 
survey did not include this topic.  
 
3.3.3.2. Creditworthiness efforts 
 
The next question, which examined a specific behaviour in credit risk 
management, was the following: “Does your organization conduct a more in-depth 
analysis of its open trade risk than it did before the financial crisis?”   
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Figure 9: Percentage of companies that reported changes in their credit analysis  
 
The changes in credit risk management in corporates in the different regions 
followed a similar trend as that observed in Question 1. A total of 80% of the 
respondents that are based in Asia-Pacific, CEE and the ME&A reported changes 
in their credit risk management as a result of the financial crisis. Latin American 
corporates exhibited an average result. In addition, approximately two-thirds of the 
corporates in Western Europe and North American stated that they conduct a more 
in-depth analysis of their open trade risk than they did before the financial crisis. 
 
The answers to the questionnaires sent to the credit analysts were quite similar: 
65% of the participating companies had a group-wide credit and collection 
guideline before the financial crisis and thus, a global view. However, the current 
responses showed that three out of four companies had stricter guidelines than 
before the crisis. During the financial crisis, an additional 15% of the companies 
implemented a group guideline, which meant that four out of five companies had a 
centralized group credit guideline.  
 
In operative credit management, the larger corporates were more cautious as a 
result of the banking crisis than the smaller companies. Approximately 40% of the 
companies with revenues below US$ 250 million per annum were not influenced 
by the crisis, whereas approximately 70% of the larger companies said that they 
conducted an in-depth analysis as a result of the financial crisis. There are two 
theories that could explain the reason for these changes in the behaviour of 
corporates: smaller companies are more focused on their direct relationship with 
the customer and less determined by data; and smaller companies do not have in-
house credit experts. In conclusion, more than two-thirds of the companies were 
currently performing a more in-depth analysis than they had done before the 
financial crisis. To optimize the results from the procedures used in credit 
management, three out of four credit analysts (72%) were stricter with the 
payment behaviour of their customers than they had been before the crisis. In 
addition, more than half (55%) of the surveyed credit analysts were using a scoring 
technique.   
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3.3.3.3. Credit report information 
 
The next question that was asked was: “Compared to before the crisis in 2008, 
does your organization currently spend more money to receive credit report 
information from banks and information brokers?” Only one in four of the smallest 
companies had increased their spending to obtain better data for their credit 
decisions, while the corporates belonging to the other four revenue sizes showed 
an increase of approximately 40%. In addition, although the corporates based in 
the ME&A had increased their spending, none of the CEE corporates had changed 
their spending behaviour. The credit analysts of nearly all of the surveyed 
companies currently analyzed the latest accounts of their customers’ companies, 
which fact was underlined by the increased volume of credit reports that were 
obtained. Approximately half of the companies investigated (45%) currently spent 
more money on credit report information from banks and information brokers than 
they had prior to the crisis.  
3.3.3.4. Automated credit processes  
 
Because personnel costs are always an important issue, corporates might utilize 
new or old technologies to improve their credit analysis and collection. This was 
the focus of Question 4: “Did your organization halt programs to automate its 
credit analysis due to the financial crisis?” Companies in the emerging markets 
invested more in technological support for their credit management. Because the 
global average implementation rate was only 16%, approximately 40% of the 
CEE, the ME&A and Latin America respondents continued to use automated 
programs. In North America and Asia-Pacific, only 10% and 13% of the 
respondents, respectively, continued utilizing automated programs.  
 
This behaviour was also broken down by the different revenue categories: 26% of 
the companies with a turnover of between US$ 50 and 250 million continued using 
automated credit analysis. Because this ratio was still low, it was clear that the 
bulk of investment in credit management software was still to come.  
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Figure 10: Percentage of organizations that utilized automated credit analysis  
 
The responses from the credit analysts showed that firms invested in special 
software for their receivables management to avoid late payments, defaults and 
discrepancies. In fact, one in three companies had additional (accounting) 
software. Before the crisis, the number of companies that used additional 
receivables-specific software was 18%.  
3.3.3.5. Exposure reporting  
 
Management reporting is more intensive when a new risk, such as a financial 
crisis, appears. The information included for trade finance increased reporting on 
topics involving country risk, defaults, premiums (credit insurer) and handling and 
coverage fees (banks).  On average, 58% of the corporates indicated more regular 
reporting of trade finance and credit management topics to top-level managers. 
The effect of the crisis was significant in North America and Western Europe, 
where approximately 50% of the companies/groups had intensified their reporting 
behaviour. In Asia-Pacific, 57% of the surveyed companies reported an increase in 
their reporting rate.  In the ME&A, nearly 90% of the companies conducted deeper 
reports due to the financial crisis, similar to the rate in the Latin American 
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companies (86%). In addition, 75% of the CEE corporates reported with greater 
frequency. Only 25% of the companies world-wide had not changed their 
reporting information.  
 
The analysis on the reporting intensity in terms of revenue size showed that the 
medium-sized to large companies (€ 250 million to € 1 billion turnover) were 
more likely to have retained their old procedures because only 41% of these 
corporates had improved their analysis package.  Analysis of the other revenue 
groups (from small to very large) showed that between 56% and 75% of these 
companies increased their reporting.  
3.3.3.6. Reports on DSO 
 
The most widely used key performance indicator (KPI) in receivables management 
is days sales outstanding (DSO), which is the time it takes to receive payment, 
including the overdue period. The DSO time has to be financed by the seller. In 
addition, the DSO ratio is currently used more often as a KPI than it was prior to 
the crisis. Companies that were based in the ME&A had the biggest impact 
because nearly all the companies (89%) reported a stronger usage of the DSO 
ratio. The fact that this result was found for an emerging market region was 
unusual because the financial crisis was felt more strongly in North America and 
Western Europe, which were the epicentre of the sub-prime and the euro crises. 
However, only approximately 33% of the firms in these most-affected regions 
mentioned an increase in their DSO reporting.  
 
The revenue size of a company did not have a significant impact on the timing of 
its DSO updates. Between 33% and 48% of the companies in each revenue-group 
indicated more frequent DSO reporting as a result of the crisis? The control group 
(the credit analysts) claimed that their DSO calculation was not performed more 
often than it was prior to the financial crisis, which is differed from the results 
obtained from the corporates. The reasons for this stable behaviour were based on 
the fact that the DSO was mainly controlled by the sales department and thus was 
seldom a treasury-based decision process (i.e. the determination of payment term 
and reminder strategy). In addition, since the crisis, an additional 31% of the 
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corporates planned their DSO; thus, a total of 80% of the firms planned their DSO. 
This planning was likely driven by the high importance placed on cash and 
financial planning.  
3.3.3.7. Overdues  report  
 
The critical part of receivables management is the overdue period because this lies 
outside of the sales contract. The seller is at a disadvantage when the buyer 
extends the payment period. Fifty-nine percent of all companies surveyed 
attempted to avoid overdue payments through stricter collection strategies than 
those that had been in place before the crisis. All the ME&A-based companies 
supported this policy change. The other regions exhibited quite different ratios: 
80%, 67%, 62%, 59% and 45% of the companies based in CEE, Latin America, 
Asia-Pacific, Western Europe and North America, respectively, indicated that they 
were stricter with collections. The breakdown by company size showed more 
similarity across the companies. Between 50% and 65% of the firms in each of the 
revenue categories had increased their collection activities since the financial crisis 
of 2008.  
 
 
Figure 11: Percentage of companies that had a stricter collection strategy as a 
result of the financial crisis 
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Stronger collection activities were supported by new collection strategies. Almost 
half of the companies (49%) had created new strategies, whereas the rest of the 
companies had retained the old protocols. The companies in Asia-Pacific (40%) 
and Western Europe/Latin America (43%) had not changed their collection 
strategy as much as the companies in the other regions, which generally behave 
differently. The companies in the ME&A (89%) and CEE (100%) were strongly in 
favour of implementing new organizational procedures to receive payments more 
quickly. In addition, approximately 50% of the companies in North America had 
implemented new procedures. 
 
The companies with a turnover of between US$ 50 and 250 million were most 
likely to change their collection strategy because 62% of these companies had 
developed a new strategy. In addition, 52% of the corporates with a turnover of 
between US$ 1 to 10 billion had also developed new strategies for the collection of 
payments. The companies with an annual turnover of between US$ 250 million 
and US$ 1 billion were less likely to change their collection strategy because 38% 
of the surveyed companies in this group had reported a change. (This question was 
not included in the questionnaire that was answered by the credit analysts.). The 
final two fixed questions focused on the next steps in receivables management and 
corporate trade finance. 
 
3.3.3.8. Matching of receivables 
 
The last question related to the future of financial receivables management: “In 
credit management and collection, is it advantageous to your organization if an 
open account debtor can electronically confirm the correctness of the liability 
before the due date?” Today, receivables invoices are unanswered by the buyer 
until the execution of the payment.  An earlier answer would help credit 
management and collections and influence auditors and analysts because the risk 
of not knowing is an uncertainty for the seller.  
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In general, 71% of the surveyed corporates were interested in receiving a debtor’s 
confirmation soon after invoicing. This confirmation should be in an electronic 
form such that it can be automatically matched with the open outstanding. The 
Asia-Pacific (81%), CEE (100%), Latin America (100%) and the ME&A (89%) 
companies exhibited the strongest demand for electronic confirmation. This trend 
might have been because these regions did not have an “old system”, such as the 
US-lockbox or a direct debit.  In North America, 63% of the surveyed companies 
were interested, whereas the demand in Western Europe was 66%.  Interestingly, 
100% of the firms with the smallest turnover (up to US$ 50 million per annum) 
supported the request. In all the other revenue segments, the positive answer 
deviated around 66%.  
 
 
 
Figure 12: Percentage of organizations that believed it would be advantageous if 
an open account debtor could electronically confirm the correctness of their 
liability before the due date 
 
The responses from the credit analysts were similar to those obtained from the 
corporates. Probably because the letter of credit is the last paper-based contract 
that is used in finance, 75% of the surveyed companies preferred an electronic 
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version. In addition, corporates would have liked to receive the “intent to pay” 
message electronically if they were the seller. If the corporates were the buyer, 
nearly half of the firms (41%) would send the “intent to pay” message if it could 
be sent electronically. Furthermore, 72% of all the corporates that were surveyed 
wanted the “intent to pay” message electronically transferred to their ERP and 
receivables management software. The “intent to pay” message would also be 
helpful in the reduction of the trade finance costs for banks, because the buyer’s 
confirmation message would enable their ability to have lower credit margins.   
 
3.3.3.9. Late payments – a big challenge  
 
Many of the responses reflected the questions that were asked in the survey, such 
as changes in automated scoring, credit information, and DSO/overdue. Other 
participants indicated that their main challenge stemmed from bank borrowing. 
The most-mentioned challenge concerned the public sector companies and (late) 
payments. Furthermore, additional receivables-oriented challenges focused on the 
training of receivables experts and the achievement of the right balance between 
credit risk and sales. More general challenges included improved liquidity 
management, local currency depreciation and decreasing product demand.  
 
The credit analysts indicated that more than 50% of the corporates considered the 
analysis of credit the biggest challenge facing the financial field today. In many 
responses, the correlation between credit analysis and sales was raised. Additional 
international sales and credit limits were also cited as important. Furthermore, the 
availability of credit information and early warning signals was raised by the credit 
analysts. The credit information at the beginning of the crisis was dated and thus 
did not reflect the impact of the crisis on customers. However, this information 
was used to detect other early warning signals. The most important early signal for 
many companies was payment behaviour.  
 
Further individual responses concerned the collection of payments. Other 
questions generated concerned the possibility of longer credit terms, partially due 
to the new bank restrictions for customers and the banks’ prior commitments.  
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3.3.4. Discussion of Research 2 and Research 3 concerning the  
            corporate trade finance portfolio approach 
Concerning Research 2, it should be noted that generally there were no detailed 
legal requirements for the information included in the annual reports, as there 
generally are in accounting. Despite these limitations, the data provided many 
clues regarding the handling. The financial crisis had led the companies to hold 
more liquidity, to improve their receivables management and to install many 
financial internal regulations. The development of the working capital showed 
further room for improvement.  
Very important for the later macro evaluation of corporate trade finance was the 
very low default rates in that field. To further secure the result, two other 
calculations were important: this research result was firstly, much better than that 
reported by Boissay and Gropp (2007), who calculated a rate of 1.81%. The 
difference between this analysis and that performed by the German group was that 
they used data from several thousand French firms, most of which were small 
firms. Like Boissay and Gropp, the researcher assumed that small companies, 
especially those with liquidity needs, would default more often than large firms. 
The second analysis provided an indication of the actual global corporate trade 
default ratio. The researcher analyzed the three biggest international credit insurer 
groups: Atradius, Euler Hermes and Coface. Together, the three groups had a 
credit exposure of euro 1.432 billion in 2010, with a default to exposure ratio of 
0.12%. In this context, exposure referred to limits; therefore, it was assumed that 
the limits used were averaged by 50%, which increased the credit default ratio to 
0.24%. In 2011, the data and the ratios were approximately the same as in 2010. 
This confirmed the low default rate for corporate trade finance.  
 
Essentially, sound corporate credit management or good credit insurance results in 
a default rate of approximately 0.2% of the exposure. In addition, small firms that 
have no active credit management, either in-house or outsourced, have a ratio of 
approximately 1.5% or higher. Furthermore, annual report data from credit 
insurers shows that the handling costs are less than 0.2% of the limit 
(approximately 0.4% of the exposure). This statement can be made because the 
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insurers had a published average credit premium of 0.36% in 2010, which was 
sufficient to cover the risk (0.2%) and handling costs. The 0.36% average 
premium also forms a good basis for the calculation of the financing costs of 
receivables, which must be added to the Euribor rate (i.e. credit interest base 
amount for 3 months). Because the Euribor was quite low over the past few years, 
corporates could strongly optimize their return on their total assets. More 
importantly, a corporate could improve its EBIT to net debt ratio, which supported 
the rating that the group would receive. These two facts indicated that the selling 
of receivables could be a very inexpensive method of obtaining significantly less 
costly financing than a company loan from a bank.  
 
3.3.4.1. Further efficiency calculations on corporate trade finance 
 
A further calculation can be made: The 72 German production companies that 
were surveyed in Research 2 had receivables at 13% of the size of the companies’ 
turnover. The average open receivables volume of a production company was 
therefore approximately 15% of its annual turnover. Furthermore, in a model 
calculation, a company with a turnover of euro 1 billion had open receivables of 
euro 150 million. Approximately 75% of the open receivables, which 
corresponded to euro 110 million, could be sold. Using the previously described 
receivables risk premium of 0.36% and the market risk premium for bank lending 
to mid-sized firms of approximately 2.5% or more, the calculated advantage for 
the financing of receivables was approximately 2%. The annual earnings 
advantage was thus euro 2.2 million. The impact of a better rating was difficult to 
calculate because it led to lower financing costs only in certain balance sheet 
situations. Probably 20% of the companies were affected. For that 20% of firms, 
an improvement in the rating due to a better EBIT to net debt ratio would improve 
the costs by an additional euro 1 million; this calculation was based on a reduction 
in the credit costs of 0.5% (source: bond price difference for various B ratings). 
This decrease could thus be used in the modelling with the assumption of a euro 
200 million financial debt to obtain a total improvement of euro 3.2 million. 
Because the average company that has been described had equity of approximately 
euro 350 million, an active trade finance management could improve the return on 
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equity by nearly 1%. In smaller firms (SMEs), the lending and debt rates were 
higher, given an equity profit improvement of over 1%. The four research studies 
presented in this manuscript showed that corporates increasingly considered 
corporate trade finance as a strategic tool for the optimization of earnings. 
However, the realization of additional earnings required some changes in 
corporate trade finance, the first of which was the introduction of credit portfolio 
management. 
 
The surveys showed that the financial crisis had an impact on all the analyzed 
regions and that it affected small firms as well as global players. Research 2 
therefore confirmed the empirical findings of Research 1. Research 2 also 
confirmed that part of the necessary “security net” was installed prior to the 
insolvency of Lehman Brothers in 2008, which many considered the starting point 
of the financial crisis. Without this security net, the firms would have been hit 
much harder during the crisis.  
 
3.3.4.2. Organization of the portfolio concept in corporate trade finance 
management  
To develop the organizational needs for corporate trade finance management that 
enable a corporate credit portfolio strategy, the existing organizational structures 
were included for viewing and examination. The basic variants of the organization 
of corporate trade finance management include two basic polar types and a hybrid 
of these:  
centralized corporate trade finance management;  
decentralized corporate trade finance management; and   
partially centralized corporate trade finance management.  
 
Centralized corporate trade finance management combines nearly all of the 
functions of credit management in one organizational unit, which is historically 
called “credit management”. The centralized unit defines the framework (credit 
policy), handles the credit analysis, makes the credit decisions and hedges the 
receivables exposure with credit assurance and the bank. The marketing/sales 
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department is involved only in the formulation of the sales and payment 
conditions. However, it should be noted that the marketing and sales departments 
in most firms are able to veto the corporate trade finance management decisions 
under certain conditions.  
 
A high degree of centralization indicates that corporate trade finance management 
has greater specialization and expertise. Companies that use centralization 
differentiate more between the various instruments of trade finance than other 
organizational variants. As an example, each customer risk is also an inherent 
country risk. In a centralized corporate trade finance organization, the total risk per 
country for the firm/group is also controlled; an action that is not possible in a 
decentralized organization. Furthermore, if a well-rated financial group has a 
subsidiary in a high-risk country, the country risk should be considered because 
the local government can stop money transfers or conversions. This activity 
typically belongs to treasury or the central trade finance unit.   
 
3.3.4.3. Monitoring credit limits of the portfolio concept in corporate trade  
             finance 
 
The monitoring of credit limits in a centralized trade finance unit occurs more 
frequently than in other forms of organization (VCI 2000, p.4 f). The limits, which 
are valid over the complete order processes, are monitored at least twice and 
sometimes during every phase of the implementation. In addition, these limits are 
determined by a respected centralized unit and are thus enforced more 
consistently.  Because the classical credit insurers did not decide credit limits 
during the financial crisis, the firms with a centralized trade finance organization 
could determine the additional risk exposure and decide how to handle the risk. In 
this specific situation, the units could use their contacts at the export agencies to 
obtain the needed credit coverage.  
 
The large portfolios of customers can be split based on a variety of factors, such as 
payment behaviour, region and/or size of the firms. This enables the use of defined 
collection strategies with cost-efficient solutions for each customer. Automated 
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electronic reminders and phone calls are executed by credit collection specialists 
to increase the efficiency of the collection process. In the case of high value 
payments, a call to the customer several days before the payment is due is a good 
strategy. In the case of small amounts when payments are overdue, however, 
centralized units typically install an inexpensive but rapid-response device that 
blocks further deliveries.  
 
Companies that have no organizational “corporate trade finance or credit 
management unit” but perform its functions, are considered companies with a 
“decentralized corporate trade finance management”. It can be assumed that 
individual specific functions have grown and that these functions have been 
assigned to individual departments. This organizational variant is marked by a 
strong division of responsibilities. Furthermore, the participation of other 
departments in the different functions is much more obvious than in the centralized 
organization. Another feature of companies with a decentralized organization is 
that some individual functions, such as the definition of rating categories, are 
either not performed or are less frequently performed. The tools used for the credit 
insurance handling are limited, and thus often lead to the buying of standard credit 
insurance.  
 
3.3.4.4. Partially centralized corporate trade finance management 
 
The term “partially centralized corporate trade finance management” means that 
there is a unit that executes some, but not all, of the essential functions of the 
centralized corporate trade finance management. These functions are assigned to 
different organizational units. In an organization with a partially centralized 
corporate trade finance management, the analysis is performed by the named unit 
and the decisions are taken by the specific departments, particularly 
marketing/sales.  The marketing/sales department is responsible for the decision to 
insure, the choice of hedging instruments that are used, and the determination of 
the credit limit. If a decentralized trade finance unit evolves to have a partially 
centralized organization, the general rules and guidelines are centralized and the 
operative steps are retained by the “old” organizational units.  
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The evaluation of the most appropriate organization for a firm can be made only 
by a benchmark study that analyses the associated costs and tasks of each variant. 
The evaluation should consider the corporate trade finance management and the 
overall success of the company. Therefore, it is necessary to identify the 
appropriate internal and external costs. The main objectives and targets to which 
the organizational forms of trade finance management can be benchmarked are the 
minimization of:   
•working capital;  
• loan losses; and  
• cost of credit protection and monitoring, which should not affect the revenues.  
 
These objectives partially compete with each other and must therefore be 
appropriately weighed against each other. A reduction in losses can be achieved 
through a tightening of the credit rules or a shorter payment period, which would 
reduce the working capital and simultaneously reduce the sales or the potential 
sales revenue because not all customers will accept less favourable terms. An 
improvement in the cash discount terms will also reduce the outstanding 
receivables, and the impact on the margin is immediately apparent. Another 
possibility is to reduce the losses through increased hedging (security and 
insurance). This approach is linked with higher costs that can either be external, 
such as insurance or letters of credit, or internal, such as personnel and IT costs. 
Ultimately, all the costs related to the corporate trade finance process must be 
analyzed together.  
 
3.3.4.5. Examples  for the corporate trade finance management 
 
The major topics to consider are the following:  
a) Relevance of the working capital: The most important data included are the 
open receivables, which are distributed by region (i.e. domestic vs. foreign) and 
status (period outstanding vs. overdue and average DSO). To identify the key 
figures, it is also necessary to determine the number of active customers and the 
number and average amount of invoices and credits issued. 
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b) Relevance of unpaid sales: In the context of unpaid sales, the data on 
receivables, the receivables’ dunning levels and the number of debtors with 
bankruptcy proceedings are collected. A regional breakdown is then possible.  
c) Relevance of the cost of credit protection and monitoring: The handling 
costs for the external service providers, such as the banks, insurance companies 
and collection agencies, should be included. In addition, there are a number of 
fees, i.e. insurance (premiums) or guarantee fees, costs for letters of credit, bills of 
exchange and collection. A reduction in costs occurs through the services received 
from credit insurers and banks. However, all the corporate internal costs of the 
corporate trade finance management process need to be determined through the 
necessary personnel and IT capacity. Furthermore, material costs and other costs 
associated with credit management need to be assessed.   
Further indications can be determined through a comparison of the revenues, the 
firm size and staff numbers. It is clear that only precise analyses of the various 
costs in relation to their appropriate benchmarks show the strengths and 
weaknesses of the different organizational processes; therefore, these are necessary 
for conclusions to be drawn on the efficiency of the processes. It must not be 
ignored that this type of analysis involves a significant amount of effort. As a 
general rule, a centralized trade finance organization enables efficient and 
inexpensive credit insurance because it balances the different receivables 
positions. Single, customized solutions, e.g. bank guarantees, make a decentralized 
trade finance organization more efficient because such organizations are close to 
the business that is executed. However, even in these cases, a central data 
warehouse can support and improve the processes.  
 
The organization of corporate trade finance management in an international group 
is not always centralized or decentralized, and is often determined by the country’s 
practices. Typical procedures that are used in different regions are the following 
(ICC 2011):  
 
North America  in-house credit analysis  
Europe   in-house credit analysis and/or credit insurance  
  
128 
 
Africa:   bank-secured (letter of credit)  
Asia:    bank-secured (letter of credit) and in-house credit analysis 
Japan:    in-house credit analysis and credit insurance  
Oceania:   in-house credit analysis  
Latin America:   in-house credit analysis (e.g. lack of credit insurance offers)  
 
Furthermore, deliveries to emerging markets are often secured by the export 
agencies. Since approximately 2005, credit insurers globally cover the customer’s 
non-payment risk. It is now technically possible to globally concentrate corporate 
trade finance. The only limiting factor concerns the knowledge of a regional 
language when speaking with the debtor. 
 
3.3.4.6. Risk-controlling corporate trade finance with the portfolio 
approach   
 
A similar assessment of customer risk can be made using a scoring model. In this 
instance, a portfolio’s credit risk can be determined, as shown in Table 14.  
 
Table 14: Example of a method to illustrate and evaluate the credit risk of a 
portfolio  
(Source: Own slide) 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk class 
No risk Low risk Normal risk High risk Unacceptable  
         Risk 
Average 
default rate 
0,00% 0,25% 0,75% 1,25% 3% 
mEuro 
volume 
500 1,000 800 600 200 
mEuro 
securities  
0 200 400 200 100 
mEuro risk 
volume 
500 800 400 400 100 
mEuro default 
expectations 
0 2 3 5 3 
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A corporate trade finance portfolio allows, in contrast to individual coverage, the 
use of taking high risks with certain limits because general failure prevention is 
not always the aim and a specific loan loss is accepted. Thus, the portfolio 
approach allows, in comparison to an individual assessment, a higher turnover of 
goods and an increased total return (Broens 2009, p. 50). Furthermore, it enables 
the use of portfolio hedges for the management of the individual risks that are 
combined in the portfolio. In addition, local units can handle the credit insurance 
contract themselves, which brings in local knowledge about the customers. This is 
the case even if the contract was obtained centrally to gain the best price offer, 
because the centralized unit can use economies of scale during the contracting 
process. Risk can be reduced if the group protects itself externally, only when the 
total claims exceed the firm’s risk appetite. This coverage is called "XL Insurance" 
or catastrophe cover. The task of the central unit in this process is to internally 
allocate the insurance premiums and the claims proceeds to the individual legal 
entities. For such centralization, the following constraints have to be considered:  
1. Not all countries allow domestic companies to obtain foreign credit insurance.  
2. The local unit is no longer responsible for defaults. This could lead to a sales 
    behaviour that does not correctly consider the risks derived from the overall 
    view.  
3. The insurance tax will be optimized by shifting the external insurance to a  
    tax-optimal location. These places and companies are named captive insurance.  
4. All insurance companies are not equally strong in all areas of the credit limit 
    assignment.  
 
3.3.4.7. Best practice for a portfolio approach in corporate trade finance  
 
To achieve best practice in corporate trade finance, the following are needed:  
- Implementation of different credit scores and credit limit methods.  
- Provision of a work-flow for the approval process.  
- Enabling of a data exchange with the credit insurers in which the limits are 
  shown. 
- Obtaining information from credit bureaus. 
- Preventing delay in payments.  
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- Solving disputed cases.   
- A safe security standard and the appropriate access rights.  
Furthermore, the automatic data exchange needs to be filed with the accounting 
systems and the IT logistics. There are currently software vendors that have 
developed programs that enable all these processes. However, the accurate product 
margins on unit costs are not yet integrated and will thus be one of the future tasks 
for these software developers. 
  
The basic requirement for the success of corporate trade finance portfolio 
management is the development of a standard credit policy. The most significant 
rules of credit policy include the following four variables:  
Credit period, which is the length of time that buyers are given to pay for their 
purchases. 
Discount conditions, which specify the alternatives given to the seller at the time 
of the sale. For example, “2/10, net 30 days” means that the discount will be 2 
percent; the cash is supposed to be deposited into the seller’s account within ten 
days after the invoice date; and the latest payment date is 30 days from the invoice 
date. If the payment is made after 30 days, the invoice is due without any 
reduction.  
Credit standards, which describe the financial strength of acceptable credit risk. A 
higher credit risk boosts sales but also increases bad debts.  
Collection policy, which provides guidance on the toughness or laxity allowed in 
the collection of slow-paying accounts. A tough policy may speed up the 
collection, but might also anger customers and cause them to take their business 
elsewhere.  
 
3.3.4.8. Holistic discussion for a portfolio approach in corporate trade 
             finance 
 
The identification of these four topics provides further detail to the corporate trade 
finance portfolio management policy. This fact can be scientifically proven by a 
description of the standard process, or determined by the decision of a group of 
experts. Both forms have a failure rate that is generally lower than that obtained 
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with decisions that are made by a single credit analyst, because spontaneous 
decisions are not possible and group decisions are better than those that are made 
by one person.  
 
In principle, a standardized process can be used for all trade credits (Brealey et al. 
p.561) because it filters out those risks and limits that cannot be forgiven. An 
individual research by a credit analyst will be necessary only for those debts that 
show no clear result, or in cases in which special factors play an important role in 
the credit evaluation. However, the collection of sufficient information is costly 
and time consuming. It is to the firm’s benefit to expedite the decision-making 
process as much as possible. Thus, the standard rule of marginal analysis, which 
states that the process is continued until the marginal costs equal the marginal 
revenues, is applied. This technique is a sequential decision-making approach 
(Gallinger et al. 1991, p.367).  Therefore, this (deep) credit analysis is not 
economical for small limits with a low default risk. Each company would therefore 
individually define its threshold amount.  
 
A standardized process allows the use of automated data processing operations, 
thereby delivering faster processing and decisions, which means that the 
subsequent processes can also occur faster. Furthermore, a standardized process 
reduces the costs, including the information costs (i.e. annual financial statements 
or credit agency costs), which in turn reduce the number of meetings or 
discussions with the customer, and results in faster in-house processing. The 
standard credit rule also enables better implementation of the objectives. The 
underlying risk setting depends on the maximum acceptable loss amount and the 
desired maximum variation of the losses in a reporting period. The corporate trade 
finance portfolio manager is typically responsible for the definition of a firm’s 
credit policy. However, because of the importance of credit, the policy is normally 
established, or at least formally accepted, by the executive board/committee 
(Brigham and Gapenski 2007, p.791).  
 
Furthermore, external requirements for the corporate trade finance portfolio 
management exist because insurers require an examination of the in-house credit 
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management. The policyholder must demonstrate that the processes and methods 
satisfy the rules of the credit insurer. In Germany, the common basic requirements 
are documented for credit management in the MACM rules. These rules were 
developed by members of the German credit manager organization VfCM. The 
120 requirements are divided into six sections: organization, staff, processes, 
control, systems, and auditing. 
 
3.3.4.9. Future evaluation of the portfolio approach in corporate trade finance  
             
Corporate trade finance portfolio management permits the use of more limits, 
resulting in better controls. The portfolio results help sales planning and the 
pricing of sales because there is interaction between the creditworthiness of the 
company, the acceptability of the prices and the development of the sales volumes. 
New developments in EDI support the portfolio approach. These are internet portal 
solutions (i.e. Elemica and GHX pharmaceuticals) that have been expanded from 
order management to ensure timeliness of payment. In many businesses, corporate 
trade finance portfolio management is still considered to be top priority for the 
senior management. However, at a time when “cash is king” (liquidity) there is the 
key to that target accounts receivable with a good collection and credit evaluation. 
Last should include an avoidance of receivables with high default risk. 
Furthermore, a good credit policy is no luxury and is certainly an instrument that is 
a burden for sales and profit for firms that want to improve the result of their 
working capital. Thus, good corporate trade finance portfolio management is a 
value for each firm and it provides severe financial and operational benefits. 
 
Thus, interaction with a customer never stops; especially not when the delivery of 
the products is made or when the service is completed. Instead, customer 
relationships should be maintained, allowing marketing and sales to directly 
benefit from these actions. A customer-oriented credit manager not only takes care 
of the payment and clears the accounts receivable, but also forms strong bonds, 
which delivers often the real important customer’s behavioural information over a 
long period of time. The elevation of the accounts receivable to an important 
strategy is only possible, when there is transparency throughout the company 
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concerning credit and sales information, from the collections department, through 
the finance and account management, to the chief financial officer (CFO) and 
chief executive officer (CEO). This transparency enables that all the business 
functions reach a similar and steady way of acting in the management of customer 
relationships, and have the ability to rapidly identify the reason why payments are 
delayed, which allows qualified and fast response in accordance with the planned 
customer’s segment. 
 
3.4. Corporate trade finance and its economic validation on a macro level. 
Research 4: The impact of a financial crisis and the resultant changes in 
corporate trade finance, especially from a corporate treasurer’s perspective 
The economic evaluation of corporate trade finance and the impact of a financial 
crisis have been researched in many papers; however, this is a unique evaluation 
due to the use of micro data from globally active treasurers and credit managers. 
An evaluation of the following points follows:  
 
The risk that a company/group takes in its credit management is based on its 
defined risk appetite and external alternatives. During a financial crisis, the 
probability of credit default increases. Therefore, corporates must theoretically 
reduce their risk appetite to achieve the same nominal risk volume.  However, in 
the financial crisis of 2008, corporates could not follow this logic because the 
financial industry (banks and credit insurers) also reduced their risk and thus the 
opportunity for the corporates to outsource their risk was no longer as prevalent. 
The survey results show that almost a third (30%) of the participating corporates 
expanded their business and increased their credit limits for customers during the 
financial crisis. This behaviour was most pronounced in the corporates that were 
based in the ME&A, where two out of three respondents reported increased credit 
limits. The corporates in Asia-Pacific and Latin America reported a similar 
change, in which 60% and 57%, respectively, implemented higher limits. In other 
continents, the situation is similar to the behaviour before the crisis: two out of 
three companies in Europe (east, central and west) and North America reported 
unchanged credit limits. In terms of revenue size, the smaller companies (below 
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€50m turnover) changed the most as a result of the financial crisis. Approximately 
50% of these small companies reported higher credit limits. In contrast, only 20% 
to 35% of the larger companies increased their credit limits.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Percentage of companies that increased their limits in trade credit as a 
result of the financial crisis  
 
The credit analysts reported that having comprehensive knowledge of their 
customers’ accounts helped control the default and late-payment risks. The 
financial crisis did not generally lead to lower credit lines. In fact, 56% (31 
responses) of the surveyed credit analysts indicated that the credit limits in their 
companies were at the same level as before the crisis. 
3.4.1. Credit outsourcing and credit insurance 
In a financial crisis, companies re-think their financial strategy and business 
objectives. This internal assessment includes an evaluation of their credit 
insurance; this is reflected by the finding that 33% of the surveyed companies 
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reported changing their credit insurance policy as a result of the crisis. The 
companies based in the ME&A (44%), Latin America (43%) and CEE (40%) most 
strongly illustrated this trend. This behaviour was not as pronounced as in Western 
Europe (34%), Asia-Pacific (33%) and North America (25%). A breakdown of the 
responses by company size showed a stronger differentiation. The medium-sized 
companies most seldom reported the use of a new strategy (7%), whereas 50% of 
the companies in the smallest revenue category reported a change in strategy, 
which is similar to the results found in the credit limit changes. In addition, 46% of 
the “smaller” multinationals (US$ 1 to 9.9 billion) changed their credit insurance 
policy.  
 
 
Figure 14: Percentage of companies that reported a strategy change in credit 
insurance as a result of the financial crisis  
 
Furthermore, the credit analysts reported that a significant majority of the 
companies (78%) did not alter their credit insurance policy as a result of the 
financial crisis. It is surprising that more corporates actually reduced their credit 
insurance (58%) than the number of companies that increased it.  
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3.4.2. Trade finance instruments: Letters of credit 
Letters of credit (LCs) are used for international sales transactions. As a result of 
globalization, which has given corporates access to credit information outside their 
home country, LCs are used only for long distance sales or deliveries that exhibit a 
high credit risk. Therefore, the impact of the financial crisis on the LC strategy is 
not applicable to all the surveyed participants. Under these conditions, the number 
of participants who reported a different LC strategy (24%) is presumably more 
than the number that would be obtained had the surveyed companies solely 
included exporters.  
 
The analysis of the regional responses shows that LCs have differing impacts in 
different countries. In the ME&A, 56% of the companies reported a change in 
their LC behaviour. The percentage of companies in CEE that reported an LC 
behaviour change was 40%. This finding could be the result of the lower risk 
appetite of banks and credit insurance companies in these regions, which is in 
agreement with other reports. In the other regions, more than 70% of the 
responding companies reported no change in their LC strategy. In addition, the 
size of a company did not appear to affect its LC behaviour because all of the 
revenue categories exhibited ratios of between 13% and 31%.  
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Figure 15: Percentage of organizations that changed their use of letters of credit 
(LC) strategy in Receivables Management as a result of the financial crisis 
 
Approximately 75% of the responses from the corporate credit experts reported an 
unchanged LC behaviour due to the financial crisis. The remaining responses 
mainly expressed an increased use of this bank product. It is very possible that 
corporates that do not obtain a sufficient credit insurance limit use more letters of 
credit. Five of the surveyed participants had reduced their letters of credit 
coverage. 
 
3.4.3. Impact of Basel III  
In response to the weaknesses of the financial crisis, bank regulators globally 
created new basic principles for the management and supervision of liquidity. 
Because this was led by the Bank for International Settlements, the principles were 
named the Basel III rules. The proposed new minimum quantitative standards have 
different risk horizons. The goal of this reform is to achieve a balance between a 
stable financial system and the avoidance of a credit crunch. The reform also limits 
and reduces the liability of public authorities and taxpayers. Furthermore, the new 
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principles should have only small dampening effects on economies. An evaluation 
of the new rules gives the impression that the higher capital adequacy 
requirements (capital adequacy ratios) lead to a high equity demand. 
 
The research question focused on the impact that the Basel III regulation plan, 
which requires that banks have increased equity to reduce the possibility of future 
financial crises, would have on corporate trade finance. Sixty-five percent of the 
firms were concerned about Basel III in relation to corporate trade finance. Of 
these, the Asia-Pacific corporates were the most concerned; 81% of the 
respondents based in Asia-Pacific responded “I am concerned”. However, many 
firms from the other regions (57% to 67%) were also concerned about the new 
rules and exhibited strong doubt about the fairness shown to trade finance by the 
Basel III regulators.  
 
The analysis of the responses and the company sizes showed that the largest 
corporates experienced the highest doubt about the impact of the new regulations. 
Eighty-four percent of the companies with a turnover of more than US$ 10 billion 
showed concern with the impact that Basel III will have on trade finance. The 
analysis of the smallest firms showed that 75% of these companies were concerned 
about Basel III. The medium-sized corporates experienced the lowest concern rate, 
at 59%. The credit analysts had a different view: 56% of the surveyed credit 
analysts felt that the new global banking regulations (Basel III) require higher risk 
premiums, due to the financial crisis in trade finance.  
 
3.4.4. Biggest economic challenge of today 
Approximately 60 participants (40%) responded to the open question regarding the 
biggest challenge that was faced during the financial crisis. Some participants 
indicated that their main challenge stemmed from bank borrowing. Therefore, one 
lesson that was learned from the recent financial crisis was that a supplier is the 
most stable credit grantor for other companies.  The second most-mentioned 
challenge concerned the public sector companies and (late) payments.  
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The credit analysts indicated that the impact of the financial crisis in some 
countries was very strong. This was particularly true for the emerging markets and 
Southern Europe. There are several challenges that the (poor) emerging markets 
faced: a) the banks open letters of credit only on a cash basis, b) the banks do not 
have sufficient rating to obtain credit from international banks, and c) the country 
risk cannot be overlooked in a crisis situation. 
 
The final general credit topics that were raised by the credit analysts included the 
lack of bank financing and thus the increased customer demand for working 
capital finance. Further questions that were generated included the possibility of 
longer credit terms, partially due to the new bank restrictions for customers, and 
the banks’ prior commitments.  
 
3.4.5. Discussion of research 4 on corporate trade finance on a macro level 
The surveys showed that the financial crisis had had an impact on all the analyzed 
regions and that it affected small firms as well as global players. The research  
showed the empirical findings and could confirm them by data and values. 
Concerning reaction to the financial crisis, the research showed the active handling 
of the groups and gave information on the changes that had already influenced the 
balance sheet and/or profit and loss results.  
 
Despite the serious impact of the financial crisis, countries and companies 
continue to finance trade. Trade finance will always be a part of the trade business. 
The availability of trade finance is critical for the sustenance of emerging markets 
and for small- and medium-sized enterprises that rely on short-term trade finance 
for their trading activities. Consequently, it is not surprising that trade finance has 
been accepted as a recognized factor in the global trade and finance fields 
(Senechal 2011). Leading global banks observe significant growth in total trade 
finance and feel the need to cooperate within the corporate community and with 
the regulators (Ahearn 2011 and Cotti 2011). Finally, firms and commercial banks 
will optimize their trade finance methods, making the utilization of trade finance 
even more attractive.   
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Historically, a typical treasury department was invisible to many parts outside. 
Even inside a firm, there was not often contact to the operations, i.e. if it 
performed its tasks successfully, then the business units, the board of directors and 
senior management, paid little to no attention to its activities. In many 
organizations, the treasury ensured an efficient banking structure, adequate 
liquidity and the safekeeping of cash resources, whereas the rest of the 
organization focused on operating profit, growth and development. The treasury’s 
role was thus critical, but it was often relegated to a support function with a back-
office status because it protected the firm’s resources instead of creating value. 
The financial crisis and credit crunch fundamentally changed the role of the 
corporate treasurer. There was need for many information about markets and credit 
from operations; and the role was not any more a traditionally back-office 
intensive function but one that is significantly more visible and highly strategic. 
The crisis also re-emphasized the role of transaction banking as a stable and low-
risk source of growth and revenue in many banks. The value and visibility of the 
treasury have increased because of the new challenges facing organizations that 
require the treasury’s guidance and leadership. In the actual post-crisis and 
economic recovery environment, companies have changed their behaviour and are 
increasingly focused on the management of risk and liquidity. Therefore, the 
treasurer has, in addition to his former duties, to be risk-aware and focus on 
necessary innovative key issues.  
 
3.4.5.1. Basel III and the corporate treasury 
 
Trade finance products have significantly different risk profiles, default rates and 
capital uses from other corporate finance products. Multinational corporations 
increasingly handle their trade finance risk globally, in a portfolio approach. They 
rely on their business partners, traders and producers in developing countries with 
weak institutions; while smaller firms generally rely more on bank-mediated trade 
finance, such as letters of credit (LCs) and guarantees.  
 
Following the financial crisis, it became clear that the concept of Basel II, which 
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became effective in February 2008, had severe shortcomings and that there was a 
need for additional change in the regulation and supervision of banking activities. 
On 12 September 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision endorsed a 
new regulatory capital and liquidity regime, referred to as Basel III. In addition to 
Basel III, a number of regional regulations, such as the Dodd-Frank Act in the US, 
were implemented. These had an impact on corporate treasuries and certainly 
modified the dynamics within financial markets as well (Oliver Wymann 2011).  
Corporate treasurers were affected in a number of ways by the consequences that 
Basel III had on banks. This was most obvious on the borrowing side, but other 
product categories also became more costly. 
 
Trade finance had been run in a consistent way for over 500 years. Banks offered 
letters of credit and other paper-based documents. Electronic data exchange in a 
standardized format was not always available and there were often at least two 
banks involved in a trade transaction. This inefficient approach to trade finance 
became affected by additional Basel III costs because the banks had to increase 
their equity, which led to higher credit margin needs and business guarantees. As a 
consequence, some smaller banks left the trade finance business. Other banks 
altered their strategy and redefined their “sweet spots”. In addition, non-bank 
financial institutions started to play a more active role because they were beyond 
the scope of the Basel III requirements, which ultimately gave these institutions a 
competitive advantage.  
 
3.4.5.2. Basel III and low default rates in trade finance 
 
Under these conditions, corporates had to control their trade finance volumes 
through active management of their trade receivables, which had a direct impact 
on debt-taking by the banks. The business to business seller had two alternatives: 
either expand the seller’s borrowing and credit risk-taking, or outsource their trade 
finance needs to a bank. The latter seemed unlikely as the demand for LCs had 
declined significantly in the past few years. This change was not related to the 
Basel III capital requirements, but associated with the fact that too much manual 
work was involved in the use of LCs and that standard electronic datasets were 
missing.  
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As mentioned previously, corporates generally have very low default rates on trade 
finance loans. The annual reports published by German corporate and global credit 
insurers’ showed that an average of approximately 0.2% of the exposure resulted 
in a default. Even during the financial crisis, defaults among the producers of 
goods were not very high. This was not only due to better credit management by 
the corporates, but was mostly based on the simple fact that a sale is short-term. 
Furthermore, buyers order products at a very high percentage simply because they 
need the products. As a consequence, a significant negotiation on trade contracts 
based on speculative price conditions does not typically occur.  
 
It was expected that Basel III would increase the costs of finance significantly. 
Although the calculation for each bank differed, an interest increase of 0.5% 
seemed probable. This negatively affected the vast majority of corporates and led 
to an increased use of in-house trade finance, or a stronger use of new market 
participants outside the banking regulations (Broens, H. 2010e); so called “shadow 
bankers”. Furthermore, Basel III increased the banks’ refinancing costs, which 
reduced their respective programs to optimize the working capital of corporates.  
 
It is understandable that the Basel Committee wants the banks to be safer than in 
the past, given the experiences of the recent financial crisis. Banks informed the 
Committee of the unfair treatment of the guarantee business in trade finance and 
consequently, the Committee will correct the risk requirements as soon as the 
banks can document their low default rates in trade finance, which will occur in 
2016. From the standpoint of the majority of corporates, financing trade is a core 
banking business, which allows corporates to focus on bringing the best product to 
the customer. The corporates therefore need banks to take part in trade finance for 
at least another 500 years (Broens 2010f).   
  
  
143 
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FOUR RESEARCHES 
 
The results of the literature analysis and the research analyses are summarized in 
the next sections. The current research investigated the influence of fiscal 
emergency of the year 2008 on business trade economics, principally centering on 
business trade credit risk in times of economic insecurity. This research includes 
review and investigative data analysis methodologies to examine and assess the 
impact of economic emergency on corporate trade finance. According to the 
results, it is noted that trade credit is a high-priced source of funding, thus it is 
logical to suppose that a company utilizing trade credit when in fiscal distress will 
acquire additional expenses that later impact the company’s general fiscal 
functioning. It is approximated that the price of fiscal emergency for companies 
amplifies considerably as they raise their utilization of trade finance if they happen 
to get into a fiscal emergency. The research studied the impact of fiscal emergency 
on corporate trade finance and employed numerous accepted theories of trade 
finance to assess if this augmentation in the claim for trade finance/credit was the 
result of fiscal emergency.  
 
Furthermore, it recognized and calculated the price of fiscal emergency which had 
not been dealt with earlier. Companies in fiscal emergency utilize additional trade 
credit from dealers that is costly and augments fiscal emergency. According to the 
reactions of business credit specialists, a rise occurs in the utilization of letters of 
credit from banks that could be a result of inadequate credit insurance, causing 
companies to have a tendency to utilize letters of credit during fiscal emergency. 
Additionally certain participants further stated that severe bank credit norms put 
extensive stress on banks and other financial establishments. Banks have listed an 
elevated accessibility to credit tools following the fiscal emergency. Nevertheless, 
apprehension is caused by the declining returns on trade that restrict a company’s 
capability to pay back on time. On average, bigger companies expand their 
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utilization of trade payables in fiscal emergency, while smaller companies, which 
have inadequate financing choices, lengthen their trade payables. This reflection is 
consistent with trade credit theories that point out that bigger companies, when in a 
fiscal emergency, depend to a lesser degree than smaller companies, on financing 
from dealers. Additionally, according to the results of investigative data analysis it 
was recognized that there exists a constructive correlation between the 
demographic position of the companies and the variables that incorporate: 
“Average days delinquent” (ADD) 2009, “Current ratio”, “Return on sales” (2009) 
and “Turnover in EUR” (2009).  It was noted that “Disputes pertaining to 
invoices” was chiefly listed within the European Union as compared to other 
countries, even though the real figure is not particularly elevated.  Unconstructive 
“Return on sales” was listed chiefly in the European Union, as compared to other 
countries. According to the results of secondary data analysis it was seen that 
“working capital” seemed to have a noteworthy correlation with “sales 
expansion”, “tangible net worth” and the “EBITDA margin”, therefore it was 
noted that unconstructive “working capital” resulted in decreased or 
unconstructive “sales growth”, “tangible net worth and the “EBITDA margin”.  
 
4.1. Actual developments in corporate trade finance  
 
The year 2010 was one of recovery for world trade after the financial crisis of 
2008. Trade volumes grew by at least 13.5% (Lamy 2011). In addition, 
approximately 80% of the total trade transactions, which were estimated to have a 
total cost of USD 15 trillion, involved a form of credit, insurance, or guarantee 
(Senechal 2011). “2011 increased the trade volume by 6.6 %, as the Arab Spring 
disruptions, the earthquake in Japan, and the debt crises in the Eurozone and the 
US – resulted in uneven performance to the year before and the outlook for 2012 is 
expected to have a negative carry-over, with annual trade growth forecast to be 
5.2 % for 2012 and 7.2 % in 2013.”  
 
“Trade finance volumes rose in 2011 and the percentage of trade credit lines that 
were cut for corporate and financial institutions continued to fall. Of the financial 
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institutions responding, 51% reported an increase in export LC volumes and 56% 
an increase in import LC volumes. Considerable increases were also reported for 
guarantees (39% on the export side and 47% on the import side)” (Lamy 2012). 
The export agencies increased their business of credit insurances by 19% in 2011 
(ICC 2012, p.45). The need for sufficient market liquidity, which started in the 
financial crisis of 2008, is still a critical factor for firms. Furthermore, such 
adequate liquidity is crucial for the functioning of markets and the banking sector. 
If the economy strongly deteriorates, market liquidity suddenly disappears, which 
causes the banking sectors to require refinancing. The central banks around the 
globe are then forced to intervene on the liquidity problems that the companies 
face. 
  
The new system of a web portal for matching trade receivables and liabilities that 
is linked to a marketplace for trade financing could prove invaluable to banks and 
firms. The preparation of the data for financing, the buying or securing of 
receivables by third parties, and the making of credit limit decisions in-house is 
also part of the system. The buyer inputs the credit-relevant information into the 
system, which enables the product seller and/or financing company to analyze the 
default risk of the receivables (see appendix). The availability of the data enables 
the financing company to rapidly give an indication of whether or not it will be 
possible to finance/ buy/secure the receivables. As determined in Research 1, 
credit scoring requires only approximate amounts. Therefore, the financing firm is 
able to use approximate figures in their decision-making process, which helps the 
debtor to remain anonymous when a finance company is asked for a price 
indication.   
 
4.2. Advantage of a new developed solution for corporate trade finance  
 
The new portal makes it possible, without using a bank, to promptly recognize any 
differences. Thus, payment losses are avoided and/or the turnaround times 
between delivery and payment are shortened. Furthermore, the web portal enables 
a better working capital management: by the matching of trade receivables and 
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liabilities, mismatches will be made available to all parties before maturity. Delay 
of payment, then, can be authorized only in exceptional cases. Thus, the matching 
substantially increases interest and liquidity advantages. The majority of the actual 
collection work can decrease, because the information of a planned payment is 
available before maturity (Richman and Mutter 2010). Furthermore, a majority of 
the manual accounting work is now void because debtors and creditors have a 
stronger interest under the electronic data exchange to harmonize the data records 
such that both sides have to do the least amount of manual work. End-of-year 
procedure work: confirmations with debtors on the existence of the receivables are 
void through this application because the position is confirmed by the matching. 
This is an improvement because only a random sampling currently occurs. Thus, 
any deliberate and/or erroneous representations of the data in the annual report are 
avoided.  
 
In addition, the portal helps banks again become the suppliers of trade finance. 
Banks have also introduced an electronic standardized irrevocable payment 
obligation (bank payment obligation, BPO), which can be linked to the web 
information. This BPO is similar to the confirmation that is given by banks for 
LCs. The International Chamber of Commerce in Paris has already confirmed this 
product; therefore, the BPO now receives worldwide status and rights that are 
comparable to those of LCs (Richman2010). Another advantage of the portal is in 
currency management: companies have a more exact knowledge of their exposure 
and banks can thus offer better handling recommendations or even an active 
management of all the company’s trade flows.  
 
4.3. Evaluation of the hypotheses  
The following are the hypotheses confirmed through this study: 
 
H1: The corporate trade credit limit has a specific relationship to financial 
data and ratios 
The hypothesis is confirmed by the literature of credit analyzing and by the 
practitioners’ handling. The relationship is circumscribed by narrow ranges, which 
helps trade buyers, bankers and new credit analysts to set credit limits.  
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H2: During a financial crisis, companies focus more strongly on a reduced 
working capital to improve liquidity 
The hypothesis concerning working capital development is partially confirmed by 
the data. The results of the annual reports data show a strong improvement in 
receivables reduction, while trade liabilities, and especially inventories, were 
adapted here only to a higher turnover. Higher liquidity is shown by volume and 
ratios. Although it is now four years since the financial and banking crisis started, 
there are no hints either in the literature, or in corporate information, that 
alternative strategies for handling liquidity in a banking crisis exist. The research 
gives some ideas about what could be done in the future. The author has the 
impression that treasurers strongly rely on bank products and are still not focused 
on fundamental alternatives.  
 
H3: The portfolio approach enables corporates to receive better results in 
trade credit management, comparable to individual credit decisions 
The hypothesis is confirmed. The portfolio approach enables companies and 
groups to optimize their credit management through better credit costs in relation 
to trade turnover. The new approach requires strict credit guidelines and 
procedures, higher credit management knowledge and further investments in 
software support.  
 
H4: The new banking regulation, Basel III might strengthen shadow banking 
for corporate trade finance 
The IMF economist Zamil (2010) considers Basel III an improvement as long as 
the banks solidly apply the assets and valuation standards and establish good risk 
management. In addition, this strategy requires assertive regulators. In contrast, 
other economists evaluate the solution as not being one of the free market; and the 
manuscript described earlier that the new Basel III regulations, in the actual rules, 
will lead to higher credit costs for banks than the price calculation for shadow 
banks. This can only be equalized for banks when they take additional risks to be 
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competitive. Credit insurance is also affected because the insurers received stricter 
guidelines that are similar to those proposed in Basel III. 
The low default rates in trade finance even in times of crisis justify the 
confirmation of the hypothesis.    
4.4. Outlook for corporate trade finance 
As described in the manuscript, corporate trade finance has many options 
regarding which processes can be kept internal and which can be outsourced. Best 
practice will differ for each seller. The risk appetite, the size of the company, the 
market in which it operates, the customer portfolio, the sales strategy, the regional 
structure and the outsourcing price will have an influence on the identification of a 
company’s best practice. In addition, the market conditions are not stable, which 
means that the best strategy and best practice may change over time. It is even 
possible that a split will occur between the finance businesses of banks and 
corporates. The solutions in trade finance are continuously improving, which often 
occurs at the micro level.  It is even beneficial to end the old-fashioned paper 
handling in international bank trade finance. The next generation of finance 
experts will only accept electronic letters of credit that are associated with a 
database that can be used to easily store and link all external requirements and 
documents with internal data. If this happens, corporate trade finance will have a 
great future.  
 
Internet portals that fulfil part of the above-mentioned points already exist. The 
latest development is that the portals can integrate the financial data of the trade 
itself (the identity of the seller and the buyer, the invoice number, the currency, the 
amount, and the due date) with the additional data that are important for credit 
decisions. This allows the seller and financial institutions to easily make a credit 
limit/finance offer without delay.    
 
Corporate trade finance has evolved from making individual trade finance 
decisions to a single portfolio approach. Active portfolio management includes the 
control and the taking of risks. Corporate trade finance portfolio management is 
increasingly IT-based and process-oriented, which means that it can be used by 
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companies that are at least medium-sized and that have a sufficiently large 
exposure of clients. Large corporations extend this approach towards a group-wide 
portfolio optimization by using "credit factories”, hedging strategies, and central 
data storage. Historical data, regression calculations, and artificial intelligence are 
now being used in corporate trade finance (Schmidt et al. 20078). The success of 
all these improvements can result in an increase in the return on equity of at least 
1% for production companies. However, an additional review of best practice by 
using a scientific approach is required. The ongoing financial crisis has 
demonstrated the importance of corporate trade finance for the economy. We will 
not forget, however, that a delivery is a gift until it is paid (Broens 2010e).  
 
As mentioned previously, best practice cannot be determined by regulators. 
Regulators can only avoid short-term overshooting or the risk of destroying 
wealth. Therefore, the new Basel III rules, which were initiated by the G20, must 
aim to improve the stability of the financial system. However, the regulations on 
capital requirements that were introduced for banks will have a negative impact on 
trade and export finance. The proposed concept will make bank guarantees in 
international trade (i.e. letters of credit) more expensive. Because there is no 
justification for defaults, the corporates will ultimately have to pay for the 
speculative behaviour of bankers before the crisis, which will result in increased 
product prices. Fortunately, the regulators will correct this as soon as actual data 
from the banks is available.  
 
The final question is whether the new activities in corporate trade finance can been 
considered best practice for the future, or whether there will be further 
developments. The answer will be strongly influenced by external developments, 
such as other political and/or economic crises. In addition, best practice also 
strongly depends on the future financial condition of companies and banks.  
  
  
150 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Ahearn, John: An industry outlook on the recovery in Rethinking Trade & 
Finance: Global Survey 2011, p. 18, ICC Services, 2011, Paris, ISBN 978-92-842-
0100-6  
 
Aktas, Nihat, De Bodt, Eric, Lobez, Frédéric and Statnik, Jean-Christophe: The 
Information Content of Trade Credit, February 12, 2010. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1568046, view 2010-08-13   
 
Altmann, Edward, I.: Financial ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of 
Corporate Bankruptcy, In Journal of Finance vol. 23, 1968 9, p.589-609, USA 
 
APQC (a member-based nonprofit organization, Houston, USA): Improving 
Working capital management and Cash Flow Intelligence, Available on apqc.org/ 
Improving-Working-Capital-Management-and-Cash-Flow-Intelligence, view 
2012-07-25  
 
Armitage, Seth:  The cost of capital: intermediate theory, 2005, Great Britain, 
ISBN 10 0-521-00044-0  
 
Arnold, Glen: Financial Times handbook of corporate finance, 2nd edition, 2010, 
Great Britain, ISBN 978-0-273-72656-2 
 
Ashby, W. Ross: An introduction to cybernetics 3rd edition, 1958, London  
 
Atanasova, Christina: Access to Institutional Finance and the Use of Trade Credit, 
Financial Management. 2007  
 
Atradius: annual report 2011 
  
151 
 
 
Baum, Christopher F., Caglayan, Mustafa & Ozkan, Neslihan 2003: The Impact of 
Macroeconomic Uncertainty on Trade Credit for Non-Financial Firms, Boston 
College Working Papers in Economics 566, Boston College Department of 
Economics 
 
Baetge, Joerg, Hüls, Dagmar, Ulthoff, Carsten: Bilanzbonitätsanalyse mit Hilfe der 
Bonitätsanalyse mit Hilfe der Diskriminanzanalyse nach neuem Recht, in 
Controlling 1994, Germany, No. 6, p.320-327 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Basel III framework for liquidity, 2011, 
Switzerland 
 
BASF S.E: annual report 2011 
 
Bastos, R and Pindado, J: An agency model to explain trade credit policy and 
empirical evidence. Applied Economics, vol. 39, 2007, p. 2631–2642 
 
Bayer AG: annual report 2011 
 
Belyacz, Ivan: Global Financial Crisis, causes and consequences in financial 
theory, documents of the First International Working Conference on 
Competitiveness Research, Budapest, 8/9 March 2012 
 
Beranek William:  A historical perspective of research and practice in working 
capital management, in Kim, Y.H. and Srinivasan, V.:  Advanced in working 
capital management: A research Annual Volume 1, 1988, London, p. 3-15   
 
Bernard, Jacques: Trade and Finance in the Middle Ages 900-1500, article 7 in: 
The Fontana Economic History of Europe - The Middle Ages, edited by Carlo 
Cipolla, Collins/Fontana, 1977, London, p. 274-275 
 
  
152 
 
Biais, B. and Gollier, C: Trade Credit and Credit Rationing.  Review of Financial 
Studies, vol. 10(4), 1997, p. 903–37 
 
Bodie, Zvi; Kane, Alex and Marcus, Alan J.:  Essentials of Investments, 9th 
edition, 2009. USA, ISBN 978-007-127828-7 
 
Böhnisch, Wolf R. / Leichtfried, Gerlinde: Hard Facts und Soft Facts der Führung 
(Leadership): Erfolgsfaktoren für das Management in: Guserl, Richard und 
Pernsteiner, Helmut: Handbuch Finanzmanagement in der Praxis, December 2004, 
München, p.347-386, ISBN: 3409124268  
 
Boissay, Frédéric and Gropp, Reint: Trade Credit Defaults and Liquidity Provision 
by Firms (May 2007), ECB Working Paper No. 753. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=985123, view 2010-08-13  
 
Bolero: Bolero signs first e-bill of lading in China, in: Global Trade Review, 
Volume 11, Issue 4, March/April 2013, London, p. 46 
 
Bonti, Gabriel, Kalkbrener, Michael, Lotz, Christopher and Stahl, Gerhard: Credit 
risk concentration under stress, in: The journal of credit risk, Vol. 2, Number 3, 
2006, Great Britain, p. 115-136, ISSN 1744-6619 
 
Brealey, Richard A. and Myers, Stewart C.: Principles of Corporate Finance, 2000, 
USA, ISBN-10:  0072352361  
 
Brealey, Richard A., Myers, Stewart C. and Marcus, Alan J.:  Fundamentals of 
Corporate Finance, 6th edition, 2009, New York, ISBN 978-0-07-128527-8  
 
Brigham, Eugene F. and Gapenski, Louis G.: Financial Management: Theory and 
Practice, 7th edition, 1997, USA, ISBN 0-03-017789-8  
 
Brigham, Eugene F. and Ehrhard, Michael C. Financial Management: Theory and 
Practice, 12th edition, 2008, USA, ISBN 978-0-324-42269-6 
  
153 
 
 
Broens, Herbert: Ways to ooptimize Credit Decisions for B2B Transactions, 
Business Credit,  USA, Vol. 111 No. 8,  2009 p.46-50, and Hong Kong Credit and 
Collection Management Association,  
www.hkccma.com/article_Herbert Broens.htm, view 20-04-2011 
 
Broens, Herbert (2010 a): Standardised Confirmation of Receivables TSU – a new 
(bank) solution with plenty of potential, SWIFT, Belgien, 2010 and Business 
Credit, 2010, USA, number 9, p.50-54  
 
Broens, Herbert (2010b):  Unlock the Secret of Effective Data Analysis, CCR 
Magazine, August 2010, Great Britain, p. 56-57  
 
Broens, Herbert (2010c): Ungesicherte Lieferantenkredite von mittelständischen 
Unternehmen, in:  Finanzierung im Mittelstand 04/2010, Duesseldorf, p. 2-4  
 
Broens, Herbert (2010d): Optimierung der Kreditentscheidung, in Exportmanager / 
FAZ , No. 6, Aug. 2010, Frankfurt, p.12-13  
 
Broens, Herbert (2010e): More is less (about Basel III) in financial I, 3Q 2010, 
Great Britain, p.30-31 
 
Broens, Herbert:  Handelsfinanzierung unter Basel III, in Exportmanager / FAZ , 
No. 2 , March 2011, p.13-14  
 
Buckham, David, Wahl, Jason and Rose Stuart: Executives guide to Solvency II, 
2011, USA, ISBN 978-0-470-54572-0 
 
Buckley, Adrian, Ross, Stephen A., Westerfield, Randolph W. and Jaffe, Jeffrey 
F.: Corporate Finance Europe, German version, Pape, Ulrich, 2000, New York, 
ISBN 3-89028-300-4  
 
  
154 
 
Bugar, Gyöngyi and Uzsoki, Mate: Changes and Achievements in Gauging 
Investment Risk, International Management Development Association (IMDA), 
USA, 2012 Helsinki Conference documentation, p. 271 – 278 
 
Burkart, M., and Ellingsen, Y: In-Kind Finance. A Theory of Trade Credit. 
American Economic Review, vol. 2004, 94, p. 569–90. 
 
Burnham James:  The managerial revolution: what is happening to the world, 
1941, New York 
  
Camerinelli, Enrico: Measuring the Value of the Supply Chain, 2009, Great 
Britain, ISBN 978-0-566-08794-3 
 
Campello, Murillo, Graham, John R. and Harvey, Campbell R.: The Real E§ects 
of Financial Constraints: Evidence from a Financial Crisis,2009, 
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~charvey/Research/Working_Papers/W90_The_real
_effects.pdf 
 
Carell, Philip: The Handbook of Risk Management: Implementing a Post-Crisis 
Corporate Culture, 2010, Great Britain, ISBN 978-0-470-68175-6  
 
Chor, D., and Manova, K.: Off the cliff and back? Credit conditions and 
international trade during the global financial crisis, Journal of International 
Economics, 87, 2012, p. 117 - 133 
 
Coenenberg, Adolf G.: Jahresabschluss und Jahresabschlussanalyse, 2003, 
Stuttgart 
 
Coface S.A.: annual report 2011 
 
COSO - The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission: Internal Control – Integrated Framework to help businesses and 
other entities assess and enhance their internal control systems. (Committee of 
  
155 
 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission): Enterprise Risk 
Management — Integrated Framework, USA Executive summary, 
 http://www.coso.org/documents/COSO_ERM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf, view 
2011-04-21 
 
Cotti, Daniel:  An industry outlook on the recovery in Rethinking Trade & 
Finance: Global Survey 2011, p. 18, ICC Services, 2011, Paris, ISBN 978-92-842-
0100-6  
 
Creditreform: 2011 Data analyze, Neuss / Germany 
 
Cunat, V: Trade credit: Suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers. 
Review of Financial Studies, vol. 21, 2007, p. 491–527 
 
Damadoran, Aswarth:  Applied corporate finance, 2006, New York, ISBN 0-471-
66093-0 
     
Danielson, Morris G. and Scott, Jonathan A.: Bank Loan Availability and Trade 
Credit Demand, Wiley, USA, Financial Review, Volume 39, Issue 4, pages 579–
600, November 2004 
 
De Blasio, Guido: Does Trade Credit Substitute Bank Credit? Evidence from 
Firm-level Data, IMF Working Papers 03/166, International Monetary Fund, 2003 
 
Delannay, A.F. and Weill, L. (2004), “The determinants of trade credit in 
transaction countries”, Economics of Planning, 37, 173-193 
 
Deloof, M and Jegers, M:  Trade credit, corporate groups, and the financing of 
Belgian firms. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, vol. 26, 1999, p. 945–
967 
 
Deloof, M and Overfelt, W. V: Trade credit and bank relationships: Evidence from 
Pre-World War I Belgium. Applied Economics, 2010, p. 1466–4283 
  
156 
 
 
Dennis, Michael:  Credit and Collection Handbook, Paramus, 2000, NJ, USA, 
ISBN 0-13-082783-5 
 
Deutsche Bundesbank: Monthly report,  3 2007, Frankfurt     
 
Dewar, James A.: Assumption based planning – a tool for reducing avoidable 
surprises, 2002, Great Britain, ISBN 0-521-80653-4 
 
Dewing, Arthur Stones: The financial policy of Corporations, 1953, USA  
 
Driscoll, Mary:  Working capital management: No Backsliding Expected, in: 
gtnews, http://www.gtnews.com/article/8320.cfm, view 2011-04-20 
 
Drukarczyk, Jochen and Schüler, Andreas: Unternehmensbewertung, 6thedition, 
2009, München, ISBN 978-3800636365 
 
Eaton, J., Kortum, S., Neiman, B., and Romalis, J.: Trade and the global recession, 
University of Chicago, 2010 
 
ECB: European Central Bank statistics data internet Return on equity:    
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/search.do?type=free&q=return+on+equity; Return on 
assets: http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/search.do?type=free&q=Return+on+assets and 
http://www.ecb.int/paym /t2/html/index.en.html,   view 2011-04-15 
 
Eck, Katharina, Engemann, Martina and Schnitzer, Monika: How Trade Credits 
Foster International Trade, CEPR Discussion Paper no. 8954, 2012 
 
Eckbo, Bjoern Espen: Handbook of corporate finance: empirical corporate finance; 
2008, Great Britain, ISBN 978-0-444-50898-0  
 
Eilenberger, Guido: Betriebswirtschaftliche Finanzwirtschaft, 2003, München,  
ISBN 3-486-25535-5 
  
157 
 
 
Elliehausen, G and Wolken, J:  An empirical investigation into motives for 
demand for trade credit, Federal Reserve Board Staff Study, No. 165, 1992 
 
Elton, Edwin, G., Gruber, Martin J., Brown, Stephen J. and Goetzmann, Wilhelm 
N.: Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis, 13th. Edition, 2007, USA, 
ISBN 978-0470-05082-8   
 
Ernst & Young: Risk appetite - The strategic balancing act, Great Britain, 2010, 
EYG no. DZ0050 
 
EU:  European Community Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 29 June 2000 on combating late payment in commercial 
transactions in Official Journal of the European Communities, L200/35 from 
8.8.2000 Luxembourg  
 
Euler Hermes: annual report 2011 
 
Eurostate:  Eurostate is the statistical office of the European Union situated in 
Luxembourg 
 
Evennett, S.J.: What can be learnt from crisis-era protectionism? An initial 
assessment; The Berkeley Electronic Press Journals: Business and Politics, 2009, 
Article 4 
 
FAZ: Mittelständler treten immer mehr Forderungen ab, in: Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 16.3.2011 
 
Fayol, Henri: General and industrial management, 1949, London, 1949, Pitman 
edition 
 
Firth, Michael A.: Management of working capital, 1976, Great Britain, ISBN 
0333187091  
  
158 
 
 
Fisman, R and Love, I: Trade credit, financial intermediary development, and 
industry growth. Journal of Finance, vol.58, 2003, p. 353–374 
 
Fitzgerald, Ray, Business Finance for Managers, 2002, London,  
ISBN 0 7494 3890 9  
 
Fraser, Lyn M. and Ormiston, Aileen: Understanding financial statements, 13th 
edition, 2010, USA, ISBN 987-0-13-815327-4 
Freund, C.: The trade response to global downturns, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper, 2009, No. 5015 
Gallinger, George W. and Basil, Healey P.: Liquidity analysis and Management 
2nd edition, 1991, USA, ISBN 0.201-53533-5   
 
Ganguin, Blaise and Billardello, John: Fundamentals of corporate credit analysis, 
2005, USA, ISBN 0-07-144163-8  
 
Gentry, James A.: State of the Art of Short-Run Financial Management, in: 
Financial Management, 1988, USA, vol. 17, number 2, p.41-57  
 
Gräfer Horst: Annual Report - Der US amerikanische Jahresabschluss, 1992, 
Stuttgart   
 
Grant, James I.: Foundations of economic value added, 2003, USA, ISBN 0-471-
23483-4  
 
Gill, Amarjit: Factors that Influence Working Capital Requirements in Canada. 
Economics and Finance Review, Vol. 1, number 3, 2008 
 
Guariglia, Alessandra and Mateut, Simona: Credit channel, trade credit channel, 
and inventory investment: Evidence from a panel of UK firms, Journal of Banking 
& Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30, number. 10, 2006, p. 2835-2856 
  
159 
 
 
Günther, Thomas: Unternehmenswertorientiertes Controlling, 2ndedition, 
München, 2003 
 
Gutenberg, Erich: Grundlagen der Betriebswirtschaft, 1972, Wiesbaden, ISBN 3-
409-88011-9  
 
Hennah, David (a): Managing the Cash Conversion Cycle: Where can SWIFT Add 
Value? In The Standard Chartered Guide to Working capital management 2009 / 
2010, Great Britain, p.84-89  
 
Hennah, David (b): The Bank Payment Obligation – bringing a new financial 
instrument to market, in: ICC books – DC Insight, Q3 2010 issue, Paris  
 
Herring, Richard, Diebold, Francis X., Doherty, Neil A.: The Known, the 
Unknown, and the Unknowable in Financial Risk Management: Measurement and 
Theory Advancing Practice, 2010, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 
ISBN 978-0-691-12883-2 
 
Higgins, Robert: Analysis for Financial Management, 8th edition, 2007, Singapore 
ISBN 007-125706  
 
Holub, Hans W. and Bolle, Michael D.: Kurz- und langfristige Analyse ungleich-
gewichtiger makroökonomischer Angebot-Nachfrage-Systeme, in: Jahrbücher für 
Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 1975, BAND: 189, p. 322 Fischer-Verlag 1975, 
Germany 
 
Homburg, Christian and Krohmer, Harley: Marketingmanagement, Gabler, 2nd 
edition, 2006, Germany, ISBN 3-8349-0289-6 
 
Howorth, C and Reber, B: Habitual late payment of trade credit: an empirical 
examination of UK small firms, in Managerial and Decision Economics, vol. 24, 
2003, p. 471–482 
  
160 
 
 
Hughes, Tony and Steward, Robert J.:  Forecasting and Stress testing using model 
pool level data, in: Moody’s Economy, Regional Financial Review, August 2008, 
USA, p. 25ff 
 
IATA- International Air Transportation Association is an international trade body, 
created over 60 years ago by a group of airlines. Today, IATA represents some 
240 airlines comprising 84% of total air traffic 
 
ICC: International Chamber of Commerce ICC Global Survey on Trade and 
Finance 2010, ICC Publication No.715, Paris, ISBN 978-3-929621-71-6 
 
ICC: International Chamber of Commerce   ICC Global Survey on Trade and 
Finance 2011, ICC Publication No.710, Paris, ISBN 978-92-842-0100-6 
 
ICC: International Chamber of Commerce   ICC Global Survey on Trade and 
Finance 2012, ICC Publication No.859, Paris, ISBN 978-92-842-0157-0 
 
IMF-BAFT Trade Finance Survey: Survey among banks assessing current trade 
finance environment, 2009 
 
IMF: Trade Finance in Financial Crisis – Assessment of Key Issues, Seminar 
Document, IMF Conference on Trade Finance on 15th May, Washington, DC, 
2003 
 
Ingersoll, Jonathan E.: Theory on financial decision making, 1987, USA, ISBN 0-
8476-7359-6 
 
Irwin, David: Financial Control, 1991, Great Britain, ISBN 0 273 03391 3 
 
ISO 31000: International Organisation for Standardisation Risk management -- 
Principles and guidelines, 2009, Geneva  
 
  
161 
 
Jährig, Alfred and Schuck, Hans  Handbuch des Kreditgeschäftes, 4th edition, 
1982, Wiesbaden, ISBN 3-409-40039-7 
 
Jaffee, Dwight and Russell, Thomas: Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and 
Credit Rationing. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 90, 1976, p. 651–66 
 
Jappelli, T. and Pagano, M.: Role and Effects of Credit Information Sharing. in 
Bertola, G,  Disney, R and Grant, C (eds.), The Economics of Consumer Credit: 
European Experience and Lessons from the U.S. (Cambridge: MIT Press), 2005, p. 
347–72 
 
Johnson, S, McMillan, J and Woodruff, C. M.: Courts and Relational Contracts.  
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 18(1), 2002, p.  221–77 
 
Joy, O. Maurice: Introduction to Financial Management, 1977, USA, ISBN 0-256-
01880-4  
 
Kallberg, J. G. and Udell, G. F: The value of private sector business credit 
information sharing: The US case. Journal of Banking and Finance, vol.  27(3), 
2003, p.  449–69 
 
Kee, H.L., Neagu, C., and Nicita, A.: Is protectionism on the rise? Assessing 
national trade policies during the crisis of 2008.” World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper, 2010, No. 5274 
 
Keown, Arthur J.: Foundations of Finance: The Logic and Practice of Financial 
Management, 2007, USA, ISBN 7302089965 
Keown, Arthur, Martin, John and Petty, William J.: Foundations of Finance, 
Upper Saddle River, 2006, USA, ISBN 0-13-201929-9 
 
Keynes, John M.: The general theory of employment, interest and money, 1936, 
London  
 
  
162 
 
Klapper, Leora F., Laeven, Luc A. and Rajan, Raghuram G.: Trade Credit 
Contracts (June 1, 2010). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, 
2010.Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1619170, view 2010-08-13 
 
Klapper, Leora and Randall, Douglas: The impact of the financial crisis on supply-
chain financing, International Finance Corporation, USA, Enterprise note No. 13, 
2010 
 
Koller, Tim, Goedhart, Marc and Wessels, David for McKinsey & Company: 
Valuation Measuring and Managing the value of companies, 4th edition, 2005, 
USA, ISBN 10 0-471-70221-8   
 
Kohler, M., Britton, E. and Yates, T: Trade credit and the monetary transmission-
mechanism, Bank of England Discussion Paper, 115, 2000 
 
KPMG: Understanding and Articulating Risk Appetite, 2008, 
http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/
Risk-appetite-O-200806.pdf, view 2011-04-05 
 
Korinek, J., Le Cocguic, J., and Sourdin, P.: The availability and cost of short-term 
trade finance and its impact on trade, Unpublished Manuscript, 2009 
 
Kulyushin, Evgeny: Analyse von Konernabschlüssen; in Das Creditmanagement 
als der Informationsaggregator “Kenne Deine Kunden“, 2007, Goch, p. 57 -70, 
ISBN 978-933969-93-4  
 
Lamy, Pascale: Consolidating the recovery of trade and trade finance, in: 
Rethinking Trade & Finance: Global Survey 2011, p. 9, ICC Services, 2011, Paris, 
ISBN 978-92-842-0100-6  
 
Lamy, Pascale (2012): A continuing tradition of providing leading information on 
trade and finance, in: Rethinking Trade & Finance: Global Survey 2012, ICC 
Services, 2011, Paris, ISBN 978-92-842-0157-0 
  
163 
 
 
Lee, Cheng F. and Lee, Allice C.: Encyclopedia of Finance, 2006, USA, ISBN 
978-0387-26284-0 
 
Leffson, Ulrich: Bilanzanalyse, 3rd edition, 1984, Stuttgart, Poeschel, ISBN 3-
7910-0366-6  
 
Lehmann, Matthias: Der Begriff der Rechtsfähigkeit, in: Archiv für die 
civilistische Praxis (AcP). 207th vol. , 2007, Germany, 1. Teilband, p. 225-255 
 
Levchenko, A.A., Lewis, L., and Tesar, L.L.: The collapse of international trade 
during the 2008-2009 crisis: in search of the smoking gun. IMF Economic Review, 
2010, 58, 214-253 
 
Liu, Young: The evaluation of classification models for credit scoring: in 
Arbeitsbericht 2/ 2002, Institut für Wirtschaftsinformatik der Universität 
Göttingen, Germany  
 
Lough, William Henry: Business Finance, 1917, Great Britain   
 
Love, I, Preve, L and Sarria-Allende, V: Trade credit and bank credit: Evidence 
from recent national crises. Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 83, 2007, p. 453-
469 
 
Malik, Fredmund: Managementperspektiven: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 
Strategie, Management und Ausbildung, Bern, 1994, Stuttgart and Wien   
 
Malik, Fredmund: Strategy des Managements komplexer Systeme, 5th edition, 
1996, Bern and Stuttgart 
 
Malouche, Mariem: Trade and Trade Finance Developments in 14 Developing 
Countries Post September 2008: A World Bank Survey, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, no. 5138, 2009 
  
164 
 
 
Marotta, G: When do trade credit discounts matter? Evidence from Italian firm-
level data. Applied Economics, vol.  37, 2005, p.  403–416 
McLaney, Eddie and Altrill, Peter: Accounting – An Introduction, 4th edition, 
2007, Great Britian, ISBN 978-0-273-71136-0 
McMillan, J. and Woodruff, C. M.: Inter firm Relationships and Informal Credit in 
Vietnam. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 114(4), 1999, p.  1285–320 
Menz, K. M., Börsenzeitung, 23 April 2010, Duesseldorf 
Meltzer, A.H: Mercantile credit, monetary policy, and size of firms, in: Review of 
Economics and Statistics, No. 42, 1960, p. 429-37 
 
Meyer, Christian: Working capital und Unternehmenswert, 2007, Wiesbaden, 
ISBN 978-3-8350-0865-5 
 
Michalski, Gregor: Determination of Accounts Receivables Level: Portfolio 
Approach in Firm’s Trade Credit Policy, in: Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, No. 5, 
2008, Czech, p. 47 – 56  
 
Mintzberg, Henry:  The Nature of Managerial Work, 1973, Great Britain, Harper 
Row  
 
Moody’s Corporation, USA annual report 2011 
 
Müller-Stewens, Günter: Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon, 
www.wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de; view 2012-02-25 
 
Nazir, M.S. and Afza, T.: On the factors determining working capital 
requirements, Proceedings of ASBBS, vol. 15, number. 1, 2008, p.  293-301 
 
Neumayer, Martina: Bilanzdaten im Kreditmanagement – Beschaffung, Einsatz, 
  
165 
 
Alternativen in: Das Creditmanagement als der Informationsaggregator “Kenne 
Deine Kunden“, 2007, Goch, Germany, p.127-148, ISBN 978-933969-93-4  
 
Neveu, Reymond: Financial Management, volume 1, USA, 1985, ISBN 
9780538061100 
 
Ng, CK, Smith, JK and Smith, R. L: Evidence on the determinants of credit terms 
used in inter-firm trade. Journal of Finance, vol. 54(3), 2005, p. 1109–1129 
 
Niethen, Susanne: Korrelationskonzepte zur Quantifizierung von 
Kreditausfallrisiken, 2001, Bad Soden, ISBN 3-933207-28-2, p. 86 
 
Nilsen, Jeffrey H: Trade Credit and the Bank Lending Channel. Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, vol. 34, 2002, p. 226–253 
 
Oliver Wyman: Serving the new Corporate Treasurer, Authors:  Elizabeth St-Onge 
Axel Miller Michael Wagner, Company analysis, 2011, USA  
 
Oxford English Dictionary 
 
Padmalatha, Suresh und Paul, Justin: Management of banking and financial 
services, 2nd edition, 2010, India, ISBN 978-91-317-3094-2 
 
Paton, William Andrew:  Accounting Theory: With Especial Reference to the 
Corporate Enterprise, New York, Roland Press Company, 1922 
 
Papaioannou, George: Economic and Market Factors versus Credit Rating 
Announcements, on Credit Default Swap Spreads, International Joumal of 
Economics and Finance, Vol. 3, No. 5; October 2011 
 
Pellens, Bernhard et al. : Internationale Rechnungslegung, 2004, Stuttgart, 
Germany 
  
166 
 
Petersen, M. A and Rajan, R. G: Trade credit: theories and evidence. Review of 
Financial Studies, vol. 10, 1997, p. 661–692 
Pike, R, Cheng, NS, Carvens, K and Lamminmaki D: Trade credit terms: 
asymmetric information and price discrimination evidence from three continents. 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, vol. 32(5 & 6), 2005, p.  1197–1236 
 
Quinn, Diana: Corporates look to their suppliers for finance, in: Sibos Issues 27-
10-2010, Amsterdam, p.7 
 
Quiri, Pascal and Vernimmen, Pierre: Corporate Finance: Theory and 
practice/Vernimmen, 3rd edition, 2011, Great Britain, ISBN 978-1-119-97558-8 
 
Raddatz, Claudio: When the rivers run dry: Liquidity and the use of wholesale 
funds in the transmission of the US subprime crisis, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 5203, 2010 
 
Rajan, R and Zingales, L: What do we know about capital structure?  Some 
evidence from international data. Journal of Finance, vol. 50, 1995, p. 1421–1460 
 
REL Consultancy Group: Improving Shareholder value through Total Working 
capital management, White Paper, 2003, London  
 
Richman, Jon: Putting an end to the zero-sum game in: Financial I Supply Chain 
& Trade Finance Handbook 2010, Great Britain, p.30-34  
 
Richman, Jon and Mutter, Alexander:  Financial supply chain management: the 
time is now, in: Trade Finance magazine, 2010, Great Britain, p. 34-35  
 
Rivett, Phil and Speak, Peter: The financial jungle – a guide to finance 
instruments, 3rd edition, 1991, Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte, Great Britain  
 
  
167 
 
Rösler, Peter, Mackenthun, Thomas and Pohl, Rudolf: Handbuch Kreditgeschäft, 
6th edition, 2002, Wiesbaden, ISBN 3-409-40041-9 
 
Ross, Stephan A. et al.: Corporate Finance, 7th edition, 2005, New York 
 
Schall, Lawrence D. and Haley, Charley. W.: Introduction to financial manage-
ment, 1991, New York  
 
Schmidt, Christian, Schuppli, Peter and Laster, David : Die Risikosteuerung der 
Kreditversicherer (Teil 2), in CM Praxis, p. 8,  4/2007, Kleve-Germany  
 
Schneider, Christian:  Controlling Working capital  bei Logistikdienstleistern in: 
Controlling Magazin, 2002, No. 6, Germany, p 540 -546 
 
Schulte, Michael: Bank-Controlling II: Risikopolitik in Kreditinstituten, 3rd 
edition, 1998, Frankfurt, ISBN 3-933165-12-1 
 
Schumann, Matthias: Was sagt der Jahresabschluss über die Unternehmens-
bonität? Möglichkeiten für das automatisierte Auswerten von deutschen und 
internationalen Abschlüssen, presantation at the VfCM-annual meeting, Göttingen, 
20.10.2004 
 
Senechal, Thierry:  ICC Banking Commission: Three years of leadership bridging 
the information gap in Rethinking Trade & Finance: Global Survey 2011, p. 10-
18, ICC Services, Paris, ISBN 978-92-842-0100-6  
 
Shim, Jae K. et. al.: Budgeting Basis and Beyond, 4th edition, 2012, USA, ISBN 
978-1-118-09627-7 
 
Silvermann Michael: Compliance Management for Public, Private, or Non-Profit 
Organizations, 2008, USA, ISBN 978-0-07-149640-7 
 
  
168 
 
Smith, Adam: An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, 1870, 
Edinburgh  
 
Smithson, Charles W: Managing financial risk, a guide to financial products, 3rd 
edition, 1998, USA, ISBN 0-07-059354-X 
 
Staele, Wolfgang H.: Management: Eine verhaltenswissenschaftliche Perspektive. 
8th edition, 1999, München 
 
Standard and Poors, a sector of McGraw-Hill Corporation: annual report 2011, 
USA 
 
Steinmann, Horst et. al.: Management, Grundlagen der Unternehmensführung, 
Konzepte-Funktionalen-Fallstudien, 1997, Wiesbaden   
 
Stone, Bernell K.: The payment pattern approach to the forecasting and control of 
accounts receivables, Financial Management, Autum 1976, USA, p. 65-82 
 
Subramanyam, K.R.: Financial statement analysis, 10th edition, 2010, New York, 
ISBN 978-0-07-337943-2 
 
Taleb, G.A., Zoued, A.N. and Shubiri, F.N.: The Determinants of Effective 
Working Capital Management Policy: A Case Study on Jordan. Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, vol. 2, number. 4, 2010, p. 248-
264 
 
Terry, Georg R.: Principles of Management, 1977, Homewood, Illinois and 
Georgetown 
 
Tirole, Jean: The theory of corporate finance, 2006, USA, ISBN 978-0-691-12556-
2 
 
  
169 
 
Thiel, Dirk: Von der Transaktionsgestaltung zur ganzheitlichen Unterstützung ,  
Controlling, number  2, February 1997, p. 99., München  
 
Thomson Financials: € 176 bn Punishment for the largest European companies for 
giving poor customer service, survey of 230 credit managers, June -September 
2007, in: CFO Europe 11/2007, London     
 
Truck, Stefan, Laub, Matthias and Rachev, Svetlozar T.: The Term Structure of 
Credit Spreads and Credit Default Swaps - an empirical investigation, 2004 
http://www.pstat.ucsb.edu/research/papers/spreads200904.pdf view 2012-12-07 
 
Tsuruta, D.: Bank information monopoly and trade credit: do only banks have 
information about small businesses? In: Applied Economics, vol. 40, 2008, p. 
981–996 
 
Uesugia, Iichiro and Yamashirob, Guy M.: The Relationship between Trade Credit 
and Loans: Evidence from Small Businesses in Japan, International Journal of 
Business, 13(2), 2008, ISSN: 1083−4346 
 
Ulrich, Hans: Von der Betriebswirtschaftslehre zur systemorientierten Manage-
mentlehre in Wunder, Rolf : Betriebswirtschaftslehre als Management- und 
Führungslehre, 1994, Stuttgart, p.161 -178 
 
VCI/Broens, Herbert; Arbeitskreis Kreditmanagement: Organisation des Kredit-
managements, in: No. 26, Schriftenreihe des betriebswirtschaftlichen Ausschusses 
und des Finanzausschusses des Verbandes der Chemischen Industrie (VCI), 2000, 
Frankfurt, Germany   
 
vanGreuning, Henning und Bratanovic, Sonja: Analyzing Banking Risk: A 
Framework for Assessing Corporate Governance and Risk Management, 3rd 
edition, 2009, USA, ISBN 978-0-8213-7726-4 
 
  
170 
 
van Horne, James C. and Wachowicz, John: Fundamentals of Financial 
Management, 13th edition, 2008, Great Britain, ISBN 978-0-273-71363-0 
 
Vernimmen, Pierre: Finance d’enterprise, 1976, Paris, ISBN 224 7024 793  
 
Vishwanath, S.R. Corporate Finance: theory and practice, 2nd ed. 2000, New 
Dehli, ISBN 978-0-7619-3497-4   
 
von Reventlow, Iven Graf : Neue Wege der Bonitätsprüfung : das Kreditgespräch 
als Instrument zur Beurteilung der Unternehmerpersönlichkeit /  Ludwigsburg 
[u.a.]: Verl. Wiss. & Praxis, 1992, Schriftenreihe Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialwissenschaften ; 9, ISBN  3-928238-22-1 
 
Vormbaum, Herbert: Finanzierung der Betriebe. 9th edition, 1995, Wiesbaden, 
ISBN 10-3409372172 
 
Vural, Gamze, Sokmen, Ahmed Gokhan and Cetenak, Emin Huseyin: Afects of 
working Capital Management on Firm’s performance: Evidence from Turkey. 
International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, vol. 2, number. 4, 2012, 
p. 488-495 
 
Wade, Marcus: Länderrisikoanalyse im Rahmen moderner Kreditrisikomodelle bei 
Banken: Eine Untersuchung mit besonderem Schwerpunkt auf 
Marktpreisinformationen von Emerging Markets, 2003, Frankfurt, ISBN-10: 
363150344X 
 
Watson, Denzil and Head, Antony: Corporate Finance: principles and practice, 5th 
edition, 2010, Essex - Great Britain, ISBN 978-0-273-72525-1 
 
Weaver, Samuel and Weston, Fred: Strategic financial management, applications 
of corporate finance, 2008, USA, ISBN 13-978-0-324-31876-0 
 
  
171 
 
Weiss, Bernd Prof.: Jahresabschlussanalyse: Einbindung der „financials“ in die 
Bonitätsanalyse und das-monitoring im Firmenkundengeschäft, in: Verein für 
Creditmanagement: Das Creditmanagement als der Informationsaggregator 
“Kenne Deine Kunden“ 2008, Goch-Germany, ISBN 987-3-933969-93-4, p.1-17   
 
Weiss, Bernd und Wikarek, Martin: Information über Rechnungslegung, in CM 
Praxis, 4/2007, p.18 ff, Kleve-Germany   
 
Wells, Ron: Global Credit management, 2003, Great Britain, ISBN 0-0470-85111-
2 
 
Weston, John F. and Copeland, Thomas E:  Financial theory and corporate policy, 
vol. 2, 1988, USA, ISBN 9780201106480 
 
Wimley, Carl J.: Savvy CFOs analyse trade receivables to reduce debts and 
enhance cash flows, in: financial I, Q1 2011, ISSN No: 1750-4015, London, p.12 
 
Wilner, B: The exploitation of relationships in financial distress: The case of trade 
credit. Journal of Finance, vol. 55, 2000, p. 153–178 
 
Witeley, John: Mastering Financial Management, 2003, Great Britain, ISBN: 
9781403913364 
 
Wöhe, Günter: Bilanzierung und Bilanzpolitik, 5th edition, 1989, München,  ISBN 
3800607840   
 
Woolley, Simon: Source of Value: A Practical Guide to the Art and Science of 
Validation, 2009, Cambridge University Press  
 
WTO Ministerial Conference: The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, Cancún, 
Mexico, 2003 
 
Zahn, Hans E.: Finanzinovationen, 1986, Frankfurt, ISBN 3-7819-2024-0  
  
172 
 
 
Zamil, Raihan S: Judgement Day, in: F&D Finance & Development, September 
2010, Vol. 47, No. 3 International Monetary Fund, USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
173 
 
Appendix:  
 
Schematic of the system and method for integrated matching,  
    credit analysis and financing of trade receivables   
 
 
  
174 
 
 
 
 
  
175 
 
 
 
  
176 
 
 
 
 
  
177 
 
 
 
 
  
178 
 
 
 
  
179 
 
 
 
  
180 
 
 
 
  
181 
 
 
 
  
182 
 
 
 
  
183 
 
 
 
  
184 
 
 
 
  
185 
 
 
 
 
  
186 
 
 
 
 
